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 Security and first-person shooter video games have one obvious thing in common: if 
you’re not continuously moving, you’re dead. In this second edition of  Managing Risk 
and Information Security , Malcolm Harkins helps us move our thinking into areas of risk 
that have become more prominent over the last several years. 
 Because there is so much new content in this edition, I will focus on a topic that has 
risen to greater prominence since the first edition: people are the perimeter. When we 
reflect on what has changed in recent years, with an eye to the vulnerabilities that result 
in real-world compromises, a pattern emerges: virtually all the major breaches that we 
have seen involve manipulation of people. When nearly everyone has heard of phishing, 
we have to ask ourselves: why is it still such an effective tool? 
 The obvious theory is that we haven’t managed people risk as well as we should. 
Perhaps we have been standing still and need to learn how to dodge and experiment 
with the way we drive better people-security outcomes. Unfortunately, the path is not 
100% clear. Unlike technology, the field of influencing human behavior in security is 
remarkably complicated and supported by limited research. 
 Malcolm provides us with a great foundation and framework to build our 
“security engagement” functions. I like to use the word “engagement” because it 
speaks to how the security organization relates to the workforce in a manner that isn’t 
simply bounded by the more traditional term “training and awareness.” Engagement 
encompasses anything that shifts the desired behavior outcome in the direction we want 
it to go. I have seen remarkable shifts in measured behavior from the use of 
non-traditional tools such as security gamification and simulation. 
 The way Malcolm differentiates between “compliance” and “commitment” is key. 
 Managing Risk and Information Security is an ever-evolving classic in the field of security 
management.
 —Patrick Heim 
 Head of Trust & Security, Dropbox 
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 Praise for the second edition 
of Managing Risk and 
Information Security 
 We assign Malcolm’s book to our Carnegie Mellon CISO-Executive 
Program students on their first day of class. It is relevant, pragmatic, and 
solution oriented. Our adversaries are changing their practices and so 
must we. Malcolm’s book is a terrific tool for the modern-day info sec 
leader who wants to shift from security as a restriction to security as a 
business enabler. 
 —Andy Wasser 
 Associate Dean, CMU Heinz College 
 Malcolm is a top-notch executive, security leader, and innovator, with 
a keen ability to convey thought-provoking and valuable insights. His 
latest effort demonstrates remarkable foresight into the skills necessary 
to excel as a security leader today and tomorrow. 
 —Clayton J. Pummill 
 Executive Director, Security Advisor Alliance 
 I could go on and on about what I liked specifically—there was 
much, including the discussion about governance models and social 
responsibility—but here is the net: this is the first time I’ve seen 
someone be able to speak to security specifics while also raising the 
conversation to a much higher level. It begins to take on an Alvin Toffler 
feel from his astounding book, The Third Wave . Malcolm’s thoughts are 
philosophically sweeping while at the same time imminently practical. 
 —Todd Ruback, Esq., CIPP-US/E, CIPT 
 Chief Privacy & Security Officer & V.P. Legal Affairs, Ghostery 
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 Malcolm Harkins is a foremost expert at managing risk and information 
security. In this latest book, he further expands his Protect to Enable 
philosophy and does so in a way that offers practical and actionable 
initiatives that any risk manager or CISO can implement to protect their 
enterprise while enabling business growth. A must-read for CISOs and 
their teams! 
 —Tim Rahschulte, Ph.D. 
 Chief Learning Officer & Content Officer, Evanta 
 Malcolm Harkins is a visionary thought leader on cyber security and risk 
management. Managing Risk and Information Security  is a must read. 
Malcolm helps readers immediately take the information and apply it to 
their own organizations. You will find that this book cuts through the fog 
and provides a clear picture of where and what to focus on to effectively 
manage cyber business risk. 
 —Phil Ferraro 
 Global CISO and Cyber Security Consultant 
 The CISO is more than just a technology expert; she must be savvy 
about leadership, influence, and change across complex organizations; 
someone who sees her mission not to just drive implementation of a 
large system, but to foster sustainable culture change at every level. As 
an organizational psychologist, I recognize Harkins’ keen eye for group 
dynamics and leadership tactics that enable CISOs to enhance enterprise 
security. He puts his finger on the habits, assumptions, and decision 
processes typical of many employees and teams, as they unknowingly 
increase security risk, and for that alone this book is a gem. It should be 
required reading for aspiring CISOs and for anyone who has a role in the 
recruitment and hiring of CISOs. 
 —Marc Sokol, PhD 
 Executive Editor, People + Strategy 
 Malcolm Harkins’ take on information security and risk is a refreshing 
change from the increasingly frequent alarm bells raised in the press 
with regard to the “brave new world” where technology is presented as 
an ever-escalating conflict between our seemingly insatiable appetite for 
connectivity, cool applications, and customized information, on the one 
hand, and a desire to control who has our information and how they may 
use it, on the other. Harkins instead offers a cool, clear-eyed perspective 
where managing information and risk are placed in a wider context. His 
prescriptions and frameworks are recipes for well-managed organizations 
in the broadest sense. They allow us to embrace our new-found 
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technological abilities without fear because we have defined their purpose 
capaciously enough to be a positive good, to be of service to all a company’s 
stakeholders. That is, once we set a truly human course, technology serves 
rather than threatens us. Organization purpose, when defined in this way, 
is an expression of our values and is empowered by that fuel. Harkins’ book 
is a practical as well as purposeful guide to a values-driven implementation 
of information technology. 
 —Mary C. Gentile, PhD 
 Author of  Giving Voice To Values: How To Speak Your Mind 
When You Know What’s Right (Yale University Press) 
 In today’s rapidly evolving security landscape, security professionals are 
navigating a complex set of dynamics across the enterprise. In Managing 
Risk and Information Security , Malcolm Harkins draws on his rich 
security experience to present a connected view of where companies 
should be focused. He puts forth a valuable perspective, as organizations 
around the world look to create a necessary balance of protection and 
innovation, which ultimately enables business success. 
 —Bret Arsenault 
 Corporate Vice President and CISO, Microsoft Corporation 
 Malcolm generously shares through personal experiences and story 
telling the formula for a successful 21st century CISO. It is one part 
multi-disciplinary leader and one part trusted advisor to the business, 
combined with behavioral models required for balanced risk decision 
making. A must-read for all new CISOs. Malcolm lives his beliefs. 
 —Nasrin Rezai 
 GE Corporate Security & Compliance Officer 
 In the second edition of his book, Malcolm seamlessly articulates the 
future horizon of cyber security and the critical role that the CISO and 
security professionals will need to fulfill in order to defend both the 
company and consumers they serve. The guidance he provides into the 
skills, leadership, and approach required for successfully navigating 
the emerging challenges of securing a digital economy is invaluable. 
Regardless of your current role, this is a must-read for everyone who has 
accepted this great responsibility and privilege. 
 —Steven Young 
 CISO, Kellogg Company 
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 While other security officers are looking to the traditional or the latest 
“cool” product, Harkins goes against the tide and asks the questions that 
need addressing. His forward-thinking mindset and Protect to Enable 
approach inspire others to innovate and go beyond the mainstream. 
If you cannot bring Harkins to your company for mentoring, this book 
will at least spark thought and will change how your engineers view 
security within the business. 
 —Charles Lebo 
 Vice President and CISO, Kindred Healthcare 
 Malcolm’s vast experience makes him one of the most credible security 
leaders on the international stage and serves as the perfect platform for 
this book. Rational, compelling, and authoritative writing is far too rare 
in the world of risk and information security, but Malcolm completely 
nails it in Managing Risk and Information Security  with invaluable 
advice and recommendations for anyone planning a future in the 
security world. His extensive experience in business before becoming 
a CISO is one of the missing ingredients in many security executives’ 
professional toolbox, which is which is why this is such an important 
book. Make sure to keep a highlighter and notepad handy because there 
are a lot of nuggets in here you’ll want to remember on your journey to 
becoming a better security professional. 
 —Mark Weatherford 
 Chief Cybersecurity Strategist at vArmour and 
former Deputy Under Secretary for Cybersecurity 
at the US Department of Homeland Security 
 I’ve had the privilege of working with many talented CISOs over the 
years and Malcolm is one of the best. His logical, methodical approach 
to solving the most complex cybersecurity problems is reflected in his 
lucid style. An enlightened approach to understanding risk that unites 
all stakeholders and a systemic intelligence-based approach to security 
infrastructure are the only ways to reduce the threat to manageable 
levels. This is our best path forward if we are ever to realize the vast 
potential of the innovative digital world we are creating. In Managing 
Risk and Information Security , Malcolm shines a light on that path in a 
comprehensive yet very readable way. 
 —Art Coviello 
 Former CEO and Executive Chairman, RSA 
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 I received valuable feedback from many readers of the first edition of this book. That 
feedback helped me to expand the book with additional insights, clarifications, and 
updated examples. It also encouraged me to add two more chapters to the second 
edition: one on corporate social responsibility, and the other on performance coaching. 
 Special thanks to Mike Faden: without his help this book would not have happened. 
 As I noted in the first edition, many people during my journey at Intel helped me 
learn and grow. A number of them published material that is still referenced in this 
second edition. 
 Other experts who have helped me come from a variety of different peer groups. 
They include members of the Bay Area CSO Council, the Executive Security Action 
Forum, the members and staff of CEB and its Information Risk Leadership Council, 
participants in the Evanta CISO Executive Summits and the CISO coalition, as well as the 
Security Advisor Alliance. 




 If you don’t believe in the messenger, you won’t believe the message. 
 You can’t believe in the messenger if you don’t know what the messenger 
believes. 
 You can’t be the messenger until you’re clear about what you believe. 
 —James Kouzes and Barry Posner, 
 in  The Leadership Challenge 
 A great deal has transpired since the first edition of this book was published in January 
2013, both in the world of information risk and in my personal life and career. To briefly 
cover the latter, in January 2013, I was named Intel’s Chief Security and Privacy Officer. 
My broad role was one of the first of its kind in corporate America: I was charged with 
managing and mitigating risk for Intel’s products and services worldwide, in addition to 
Intel’s internal IT environment. In June 2015, I left Intel to become CISO at Cylance Inc., 
and in May 2016, I was named Cylance’s Chief Security and Trust Officer. 
 These career changes occurred during an extraordinary period of escalating 
information risk, as evidenced by an almost continuous stream of major hacks and 
breaches, and a corresponding rise in society’s awareness of risk. Some key examples:
•  May 2013: Edward Snowden flies to Hong Kong after leaving 
his job at an NSA facility in Hawaii. The following month, he 
reveals thousands of classified NSA documents. The disclosures, 
including previously unknown government surveillance 
programs, continue to cause worldwide repercussions today. 
•  December 2013: The blog Krebs On Security reports a massive 
data breach at Target. The company confirms the breach the next 
day. Within months, Target’s CIO and CEO both resign amid the 
fallout. 
•  May 2014: A U.S. grand jury indicts five Chinese military officers 
on charges of hacking American companies and stealing trade 
secrets. 
•  November 2014: Employees at Sony Pictures arrive at work to 
discover their network has been hacked. Attackers steal and then 
erase data on thousands of systems, forcing studio employees to 
revert to using fax machines and pen and paper. The attackers 




•  March 2015: Google’s Project Zero hacking team demonstrates 
the ability to exploit a fundamental flaw in DDR3 SDRAM to 
perform privilege escalation attacks on systems containing the 
chips. Some mitigation approaches are available, other than 
replacing the DDR3 memory in millions of systems worldwide. 
•  June 2015: The US Office of Personnel Management announces 
a data breach targeting the personal data of up to 4 million 
people. The attack, which includes security clearance-related 
information, is one of the largest-ever breaches of government 
data. By July, the estimated number of stolen records increases to 
21.5 million. 
•  February 2016: The Hollywood Presbyterian Medical Center in 
Los Angeles says it has paid a bitcoin ransom to attackers who 
held its systems hostage, encrypting data and blocking access by 
hospital staff. Some believe the healthcare industry is the next 
major target for cyber criminals. 
 Given this escalating cycle of risk, and the potential catastrophic societal 
implications of today’s attacks, we must all be ready to be held accountable. This may 
require a large mental shift for those used to simply assigning responsibility and blame 
for a breach to the people who traditionally perform post-attack cleanup: corporate IT 
departments, internal information security teams, and investigations and computer 
forensics groups. Everyone, from corporate executives to security practitioners, shares 
responsibility for security and privacy. We must all step back and contemplate our own 
personal responsibilities, not only to the organizations we work for and the customers we 
serve, but also to society as a whole. 
 The challenge we sometimes face is how to characterize that responsibility. Is our 
responsibility to limit liability for our organizations? Or is it a duty of care to the people 
whose information we store? What values are we using when we make decisions about 
cyber risk, and what bias do those values create in our decisions? Are we forward-
looking enough, or will the decisions we make to fix our problems today create other 
problems in the future? As Benjamin Franklin once said, “All human situations have their 
inconveniences. We feel those of the present but neither see nor feel those of the future; 
and hence we often make troublesome changes without amendment, and frequently for 
the worse.” 
 As security and privacy professionals, a key part of our role is to ensure the right 
dialogue and debate occurs. We need to ask “high-contrast” questions that sharply 
define the implications of the choices our organizations make. We need to make sure 
that the opportunities are as clearly defined as the obligations to mitigate risk, so that 
our organizations make the right decisions. And we need to take equal responsibility for 
the outcomes of those choices, as opposed to abdicating that responsibility solely to the 
business. Once the choice is made, we must transition out of the debate about what is 
right and focus on taking the right actions—on making tomorrow better than today. 
 We can think of this as doing what’s right. We can think of it as protecting our 
customers and partners and keeping our markets healthy for everyone. No matter what 
motivates us, thoughtfully building systems to support a culture of genuine responsibility 
for privacy and security is not only good corporate responsibility; it is also good for 
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business. For computing to continue to improve the world we live in rather than endanger 
it, it needs to be trustworthy. And for that trust to be deliverable, we need to ensure the 
data we enter into our computers is both secure and private. As an organization, we 
demonstrate and build trust through our approach to solving these cyber-risk challenges. 
 In the preface of the first edition, I said “ Managing Risk and Information Security is 
a journey, but there is no finish line. Our approach to managing information risk must 
continue to evolve as rapidly as the pace of business and technology change. My hope is 
that people will read this book and begin their own journey.” 
 I still firmly believe what I said then. But I also believe that, as General George 
Marshall once said, “The only way human beings can win a war is to prevent it.” We 
are at war against adversaries who wish to harm the users of technology. But there is 
also a battle among those responsible for protecting security and privacy. On one side 
are organizations that would like to continue on the current path because they profit 
from the insecurity of computing, or that approach the duty of care with a bias towards 
limiting liability rather than protecting their customers. On the other side are those who 
believe that our role is to generate trust. We do that by protecting to enable people and 
businesses. It’s a hard road; I know, because I experience it every day. But we shouldn’t 
back away from something just because it is hard. We need to plant our feet and stand 
firm. The only question is where we plant our feet. 
1© Malcolm W. Harkins 2016 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 Introduction 
 There are two primary choices in life: to accept conditions as they exist, 
or accept the responsibility for changing them . 
 —Denis Waitley 
 In January 2002, I was hired to run a new Intel internal program called Security and 
Business Continuity. The program had been created following the major security events 
of the previous year (9/11 and the Code Red/Nimda viruses) and it focused primarily 
on the availability risks at that time. I had no background in technical security, but I 
had been at Intel for nearly 10 years in a variety of business-related positions, mostly 
in finance. As I learned about information risk during the first few months, it became 
apparent to me that the world was starting to change rapidly and that a “perfect storm” 
of risk was beginning to brew. In June 2002, I put together a diagram (Figure  1-1 ) to 
explain the risks to my manager, Intel’s CIO, and anyone who would listen to me. 
The diagram has been updated slightly since then to more explicitly highlight the 
geo-political forces that are a key part of the threat, vulnerability, and regulatory 
risk landscape.  
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 Today, it is clear that my view of the world was essentially accurate. Security breaches 
and intrusions are reported almost daily at organizations of all sizes, legal and regulatory 
issues related to technology use continue to grow, and geo-politics have surged to the 
forefront of some of these discussions in a post-Snowden era. Cyber attacks and data 
breaches are now considered the biggest threats to business continuity, according to a 
recent survey (Business Continuity Institute 2016). 
 But the key question that I asked in the first edition of this book is still valid. Is 
information security really effective? Given the rapid evolution of new technologies and 
uses, does the information security group even need to exist? 
 Obviously, this is a somewhat rhetorical question. I cannot imagine that any sizeable 
organization would operate well without an information security function. But the real 
issue is whether the information security group should continue to exist as it does today, 
with its  traditional mission and vision . It is clear from the prevalence of breaches and 
compromises that we have not kept up with the threats, and we appear to be slipping 
farther behind as the world grows more volatile, uncertain, and ambiguous. It is no 
wonder that we have fallen behind: as the world of technology expands exponentially, 
so do the technology-related threats and vulnerabilities, yet our ability to manage 
those security and privacy risks has progressed only at a linear rate. As a result, there 
is a widening gap between the risks and the controls. In fact, many organizations have 
essentially given up actively trying to prevent compromises and have defaulted to 
reliance on after-the-fact detection and response tools. 
 Figure 1-1.  The  perfect storm of information risk 
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 As information risk and security professionals, we should be asking ourselves 
pointed questions if we wish to remain valuable and relevant to our organizations. Why 
do we exist? What should our role be? How are new consumer and  Internet of Things 
(IoT) technologies shaping what we do, and can we shape the world of these new 
technologies and usage models? How is the evolving threat landscape shaping us, and 
can we shape the threat landscape? Given the bewildering pace at which technology 
changes and new threats appear, how do we focus and prioritize our workload? What 
skills do we need? 
 Traditionally, information security groups in  businesses and other organizations 
have taken a relatively narrow view of security risks, which resulted in a correspondingly 
narrow charter. We focused on specific types of threats, such as malware. To combat 
these threats, we applied technical security controls. In an attempt to protect against 
attacks and stop them reaching business applications and employees’ PCs, we fortified 
the network perimeter using firewalls and intrusion detection software. To prevent 
unauthorized entry to data centers, we installed physical access control systems. Overall, 
our thinking revolved around how to lock down information assets to minimize security 
risks, and how to reactively detect and respond to risks as they presented themselves. 
 Today, however, I believe that this narrow scope not only fails to reflect the full 
range of technology-related risk to the business; it is detrimental to the business overall. 
Because this limited view misses many of the risks that affect the organization, it leaves 
areas of risk unmitigated and therefore leaves the organization vulnerable in those 
areas. It also makes us vulnerable to missing the interplay between risks and controls: by 
implementing controls to mitigate one risk, we may actually create a different risk. And 
by focusing primarily on detection and response, we are not preventing harm; we are just 
trying to limit the damage. 
 As I’ll explain in this book, we need to shift our primary focus to adopt a broader 
view of risk that reflects the pervasiveness of technology today. Organizations still need 
traditional security controls, but they are only part of the picture. 
 There are several reasons for this. All stem from the reality that technology plays an 
essential role in most business activities and in people’s daily lives. 
 Technology has become the  central nervous system of a business, supporting the flow 
of information that drives each business process from product development to sales. In 
addition, as I’ll discuss throughout this book, almost every company is becoming a supplier 
of technology in some form, as technology becomes a vital element of most products, 
services, and infrastructure from cars and household appliances to the power grid. 
 The role of  technology in peoples’ personal lives has expanded dramatically, too, and 
the boundaries between business and personal use of technology are blurring. Marketers 
want to use social media to reach more consumers. Employees want to use their personal 
 smartphones to access corporate e-mail. 
 Meanwhile, the  regulatory environment is expanding rapidly, affecting the way that 
information systems must manage personal, financial, and other information in order to 
comply—and introducing a whole new area of IT-related business risks. 
 Threats are also evolving quickly, as attackers develop more sophisticated 
techniques, often targeted at individuals, which can penetrate or bypass controls 
such as network firewalls, traditional antivirus solutions, and outdated access control 
mechanisms such as passwords. 
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 In combination, these factors create a set of  interdependent risks to a business’s 
information and technology, from its internal information systems to the products and 
services provided to its customers, as shown in Figure  1-2 . 
 Figure 1-2.  Managing the  interdependent set of technology-related risks 
 Traditional security or other control type thinkers would respond to this situation 
by saying “no” to any technology that introduces new risks. Or perhaps they would 
allow a new technology but try to heavily restrict it to a narrow segment of the employee 
population. An example of this over the past few years was the view at some companies 
that  marketers should not engage consumers with social media on the company’s web 
site because this meant accumulating personal information that increased the risk of 
noncompliance with privacy regulations. Another example was that some companies 
didn’t allow employees to use personal devices because they were less secure than 
managed business PCs. 
 The reality is that because IT is now integrated into everything that an organization 
does, security groups cannot simply focus on locking down information assets to 
minimize risk. Restricting the use of information can constrain or even disable 
the organization, hindering its ability to act and slowing its response to changing 
market conditions. A narrow focus on minimizing risk therefore introduces a larger 
danger: it can threaten a business’s ability to compete in an increasingly  fast-moving 
environment . 
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THE CHALLENGES OF RISING SECURITY COSTS AND 
SKILLS SHORTAGES
 Growing recognition of the importance of  security and privacy , triggered largely by 
highly publicized breaches, has led to sharply increasing security spending and 
an accompanying skills shortage. If the current trajectory continues, Gartner Inc. 
predicts that by 2017 the typical IT organization will spend up to 30 percent of its 
budget on risk, security, and compliance, and will allocate 10 percent of its people 
to these security functions. That is triple the levels of 2011 (Gartner 2015b). At the 
same time, skill shortages may worsen; more than a third of security managers 
surveyed in 2015 reported significant obstacles in implementing security projects 
due to inadequate staffing (Morgan 2015). One question is how much of the 
projected cost increase is due to under-investment in the past, and how much is due 
to the fact that organizations have invested in technologies that do not adequately 
reduce risk. To break the cycle, as I’ll explain in Chapter  7 , we need a new security 
model and tools that create a demonstrable decrease in the risk curve, with a 
greater focus on effective prevention and machine learning to reduce cost and 
manual effort. 
 Protect to Enable ® 
 To understand how the role of information security needs to change, we need to 
re-examine our purpose. We need to  Start with Why , as author Simon Sinek argues 
convincingly in his book of the same name (Portfolio, 2009). Why does the information 
security group exist? 
 As I considered this question back in 2010, and discussed it with other members 
of the risk and security team that I led at Intel, I realized that we needed to redefine our 
mission. Like the IT organization as a whole, we exist to enable the business, to help 
deliver IT capabilities that provide competitive differentiation. Rather than focusing 
primarily on locking down assets, the mission of the information risk and security group 
must shift to enabling the business while applying a reasonable level of protection. To 
put it another way, we provide the protection that enables information to flow through 
the organization, our partners, and our customers. We also provide the protection for the 
technology that our organizations create to provide new experiences and opportunities 
for our customers. 
 The  core competencies of information security groups—such as risk analysis, 
business continuity, incident response, and security controls—remain equally relevant as 
the scope of information-related risk expands to new areas, such as technology-enabled 
products and services, as well as privacy and financial regulations. But rather than saying 
“no” to new initiatives, we need to figure out how to say “yes” and think creatively about 
how to manage the risk. 
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 During my time at Intel, the security group’s mission evolved toward this goal as 
we helped define solutions to a variety of technology challenges. For example, my team 
recognized as early as 2002 that implementing wireless  networks within Intel’s offices 
could help make the workforce more productive and increase their job satisfaction by 
letting them more easily connect using their laptops from meeting rooms, cafeterias, and 
other locations. At the time, many businesses avoided installing wireless networks within 
their facilities because of the risk of eavesdropping or because of the cost. We learned 
pretty quickly that when we restricted wireless LAN deployments or charged departments 
additional fees to connect, we actually generated more risks. This was because the 
departments would buy their own access points and operate them in an insecure 
fashion. We recognized that the benefits of installing wireless LANs across the company 
outweighed the risks, and we mitigated those risks using security controls such as device 
authentication and transport encryption. By 2004, that approach had enabled ubiquitous 
wireless and mobile computing that propelled productivity and actually reduced risks. 
 A more recent example that many organizations have experienced: for years, Intel 
didn’t allow employees to use personal smartphones for business, due to concerns about 
privacy and other risks such data theft. However, we experienced growing demand from 
employees soon after the launch of the iPhone 3 in 2009.  We realized that letting them use 
these consumer devices to access e-mail and other corporate systems would help boost 
employee satisfaction and productivity. 
 By working closely with  legal and human resources (HR) groups , we defined security 
controls and usage policies that enabled us to begin allowing access to corporate e-mail 
and calendars from employee-owned smartphones in early 2010. The initiative was highly 
successful, with a massive uptake by employees, overwhelmingly positive feedback, and proven 
productivity benefits (Evered and Rub 2010, Miller and Varga 2011). The success of the initiative 
led to its selection for an in-depth Ivey Business School case study (Compeau et al. 2013). 
 The  transformation within the information security group was reflected in changes 
to our mission statement and top priorities over the years. In 2003, the internal mission 
statement reflected the traditional focus and scope of information security organizations: 
the overarching goal was to protect information assets and minimize business disruption. 
 By 2010 it was clear to me that we needed to simplify our purpose and also broaden 
the scope. So in 2011, I changed our mission to Protect to Enable to express the idea that 
our primary goal was to find ways to enable the business while providing the protection 
necessary to reduce the risk to an acceptable level. 
 For a few years after this, I thought of information risk and security as a  balancing 
act . I felt that we needed to try to find the right balance between providing open access to 
technology and information to enable the business and locking down assets. Providing 
open access allows greater business agility. The business can move more quickly with 
fewer restrictions. Employees can work more freely, and the faster flow of information 
allows the company to grow and transform. 
 But as my  responsibilities grew to encompass security and privacy not only for 
internal systems but also for all aspects of products and services, I realized that a 
balancing act was the wrong analogy. We should not start from a position of making 
trade-offs between risks and enablement, or between security and privacy. So I began 
using a different model that I now feel more accurately represents the challenges of 
managing information risk: we should take on the harder task of optimizing what is 
really a multivariate equation of risk dynamics and business objectives in order to create 
solutions that are “ tuned to target ,” as shown in Figure  1-3 . 
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 For each problem and solution, we try to optimize or “tune” five  primary variables :
•  Risk and Compliance : Meeting security, privacy and compliance 
requirements, based on the organization’s risk tolerance and 
security and privacy principles. 
•  Cost and Maintenance: The total cost of controls, factoring in 
deployment and maintenance costs. 
•  Productivity and User Experience : The extent to which controls 
hinder business velocity by making it harder for users to do their 
jobs. I call this  control friction . In addition, if we make it difficult 
or time-consuming for users to follow security policies or use 
security tools, they’ll ignore them, thus creating more risks. (See 
the discussion of the 9 Box of Controls in Chapter  7 ). 
•  Market Objectives : The company’s goals, such as increased 
market share. 
•  Customer Needs: Our customer’s privacy and security needs, as 
well as their overall experience. 
 Ultimately there may be cases where we cannot fully optimize each item and we 
need to make trade-offs, but that doesn’t mean we shouldn’t try. 
 Figure 1-3.  Tuned to target: optimizing the equation to meet business objectives and 
customer  needs 
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 I hope that this model may help information security groups at other organizations 
think about how these priorities relate to their own businesses. The optimization points 
for each variable and objective will depend on factors such as the organization’s overall 
culture, technical acumen, and appetite for risk. 
 Building  Trust 
 I believe that if computing is to continue to improve the world we live in, rather than 
endanger it, it must be trustworthy. Unfortunately, as I describe in Chapter  9 , the privacy 
and security breaches that have hit the headlines in recent years have weakened the 
public’s trust in technology, according to the Edelman Trust Barometer, a widely used 
indicator. The rapid implementation of new technologies emerged as a new factor in 
depressing trust overall. “By a two-to-one margin, respondents in all nations feel the new 
developments in business are going too fast and there is not adequate testing,” the study 
concluded (Edelman 2015). 
 To rebuild trust in technology, we need to ensure the data we enter into our systems 
is both secure and private. At Cylance, we strive to cultivate a work environment where 
security, privacy, and trust are an integral part of the evolving culture of the company and 
foundational to the design, development, and delivery of our products and services. 
 To analyze the context that led to my approach to the risk and security mission, and 
helped to shape top priorities, I’ll explore some of the key changes in the landscape: 
the rapidly expanding regulatory environment, the emergence of new devices and 
technologies, and the changing threat landscape. 
 Keeping the Company Legal: The Regulatory Flood 
 Until the early 2000s, I didn’t see regulatory compliance as a top priority for information 
security. That’s simply because there weren’t many regulations that impacted IT, at least 
in the United States. There were a few exceptions that affected a subset of companies, 
including Intel, such as controls on certain  high-tech exports . And in European 
countries, there were already regulations that sought to protect personal information. 
But in general, IT groups didn’t have to dedicate much of their time, or budget, to 
regulatory compliance. 
 The change in the last decade has been extraordinary. We have seen a flood of new 
regulations implemented at local, national, and international levels. They affect the 
 storage and protection of information across the entire business, from the use of personal 
information for HR and marketing purposes, to financial data, to the discovery of almost 
any type of document or electronic communication in response to lawsuits. And with 
growing concerns about cyberwarfare, cyberterrorism, and hacktivism, several countries 
are evaluating additional  cybersecurity legislation in an attempt to protect critical 
infrastructure and make industries more accountable for strengthening security controls. 
 In most cases, these regulations do not aim to specifically define  IT capabilities ; 
however, because information is stored electronically, there are huge implications 
for IT. The controls defined in the regulations ultimately must be implemented in the 
organization’s systems. These systems include more than just technology: they consist of 
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people, procedures, devices, and applications. The business risk includes a significant 
IT-related component, but we must take a holistic view of risk management. Noncompliance 
can damage a company’s brand image, profitability, and stock price—not just through 
resulting legal problems, but through bad publicity. 
 Let’s take a brief look at some of the key areas and regulations that are having the 
biggest impact. 
 Privacy:  Protecting Personal Information 
 For many US companies, the wake-up call was the California data security breach 
notification law (State Bill 1386), which became effective in 2003. A key aspect of this 
law requires companies that store personal information to notify the owner of the 
information in the event of a known or suspected security breach. Businesses could 
reduce their exposure, as well as the risk to individuals, by encrypting personal data. 
 After this, other states quickly followed suit, implementing regulations that generally 
follow the basic tenets of California’s original law: companies must promptly disclose a 
data breach to customers, usually in writing. 
 In addition, federal laws, such as the  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA) , have addressed specific categories of personal information. Further 
regulations have been added in other countries, too, such as the updated data-protection 
privacy laws implemented in Europe (European Commission 2011, 2012). 
 The implications of these local and national regulations extend beyond geographical 
boundaries. As companies do more business online, they’re increasingly likely to acquire 
and store information about customers from other countries, and find that they also 
need to comply with regulations around the world. Those regulations may change, with 
implications for businesses in multiple countries. In late 2015, for example, Europe’s 
highest court struck down the so-called “safe harbor” agreement that had allowed 
companies to move information about consumers between the European Union and 
the United States. The replacement EU-US Privacy Shield, agreed after three months of 
negotiations, aimed to address European privacy concerns with written guarantees that 
US intelligence agencies would not have indiscriminate access to Europeans’ personal 
data stored in the US (Scott 2016). 
 The issue can become even more complex when businesses outsource application 
development or HR functions to providers located in yet another country. Now, software 
developers in India may be building and operating the systems that collect information 
about Europeans for US companies, making it even more difficult for businesses to 
navigate compliance with all relevant privacy regulations. 
 Personalization vs. Privacy 
 Privacy concerns are set to become even more important over time, as businesses 
increasingly seek to create online experiences tailored to the needs of individual users. 
The more a business knows about each individual, the more it can personalize services 
and offer targeted advertising based on income and preferences. 
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 Many users also like personalized services. If a web site “remembers” them, they 
don’t need to enter the same information each time they visit the site, and they’re more 
likely to see content and offers relevant to their needs. In fact, companies may be at a 
disadvantage if they don’t personalize services because users may prefer a web site from a 
competitor that offers a more streamlined experience. 
 However, there’s an inevitable conflict between personalization and privacy. 
The personalization trend is fueling the growth of an industry focused on collecting, 
analyzing, and reselling information about individuals. This industry existed long before 
the Web; personal information has been used in mass-mailing campaigns for decades. 
However, the Web is both increasing demand for this information while providing 
new ways to collect it. Companies now have opportunities to collect information from 
multiple online sources, correlate and analyze this information, and then sell it to others. 
And of course, consumers’ fears that information will be lost or misused have increased 
accordingly. 
 For businesses, however, offering personalized services also can increase 
compliance concerns. As companies store more personal information, they are 
responsible for safeguarding that information and are liable for any loss or compromise. 
In many parts of the world, companies are also required to explain why they are collecting 
personal data, how they are protecting it, and how long they will keep it. 
 We can expect continuing tension due to conflicting desires for personalization and 
privacy—and more regulation as a result. Governments clearly believe that businesses 
cannot be relied upon to regulate themselves, so they will continue to add regulations 
designed to protect the privacy of individuals. Meanwhile, businesses will seek new ways 
to collect more information so that they can further personalize services. Developing 
compliance strategies and guidelines becomes even more pressing. 
 Financial Regulations 
 Financial regulation surfaced as a top priority in the United States with the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act ( SOX ), which emerged from the public outrage over corporate and financial 
accounting scandals at companies such as Enron and WorldCom. These scandals cost 
investors billions of dollars and damaged public confidence. To help avoid similar 
catastrophes in the future, SOX imposed financial tracking requirements designed to 
ensure that a company’s financial reporting is accurate and that there hasn’t been fraud 
or manipulation. Once enacted, SOX required publicly held companies to meet specific 
financial reporting requirements by the end of 2004. 
 Although the Sarbanes-Oxley Act doesn’t mandate specific technology controls, 
it has major implications for IT. Ensuring financial integrity requires controls to be 
implemented within everyday financial processes. In practice, this means they must 
be enforced within the IT applications and infrastructure that support those processes. 
Purchases above specific thresholds may require approval from the finance group; the 
underlying applications have to support this workflow, and to be sure the applications 
function correctly, businesses need to establish the integrity of the underlying computer 
infrastructure. Compliance with financial regulations therefore creates a series of IT 
requirements, from making sure that applications provide the right functionality to 
implementing access controls and updating software. 
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 E-Discovery 
 Regulations governing the discovery of information for litigation purposes officially 
extended their reach into the electronic realm in 2006. That’s when the US Supreme 
Court’s amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly created the 
requirement for e-discovery—the requirement to archive and retrieve electronic records 
such as e-mail and instant messages. 
 This created an immediate need not just to archive information, but to automate its 
retrieval. This is because records must be produced in a timely way, and manual retrieval 
would take too long and be prohibitively expensive. The business risks of noncompliance 
are considerable: unlike many countries, US practice allows for potentially massive 
information disclosure obligations in litigation. Companies that fail to meet e-discovery 
requirements may experience repercussions that include legal sanctions. The 
implications are correspondingly onerous. Lawsuits may draw on information that is 
several years old, so businesses must have the capability to quickly search and access 
archived information as well as current data. E-discovery is further complicated by the 
growth of cloud computing models such as software as a service (SaaS). As organizations 
outsource more business processes and data to cloud service suppliers, they need to 
ensure that their suppliers comply with their e-discovery needs. 
 Expanding Scope of  Regulation  
 The regulatory universe continues to expand, with the likelihood of more regulations 
that explicitly address IT, as new technologies emerge and governments try to control its 
use and inevitable misuse. In the US, lawmakers have proposed legislation to increase 
the security and privacy of connected cars, following a widely publicized demonstration 
in which researchers hacked into a Jeep and took over its controls. The Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) has published cybersecurity guidelines describing requirements 
for manufacturers of Internet-connected medical devices (FDA 2016). 
 The attempts by various governments to gain access to technology for the purposes 
of combating terrorism have generated considerable impact and controversy. In China, 
a new anti-terrorism law requires that technology companies hand over technical 
information and help with decryption when the police or state security agents demand 
it for investigating or preventing terrorist cases (Buckley 2015). In the US, even greater 
controversy was generated by the US Government’s attempts to force Apple Computer 
to create “back doors” that make it easier to access information on iPhones used by 
terrorists or criminals. In India, after terrorists used unsecured Wi-Fi access points 
to communicate information about their attacks, the government created a legal 
requirement that any access point must be secured (Government of India Department of 
Telecommunications 2009). 
 In other countries, businesses that operate unsecured Wi-Fi access points (a 
common way to provide Internet access for visitors) may find themselves facing other 
legal problems. For example, unscrupulous individuals may tap into the network to 
access web sites for purposes such as illegally downloading music or pornography. 
Access appears to originate from the company hosting the access point, which may then 
find itself on the receiving end of correspondence or raids from the music industry or 
government agencies. 
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 The Rapid Proliferation of Information, Devices, 
and  Things 
 The computing environment is growing as rapidly as the regulatory environment. The 
sheer volume of information is exploding, and it is being stored across a rapidly growing 
array of devices. The Internet of Things will drive yet another exponential increase: 
Gartner, Inc. estimates that during 2016, 5.5 million new “things” will be connected every 
day, and Cisco expects 50 billion connected devices by 2020. In the not too distant future, 
almost any device with a power supply may have an IP address and will be capable of 
communicating—and being attacked—over the Internet. 
 Recent headlines have highlighted the growing threat activity focused on IoT, as I’ll 
discuss further in Chapter  7 . Researchers hacked into a Jeep via its Internet-connected 
entertainment system and remotely controlled the vehicle’s functions (Greenberg 2015); 
other researchers showed that thousands of medical devices in hospitals are vulnerable 
to attack. 
 At the same time, the boundaries between work and personal technology have in 
some cases completely dissolved. Whether businesses officially allow it or not, employees 
are increasingly using their personal devices for work by sending e-mails from and storing 
information on their personal smartphones and computers. Furthermore, people may 
forward e-mail from business accounts to personal accounts created on external systems, 
without considering that when they signed up for the personal account, they agreed to a 
license that allows the external provider to scrutinize their e-mails. 
 The use of personal technology such as smartphones can considerably enhance 
business productivity because employees can now communicate from anywhere at 
any time. However, this also creates a more complex, fragmented environment with 
more potential points of attack. Information is now exposed on millions of new devices 
and disparate external networks, many of which do not have the same type of security 
controls as corporate PCs, and all of which are outside corporate network firewalls. Not 
surprisingly, mobile malware has become a major industry, and is still growing: one 
survey found more than 1,200 known families of Android malware in 2014, more than 
double the number found the previous year (Millman 2015). 
 The boundaries between work and personal lives are dissolving in other ways, 
too. Employees store more information on the Internet—on business and consumer 
social media sites, for example—than ever before. These sites are powerful tools for 
communicating with audiences outside the corporate firewall. 
 However, just as there’s an industry gathering and analyzing personal information 
for marketing purposes, information on the Web can be used for competitive intelligence 
or for less legitimate purposes. Users store snippets of information in multiple places 
on the Web. Although each of these snippets may not provide much information, when 
pieced together they can provide new intelligence not just about the individual, but also 
about the organizations to which the person belongs. Each item is like a single pixel in 
a digital picture. Alone, it doesn’t convey much information; but step back, aggregating 
information from a wider range of sources, and those pixels combine to form a portrait. 
In the same way, pieces of information strewn across a variety of unrelated web sites—the 
name of a department, workmates, pet names that might be used as passwords—can be 
linked together to create a picture of an individual and used for malicious purposes. 
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 The Changing Threat Landscape 
 The  threat landscape is evolving rapidly, with an increase in highly organized and well-
funded groups capable of executing sustained attacks to achieve long-term goals, including 
cyberespionage, cyberterrorism, and cyberwarfare. These attackers, generally known as 
 advanced persistent threats ( APTs ), were originally thought to focus mainly on governments 
but more recently have also been shown to target private-sector organizations, with the 
goal of stealing intellectual property or simply causing damage. APTs include nation-state 
organizations, “hacktivist” groups attempting to publicize or further their cause, and 
organized crime. Hacktivists who said they were targeting oppressive regimes claimed 
responsibility for an attack that disabled more than 30,000 computers at the world’s biggest 
oil producer, Saudi Aramco. The FBI blamed North Korea for a crippling attack on Sony 
Pictures (Schmidt et al. 2015). In 2014, the US Justice Department indicted five Chinese 
military hackers for stealing trade secrets and other information from US companies in the 
nuclear power, metals, and solar industries (Department of Justice 2014); in 2016, the US 
charged seven hackers linked to the Iranian government with hacking US banks and dam 
operations (Nakashima and Zapotosky 2016). 
 The steady rise of organized  cybercrime online  is entirely logical. As the exchange 
of money and information has moved online, organized crime has followed, focusing on 
theft of valuable assets such as intellectual property. This has spawned a mature malware 
industry that increasingly resembles the legitimate software industry, complete with a 
broad set of services, guarantees, and price competition among suppliers.  Ransomware , 
which encrypts a victim’s data until a ransom is paid, is a recent trend. 
 Stealthy Malware 
 This evolving set of threat agents is using new, more sophisticated tools and methods 
to mount attacks. Once upon a time, attackers were amateurish and often driven by 
personal motives such as the prestige of bringing down a big company’s network. 
Accordingly, the arrival of malware on a user’s machine was easy to detect: the malware 
announced itself with icons or messages, and the system often became unusable. 
 Now the trend is toward malware that is stealthy and uses sophisticated techniques 
to avoid detection. Attackers plant malware that lies undetected over a long period while 
it captures information. Another common technique is to quietly spread malware by 
injecting malicious code into an unsuspecting company’s web site; users who visit the site 
then unknowingly download the code onto their systems. 
 Accompanying this is a shift from spam mass e-mails to carefully crafted 
 spearphishing attacks aimed at individuals or specific  groups . These typically use social 
engineering techniques, such as providing enough contextual or personal information in 
an e-mail to tempt people to download malware or click on a link to an infected web site 
created specifically for that purpose. Though more expensive to mount, spearphishing 
attacks can be enormously profitable to cybercriminals; an analysis by a supplier of anti-
phishing solutions found that they were the primary initial attack method used by APTs 
in 2015; 22% of attacks were motivated by financial fraud or other crimes (PhishLabs 
2016). We can expect these stealthy and targeted attacks to continue, with new methods 
emerging as necessary to circumvent defenses. 
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 Nine Irrefutable Laws of Information Risk 
 Over the years, I’ve identified a number of “laws” that encapsulate some of the lessons 
I’ve learned, and that seem to remain true despite the continually changing environment. 
 I call these the Nine Irrefutable Laws of Information  Risk (with acknowledgements to 
Culp (2000), Venables (2008), Lindstrom (2008), and other sources):
•  Law #1:  Information wants to be free . People want to talk, post, 
and share information—and they increase risk by doing so. Some 
examples: 
 A senior executive at a major technology company updated 
his profile on a business social networking site. In doing so, he 
inadvertently pre-announced a shift in his employer’s strategy—a 
mistake that was promptly and gleefully picked up by the press. 
 An employee found a novel way to fix a piece of equipment 
more quickly and, to help others across the company, decided to 
videotape the procedure. Because video files are so large, it didn’t 
make sense to e-mail the video, so the employee posted it online. 
Unfortunately, by doing so, he exposed confidential information. 
 At one time or another, many people have experienced this 
disconcerting event: when composing a message, the e-mail 
software helpfully autofills the address field, but it selects the 
wrong name from the address book. You hit Send without 
realizing the error, thus dispatching a company-confidential 
message to someone outside the organization. 
 It’s worth noting that that this rule is not new. Information has 
always wanted to be free: think of the World War II slogan “loose 
lips sink ships.” People communicate, and sometimes they share 
more information than they should. It’s just the methods that 
have changed, and the fact that, with the Internet, a carelessly 
mentioned detail is instantly available to anyone across the globe. 
•  Law #2:  Code wants to be wrong . We will never have 100 percent 
error-free software. In fact, the more widely used the software, 
the more malicious individuals will hunt for vulnerabilities in the 
code. They have found and exploited errors in the world’s most 
widely used web sites, productivity applications, and enterprise 
business software. 
•  Law #3:  Services want to be on . On any computer, some 
background processes always need to be running, and these can 
be exploited by attackers. These could even be security software 
processes used for everyday activities like keeping systems up-to-
date with software patches or monitoring for malware. 
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•  Law #4:  Users want to click . People naturally tend to click when 
they see links, buttons, or prompts. Malware creators know this, 
and they take advantage of it. In fact, the entire phishing industry is 
based on the assumption that users will click on enticing e-mails, 
web sites, or pop-up ads, triggering the download of malicious 
code to their systems. The evolution of highly targeted attacks such 
as spearphishing has taken this to a new level, as when e-mails 
purporting to be letters discussing legal action from a circuit court 
were sent to senior executives at a number of companies. 
•  Law #5:  Even a security feature can be used for harm. Security 
tools can be exploited by attackers, just like other software. This 
means that laws 2, 3, and 4 are true for security capabilities, too. 
Networking equipment supplier Juniper Networks discovered 
that its firewall software contained “unauthorized code” that 
surreptitiously decrypted virtual private network traffic (Goodin 
2015). Security researchers have uncovered vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited by attackers in products from well—known security 
suppliers, including Kaspersky Labs and FireEye (Ashford 2015). 
•  Law #6:  The efficacy of a control deteriorates with time . Once 
put in place, security controls tend to remain static, but the 
environment in which they operate is dynamic. Organizations 
tend to “set and forget”: to install security controls and then fail to 
update them with security patches or to properly maintain access 
lists. As attackers find new ways to circumvent or compromise the 
controls, their effectiveness progressively degrades. As Rob Joyce, 
who heads the National Security Agency’s elite hacking unit, put 
it, an organization with static defenses will drift to the back of the 
herd, where it is easily picked off by a predator (see Chapter  6 ). 
•  Law#7:   Code needs to execute. All software, good or bad, needs 
to execute in order to perform its intended function. Malware is 
created with malicious intent, but until it executes, it is dormant 
and can do no harm. Exploits can therefore be intercepted and 
stopped by security tools that inspect code before execution, 
identify good from bad, and prevent bad code from executing. 
•  Law #8:  Controls create friction. Security controls can slow users 
and business processes by impacting system performance 
or forcing them to use cumbersome processes. High-friction 
controls therefore impose a “drag coefficient” on business 
velocity. Users react to a high degree of control friction by 
circumventing the controls whenever possible; as a result, the 
controls can actually introduce new risks as business users go 
around IT to get their jobs done. Control friction is an important 
consideration when designing security architectures (see the 
discussion on the 9 Box of Controls in Chapter  7 ) 
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•  Law #9:  As our digital opportunities grow, so does our obligation 
to do the right thing. As technology becomes embedded into the 
fabric of our lives, exploits that take advantage of technology 
vulnerabilities may increasingly impact the well-being of almost 
everyone in society. So it is particularly important that we apply 
the right ethical values to shape the way we design, develop, 
and implement these technologies. As I explain in Chapter  9 , 
security and privacy should now be considered a corporate social 
responsibility. 
 A New Approach to Managing Risk 
 Given the ever-broadening role of technology and the resulting information-related 
business  risk , we need a new approach to information security built on the concept of 
protecting to enable. This approach should
•  Incorporate privacy and regulatory compliance  by design, taking a 
holistic view of information risk . Also, because all companies are 
moving toward using technology not only for internal operations 
but also in products and services, the information security 
organization must work closely with other business groups to 
understand and manage risk. 
•  Recognize that people and information, not the enterprise  network 
boundary,  are the security perimeter . Information is no longer 
restricted to tightly managed systems within data centers; it now 
also resides outside the firewall, on users’ personal devices, and 
on the Internet. Managing risk therefore requires a range of new 
tools, including user awareness and effective security controls for 
personal devices. 
•  Be  dynamic and flexible  enough to quickly adapt to new 
technologies and threats. A static security model will inevitably 
be overtaken by the dynamic nature of threats. We need security 
architectures that can rapidly learn and adapt to new devices and 
evolving threats, with a high degree of automation. 
 Above all, we need to accomplish a shift in thinking, adjusting our primary focus 
to enabling the business, and then thinking creatively about how we can do so while 
managing the risk. Our roles will only increase in importance as technology becomes 
even more prevalent. Our ability to protect information security and privacy will be 
essential to building the trust that enables our organizations to take advantage of new 
digital opportunities. 
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 CHAPTER 2 
 The Misperception of Risk 
 The moment we want to believe something, we suddenly see all the 
arguments for it, and become blind to the arguments against it. 
 —George Bernard Shaw 
 One hundred years ago, the “unsinkable”  Titanic foundered after striking an iceberg 
off the coast of Newfoundland. More than 1,500 people died in what became one of the 
deadliest maritime accidents ever. Several factors contributed to this massive death toll, 
but perhaps the most critical was that there simply weren’t enough lifeboats. The ship 
carried 2,224 people, but fewer than half of them could squeeze into the boats. 
 As we know, passengers who didn’t get a spot in one of those lifeboats quickly died 
in the freezing waters of the North Atlantic. What’s less well known is that the  Titanic ’s 
supply of lifeboats was in full compliance with the British marine regulations in force at 
time. The law required the ship to carry 16 lifeboats; the  Titanic actually had 20 lifeboats. 
 The ship’s owners did a good job of providing enough boats to address the regulatory 
risk of noncompliance. Unfortunately, meeting regulatory requirements did little to 
prevent the tragic loss of life. 
 This is a case of  misperception  of risk . The owners focused on mitigating the 
regulatory risk, apparently blind to the much larger risk of disaster. They framed the 
lifeboat issue as a compliance item that needed to be addressed so that the ship could 
start carrying passengers and generating revenue. One could argue that if they had 
stepped back and considered the potential consequence s for the customers rather than 
the company’s short-term priorities, history might have unfolded differently. Reports 
suggest that the  Titanic had enough capacity to easily add enough lifeboats for everyone 
on board, had the owners chosen to do so. 
 What does this example have to do with managing information risk? We encounter 
misperceptions every day within the realm of enterprise risk and security. Every 
organization has a greater responsibility than simply complying with regulations. We have 
to think about whom is ultimately at risk: the company or the customer? Furthermore, 
as I’ll show in this chapter, everyone in the organization has their own priorities and 
their own subjective view of risk. Unless we mitigate these misperceptions, they can have 
disastrous consequences. As a result, I believe that the misperception of risk is the most 
significant vulnerability facing enterprises today. 
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 The Subjectivity of Risk  Perception 
 As  security professionals , we tend to think about objective ways to estimate risk—to 
assess the likelihood and extent of harm that can occur due to specific threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
 But in reality, the way people perceive risk has a strong subjective component. 
 Economic and psychological factors greatly affect how each of us perceives the likelihood 
and potential impact of harm from specific actions or situations. Within an organization, 
each individual’s perception of risk varies depending on his or her job role, goals, 
background, and peer group. This means managers, security professionals, and end users 
all may have a different view of the risk associated with a specific technology or action. 
 Misperceiving risk has serious consequences because our actions are shaped by 
our perception of risk. An employee may think that posting personal and work-related 
information on a social media  site is relatively harmless. However, hackers might use this 
publicly available information in phishing e-mails to gain access to enterprise systems via 
the employee’s computer, ultimately resulting in detrimental security breaches. 
 End users are not the only members of the organization who can misperceive risk. 
Everyone is capable of misperceiving risk, including risk and security professionals. As 
I’ll explain later in this chapter, misperceptions occur at the group level as well as the 
individual level. Members of a group may share the same bias in their perception of risk 
and benefit. 
 The decisions that result from these misperceptions can weaken the entire 
organization’s security  posture . If an organization underestimates a risk, it will 
underspend on controls to mitigate that risk, increasing the likelihood and potential 
impact of major problems such as data breaches. On the other hand, if the organization 
overestimates a risk, it will allocate a disproportionately large share of its security 
resources to the risk, leaving other parts of the risk landscape underprotected. 
 In this chapter, I’ll discuss how and why different people within an organization 
misperceive risk, whether they are acting as information technology users, security 
professionals, or managerial decision makers. To explore these misperceptions, I’ve drawn 
on research across the broader field of risk psychology, notably  The Psychology of Risk , 
a book by Professor Dame Glynis Breakwell, Vice Chancellor of the University of Bath 
(Cambridge University Press 2007). I’ll examine how these ideas about risk perception 
apply to information risk and security. I’ll explain some of the consequences of those 
misperceptions, and I’ll discuss some of the ways an organization can address them. 
 How  Employees Misperceive Risk 
 Research shows that if we like an activity, we tend to judge its benefits to be high and its 
risk to be low (Slovic 2010). Conversely, if we dislike the activity, we judge it as low-benefit 
and high-risk. Because of this, the perception of risk by individuals and groups within an 
organization tends to be biased by their preferences, roles, and objectives. Everyone is 
trying to achieve their individual or group goals within the organization, so they tend to 
see activities and technologies that support those goals as beneficial, and therefore they 
tend to underestimate the risk. 
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 So if employees like social media, their attraction to the technology skews their 
perception of benefit and risk. Because they judge the benefit to be high and the risk to be 
low, they feel comfortable posting information such as their job title, location, and even 
the projects they’re working on. They may even allow sites to capture their location, using 
the global positioning system in their cell phone, and display the location in real time. 
 Unfortunately, these employees may not think about how a malicious individual 
could use the information. Today, as we’ve seen, an individual’s use of technology can 
harm not only the individual but the entire organization. Attackers exploit publicly 
available personal information to craft spearphishing e-mails that are particularly 
convincing because they appear to demonstrate a relationship with the recipient, making 
the employee more likely to click on a link that downloads malware to the system. From 
there, the attack spreads to the rest of the corporate network. In addition, information 
posted by individuals is now routinely aggregated, analyzed to identify patterns, and sold, 
often to a company’s competitors. 
 The risk and security team may also misperceive the risk of social media, but in the 
opposite direction: they overestimate the risk and underestimate the benefits. They may 
not like social media because it creates vulnerabilities, and their perception then drives 
them to focus on minimizing the risk by trying to block the use of the technology. 
 Other psychological factors also come into play in shaping end users’ risk 
perception. People in general tend to believe they are personally less likely than others 
to experience negative events and more likely to experience positive events, leading to 
a sense of personal invulnerability (Breakwell 2007). In addition, users also are more 
likely to behave in risky ways if their colleagues do so. “It’s conformity: being seen to be 
doing what everybody else is doing,” Breakwell says (pers. comm.). Many social media 
sites encourage this conformist tendency; if all your friends are using a social media site, 
you’re likely to join the site too because it enables you to see what they are doing and 
share information with them more easily. 
 The likelihood that individuals will behave in ways risky to the organization also 
increases when their individual interests don’t align with the company’s. This divergence 
is most likely when employees are discontented, resentful, demoralized, or simply don’t 
trust IT or the broader organization. 
 In economic theory, the problem resulting from this lack of alignment is known as a 
 moral hazard : a situation in which someone behaves differently from the way they would 
if they were fully exposed to the risk. A useful moral hazard analogy is renting a car with 
full insurance coverage. People are likely to be less careful with the rental car than they 
would be with their own car if they’re not responsible for the consequences. The attitude 
is “if it’s not mine, it doesn’t matter.” 
 In the realm of enterprise IT, moral hazards may be a bigger concern than many 
appreciate. A Cisco survey (2011a) found that 61 percent of employees felt they were not 
responsible for protecting information and devices, believing instead that their IT groups 
or IT service providers were accountable. Ominously, 70 percent of these surveyed 
employees said they frequently ignored IT policies. 
 One indicator of the extent of moral hazard within an organization may be how 
employees treat company-provided laptops. Higher-than-average loss or damage rates 
might suggest employees don’t care about the laptops and may be an indication they 
don’t care about other corporate assets either. As I’ll discuss in Chapter  5 , I believe 
allowing reasonable personal use of laptops can help reduce the risk of moral hazard 
because it aligns personal interests with those of the organization. 
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 More broadly, organizations can address the moral hazard issue by taking steps 
to align the goals and concerns of everyone involved: end users, information security 
professionals, and executives. This returns us to the theme of the book: as information 
security professionals, our mission is to Protect to Enable. This mission aligns our security 
goals with those of the business. It helps maintain the perception of shared values. 
Research suggests that people with whom we share values are deemed more trustworthy 
(Breakwell 2007, 143). If employees trust us, they are more likely to believe our warnings 
and act on our recommendations. 
 The Lure of the Shiny Bauble 
 One further point to remember is that everyone in the organization, regardless of the job 
role, is an end user. Therefore, we can all fall prey to the same tendencies. Our attraction 
to new consumer technologies can also cause us to ignore the risks. I call this magpie-
like attraction the  lure of the shiny bauble ; mesmerized by the appeal of gleaming new 
technologies, we downplay or even fail to notice the risks lurking in the shadows. 
 How Security Professionals Misperceive  Risk 
 While end users tend to underestimate the risks of a desirable activity or technology, 
security professionals sometimes display the opposite tendency. We focus obsessively 
on the information risk associated with a specific threat or vulnerability. In doing so, we 
completely miss bigger risks. 
 This phenomenon is known as  target fixation , a  term originally coined to describe 
a situation in which fighter-bomber pilots focus so intently on a target during a strafing 
or bombing run that they fail to notice the bigger risk to themselves and crash into the 
target as a result (Colgan 2010, 44). As information security professionals, we can develop 
a similar fixation. We focus so intently on one risk that our awareness of larger hazards is 
diminished. This target fixation can also occur in other groups with “control” functions 
within the organization, such as internal audit, legal compliance, and corporate risk 
management. 
 Here is an example from my own experience at Intel. Several years ago, we 
discovered that malware had been introduced onto our network from an employee’s 
personal computer. We became so focused on this source of danger that we eliminated 
all personal devices from our network. We further fueled our target fixation by labelling 
these devices “non-Intel managed systems ( NIMS ) ,” a term that reflected the frustration 
over our lack of control. I vowed we would never again allow network access from devices 
that we didn’t fully control. 
 However, by becoming fixated on a single threat, we may have created some larger 
risks and additional costs. For example, we needed to issue contract employees with 
corporate PCs, each of which allowed broader access to the Intel environment. If we 
had instead focused on how we could provide limited access to the environment from 
“untrusted”  devices , we might have managed the risk with lower total cost and obtained 
a head start in developing a key aspect of a more flexible security strategy, as I’ll describe 
in Chapter  7 . 
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 It’s worth noting that security professionals can also suffer from a problem that’s 
almost the opposite of target fixation:  alert fatigue . At many organizations, security 
groups experience a constant deluge of thousands of alerts emanating from security 
tools across the enterprise. With so much noise, it’s easy to become overwhelmed and 
miss important threats. 
 As security professionals, we also may misperceive  risk due to the tendency to “set 
and forget” security controls. This common security loophole is described in the sixth 
Irrefutable Law of Information Security in Chapter  1 , which states that the efficacy of 
a control deteriorates with time. Once in place, controls tend to remain static, but the 
threats they are intended to mitigate continue to evolve and change, sometimes in 
very dynamic ways. Controls that are initially very effective can become inadequate 
over time. Ultimately, an adverse event may occur and may even have disastrous 
consequences. 
 Think about the  history of major oil tanker spills. For years, regulations allowed 
tankers to be built with a single hull, instead of a double (inner and outer) hull to provide 
additional protection in the event of a leak. Meanwhile, tankers grew steadily larger 
because bigger ships could transport oil more efficiently than smaller ones. It wasn’t 
until the  Exxon Valdez ran aground, puncturing its hull and creating a giant oil leak that 
contaminated huge stretches of Alaska’s coast, that authorities were spurred to create new 
regulations requiring double hulls in oil tankers (EPA 2011). 
 Within enterprise IT, a typical “set and forget”  error is the failure to keep controls 
up-to-date, particularly if the controls are designed to mitigate a relatively low risk. A 
case in point:  distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)  threats were a big concern more than 
a decade ago, due to widely publicized attacks by worms such as Code Red, Nimda, and 
SQL Slammer. These attacks disabled corporate web sites or flooded internal networks 
by overloading them with requests. To mitigate the availability risk, many organizations 
invested in defenses against DDoS attacks. 
 Over time, however, DDoS attacks became less frequent, and organizations were 
assailed by newer threats. With limited resources, information security groups focused 
on mitigating these new threats rather than continuing to build defenses against DDoS 
attacks. At the same time, though, businesses were increasing their online presence. Web 
sites evolved from being used primarily for advertising and displaying static corporate 
information to managing business-critical data and applications. Some organizations 
began conducting all their business online. Even traditional brick-and-mortar 
businesses moved customer support, order management, and other critical business 
processes onto the Web. The larger online presence multiplied the potential impact of a 
successful attack. As a result, when DDoS attacks from a variety of groups resurfaced in 
the past few years, they created even greater disruption to business operations as well as 
damage to corporate brands. 
 Another example: over the past few years, many organizations have become much 
more diligent about  scrubbing data from the hard drives of old computers before 
disposing of them or reselling them. But they failed to follow similar precautions for other 
business devices that have evolved to include hard drives. 
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 Nearly every digital copier contains a drive storing an image of each document 
copied, scanned, or e-mailed by the machine. When CBS News reporters visited a 
company that specialized in reselling used copiers, they found businesses and agencies 
had discarded machines containing lists of wanted sex offenders, drug raid targets, pay 
stubs with Social Security numbers, and check images. One copier’s hard drive even 
contained 300 pages of individual medical records, including a cancer diagnosis, which is 
a potential breach of federal privacy law (Keteyian 2010). 
 Security and Privacy 
 As I explained earlier in the book, security professionals, and the broader security 
industry, can sometimes be tone-deaf when it comes to privacy concerns. In their zeal to 
collect data for security purposes, they may create risks that the data could be used in a 
way that may violate people’s privacy, or at least their expectations of privacy. 
 The challenge of balancing privacy and security concerns in the enterprise bears 
many similarities to the broader issue of balancing security and privacy in society, an 
area that has been extensively explored by privacy legal expert Daniel J. Solove. As he 
explains in the book  Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff between Privacy and Security 
(Solove 2011) , the debate between security and privacy has often been incorrectly 
framed to imply that we must choose between one value and the other. “Security and 
privacy often clash, but there need not be a zero-sum game,” he writes. “There is a way 
to reconcile privacy and security: by placing security programs under oversight, limiting 
future uses of personal data, and ensuring that programs are carried out in a balanced 
and controlled manner.” 
 Solove’s conclusion is equally applicable to information security. Many in the 
security profession think that security equals privacy. That is not the case. We need good 
security to achieve privacy, but the two are not synonymous. Some security industry 
solutions conduct broad-based bulk data collection, monitoring the activity of users 
and their machines, and siphoning the data to the cloud. That data is then used to 
build profiles and, combined with other information, to enable the solution to scan for 
potentially anomalous activity. Considered in isolation, some machine data has few, if 
any, privacy implications. However, the collection of thousands of pieces of information 
about what the machine is doing, when and how, while someone is using it and even 
when not, creates a detailed digital profile of an individual and his or her behavior. That 
profile is collected, stored in perpetuity and analyzed. As our lives become more digitized, 
the richness of that profile will grow and evolve. We need to step back and ask ourselves 
whether this is really necessary for our protection. 
 As I’ve discussed elsewhere in this book, I believe that security and privacy programs 
should be managed together as elements of an overall enterprise information risk 
management strategy. Security and privacy are like the two halves of a zipper: when 
meshed together, they create a strong bond, protecting the enterprise and the individual 
against risk. Managing them as isolated silos is more likely to result in dangerous 
misperceptions of risk.  
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 MISMATCHING CONTROLS TO THREATS
 Businesses sometimes devote considerable time and resources to implement 
security  controls that are completely irrelevant to the threats the companies are 
trying to mitigate. These mismatches reveal a lack of understanding of the security 
technology and the threat. The controls may further add to the risk by providing 
a false sense of security. In reality, deploying the wrong control is like carrying a 
lightning rod to protect oneself from getting wet in a storm. 
 Typical mismatches include
•  Using firewalls to prevent data theft from applications that are 
allowed to operate through the  firewall 
•  Using standard antivirus tools that are effective only against 
previously identified threats, to protect against zero-day attacks 
•  Using controls at the operating-system level to detect application-
layer attacks 
 This mismatch does not mean that these controls are worthless. It simply means 
that if our goal is to deal with a specific threat, we must understand both the attacks 
and the controls well enough to identify which controls are applicable, and where it 
is necessary to add other controls. For example, if a firewall cannot prevent attacks 
against an application, we might deploy an additional control behind the firewall. 
 How  Decision Makers Misperceive Risk 
 Managers make decisions based on information from technical specialists and other 
experts. Therefore, the decisions that managers make are only as good as the information 
they receive. Decision makers can misperceive risk when their decisions are based on 
biased or incomplete information. 
 Bias can influence these decisions every day. If people are trying to sell a particular 
proposal or point of view to their manager, what are they likely to do? They tend to select 
data supporting their arguments and often ignore data contradicting those arguments. 
 The danger of misperception is particularly acute when decision makers rely on 
a narrow range of sources with similar viewpoints. Without obtaining a diversity of 
viewpoints, managers don’t get a full picture of the risk. Like-minded individuals tend 
to agree with each other, as you might expect. When a group is composed solely of 
people with similar backgrounds and viewpoints, it may be particularly prone to  group 
polarization (Breakwell 2007, 99) and the group’s decision may be more extreme than the 
mean of their individual views. This problem may be especially acute when the people 
involved share the same mental model of the world, as is likely to be the case when the 
group consists only of specialists from the same organization. 
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 An even broader concern is how a focus on business goals can drive people to make 
unethical decisions. When these decisions are made by managers at the organizational 
level rather than at the individual level, the impact is compounded by the potential for 
widespread disaster. 
 After the  Challenger space shuttle exploded in 1986, extensive post-crash analysis 
revealed the tragedy was caused because an O-ring on one of the shuttle’s booster rockets 
failed to seal due to the low ambient temperature at launch time. 
 However, it subsequently emerged that engineers had warned of the potential danger 
before the launch. Engineers from NASA contractor Morton Thiokol recommended the 
shuttle not be launched at low temperatures after analyzing data that indicated a link 
between low temperatures and O-ring problems. After NASA responded negatively to 
the engineers’ recommendation, Morton Thiokol’s general manager reportedly decided 
to treat the question of whether to launch was a “management decision.” Against the 
objections of their own engineers, Morton Thiokol’s managers then recommended NASA 
go ahead and launch, and NASA quickly accepted this recommendation (Bazerman and 
Tenbrunsel 2011, 13–16). 
 For Morton Thiokol’s managers, the desire to meet the business goal of pleasing the 
company’s customer, NASA, apparently caused the ethical dimensions of the problem to 
fade from consideration—with terrible consequences. 
 According to Tenbrunsel, this  ethical fading is not uncommon. The way a decision 
is framed can limit our perspective. If the decision is framed purely in terms of meeting 
business goals, ethical considerations may fade from view. In fact, we may become blind 
to the fact that we are confronting an ethical problem at all (Joffe-Walt and Spiegel 2012). 
 Another infamous ethical lapse involved the Ford Pinto, whose gas tank exploded 
in a number of rear-end collisions, resulting in fatalities. As Bazerman and Tenbrunsel 
describe (2011, 69–71), Ford discovered the dangers in preproduction testing. 
However, facing intense business competition, the company decided to go ahead 
with manufacturing anyway. The decision was based on a cost-benefit analysis. Ford 
apparently considered the choice as a business decision rather than an ethical decision 
and determined it would be cheaper to pay off lawsuits than make the repair. The impact 
of dehumanizing this risk decision was disastrous. 
 In the past, many information technology risk decisions have often been considered 
only in terms of their potential business impact. As information technology is integrated 
into more and more products, decisions about information risk will increasingly affect 
the lives of millions of people, making it essential to consider the ethical as well as the 
business dimensions of information risks. It becomes even more important that we, 
as CISOs, keep ethical considerations to the forefront. What is the potential impact 
of a security breach when a car’s sensors and control systems can be accessed via the 
Internet? Or when medical life-support equipment can be remotely controlled using 
wireless links? 
 How to Mitigate the Misperception of Risk 
 It should be apparent by now that the tendency to misperceive risk is universal. We need to 
find ways to help compensate for this misperception, given that it is our job to manage risk. 
As security professionals and managers, how can we  mitigate the misperception of risk? 
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 We can start by ensuring that we include a diversity of viewpoints when making risk 
management decisions. Whenever possible, we should involve a broad cross-section of 
individuals representing groups across the organization. This diversity helps compensate 
for individual biases. 
 However, assembling the right mix of people is only the first step in building a 
more complete picture of risk. As information security and risk professionals, we need 
to ensure that the discussion brings up new perspectives and views. We must ask 
penetrating questions designed to bring alternative viewpoints to the surface. I think 
of these as  high-contrast questions because the process is analogous to adjusting the 
contrast or colors of a photograph to highlight key elements of possible interest. This 
questioning counteracts the  inevitable bias due to target fixation. We can also help 
counter target fixation by simply recognizing it exists, and then consciously trying to see 
the problem from someone else’s viewpoint. 
 In addition, we need to continually seek out the minority report, the view that is 
contrary to perceived wisdom. If the majority is telling us to turn right, are we missing 
something important that we’d find out by turning left? In a striking example, Israel’s 
Directorate of Military Intelligence considered this viewpoint so important that it created 
a devil’s advocate office as an institutional safeguard against group-think. The office’s job 
was to criticize analysis coming from the Directorate’s other divisions and write papers 
countering the analysis. In order to explore alternative assumptions and worst-case 
scenarios, it examined possible radical security developments scenarios, including those 
that the defense establishment considered unlikely. Notably, the office was staffed by 
experienced, highly regarded people known for their creative thinking, and its reports 
went directly to all major decision-makers (Kuperwasser 2007). 
 Uncovering New Perspectives During Risk  Assessments 
 Risk  assessment models can be valuable tools for helping to evaluate risks and to 
prioritize security resources. But all models have limitations. If we base our decisions 
solely on the results generated by a model, we may miss important risks. 
 Many organizations use a risk assessment model based on a standard methodology. 
The model scores each risk using the following formula: 
 Impact of Asset Loss × Probability of Threat × Vulnerability Exposure = 
Total Risk Points 
 For each risk, we assign a rating to each of the three contributing factors in the 
formula. To illustrate, I’ll use a scale of 1 to 5. A high-value asset, such as a microprocessor 
design, might warrant a rating of 5. 
 We then multiply the three ratings to obtain the total risk points. In this example, the 
maximum possible risk score is therefore 53, or 125. 
 A simple approach to risk management, using the output of the model, would be to 
divide the security budget among the highest-scoring risks. 
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 The model is valuable because it provides a consistent method for helping compare 
and prioritize a broad spectrum of risks. However, allocating resources based only on 
the overall risk score can miss potentially disastrous “black swan” events that have very 
low probability but extremely high impact (Taleb 2007). Because the formula simply 
multiplies three ratings to obtain the overall score, black swans tend not to score as highly 
as lower-impact events with higher probability. 
 To counteract this problem, we can examine the information in the model in more 
detail, from different perspectives. We can create a list of the 20 most valuable assets and 
consider whether they need additional controls. In the same way, we can examine the top 
threats and vulnerability areas. 
 The point is that any model used to calculate risk should be used as a framework to 
drive a dialogue about all the variables and options, rather than as a tool that generates 
the answers to our problems. By discussing the issues from a variety of perspectives, we 
may identify important concerns we’d miss if we simply look at the overall risk scores. 
 Before I moved into the information security field, I worked in finance. In our 
finance group, we found the same principle held true when conducting ROI (return on 
investment) analysis. Our ROI model generated forecasts. However, it was by discussing 
the model’s assumptions that we determined whether or not the model’s predicted 
financial returns were reasonable. 
 Another method for prioritizing information systems risk management is to examine 
systems from the perspective of critical business processes and to consider the impact of 
a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability. 
 An application that prints shipping labels may initially appear to be low priority 
because it is small, inexpensive, and doesn’t contain confidential data; it simply takes the 
information it needs from a customer information system on the network. However, if it’s 
unavailable because the network is experiencing problems, the impact is huge because 
the company cannot ship products. 
 The potential impact to a business process of losing confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability may also vary depending on the stage of the business cycle. Consider a payroll 
system. Information confidentiality and integrity are always important, but availability is 
exceptionally critical on payday. 
 Communication Is Essential 
 Communication is an essential part of any strategy to mitigate the misperception of risk. 
To alter the way people behave, we need to change their perception of risk. To effect that 
change, we must communicate with them. 
 Changing  perceptions is difficult. We may need to address long-held preconceptions 
about what is risky and what is not. Once people form an initial estimate of risk, they can 
be remarkably resistant to adjusting their perception, even when given new information 
(Breakwell 2007, 59). 
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 In addition, each person may have a different perception of risk. To communicate 
effectively, we may need to understand an individual’s viewpoint and then tailor our 
communication accordingly. Consider the example of taking laptops to countries with a 
high risk of information theft (see sidebar). People who are extremely concerned may need a 
patient, thorough explanation of the risks and benefits of taking their laptop versus leaving it 
in the office. A less fearful individual may just need a quick reassurance and a few basic facts. 
 Although changing risk perceptions can be challenging, we don’t have any choice 
but to try. Employees will use social media whether we like it or not. When they do, they 
may not only put themselves at risk; they could be putting the company at risk too, if they 
are not careful. 
 Communication can reduce the issue of misperception due to asymmetry of 
 information . This asymmetry is created when security professionals know about risks but 
don’t share the information with end users within their organization. When two parties 
differ in their knowledge of a threat or vulnerability, their perception of risk is likely to 
differ also. In other words, it is difficult for users to care about a hazard if they don’t even 
know it exists. 
 To succeed in changing users’ perceptions, we must communicate in ways that 
engage them, using language they understand rather than technical jargon. In my roles as 
a security professional, I have always tried to employ entertaining, interactive video tools 
to help engage users and teach them how to spot dangers such as phishing web sites. As 
I’ll explain further in Chapter  5 , I have found these methods have been highly effective in 
changing users’ awareness and perceptions, and ultimately in shaping their behavior. 
 Patiently explaining to users the consequences of their actions can also help shape 
their perception of risk. In some countries,  pirating software is so commonplace that it 
is almost an accepted part of the culture. This poses a problem for many multinational 
companies. Employees in these countries may not even believe copying software 
is wrong, let alone view it as an illegal act. It can be useful to describe the potential 
consequences of copyright infringement for the individual and for the organization. We 
can explain to employees that a decision to pirate software can expose the company to 
software license compliance risks. The consequences may be even more far-reaching if 
the copied software is then incorporated into the company’s technology-based products 
or services. If a product is discovered to include stolen software, the company may be 
unable to ship it to customers, which means a significant loss of revenue. Of course, 
employees may experience personal consequences too: if they copy software, they run a 
high risk of losing their jobs. 
 Organizations as a whole may also be blind to risks, or may simply choose to ignore 
them. One way to overcome this misperception is to patiently build up a list of examples 
showing how other organizations ignored similar risks and experienced adverse 
consequences as a result, according to Breakwell, the University of Bath psychologist 
(pers. comm. 2012). The more examples in the list, the harder they are to ignore. 
 “Organizations stick their heads in the sand, ostrich-like,” she says. “But if you have 
a database of examples illustrating where things have gone wrong elsewhere, it becomes 
harder and harder to find enough sand to stick your head in.” 
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 CHALLENGING PRECONCEPTIONS: TAKING LAPTOPS TO 
HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES
 
 It may be necessary to challenge perceived wisdom in order to expose a clear 
picture of the real risks, and consequently make the right decision.  
 Some companies react to the higher rates of intellectual property theft in certain 
countries by barring employees from taking their corporate laptops on business 
trips to those countries. In some cases, the companies issue employees with a new 
“clean” system from which all corporate data has been purged. 
 The goal is to prevent situations in which information theft might occur, such as 
when an employee leaves a laptop containing corporate data unattended in a hotel 
room. A malicious individual could then get physical access to the system and copy 
the data or implant software that will surreptitiously steal information over time. 
 But does preventing employees from taking their familiar laptops really solve 
the problem? Let’s suppose we issue employees with a new, data-free laptop. 
To do their jobs, they’ll still need to use this system to log into their corporate 
e-mail and other applications—providing an opportunity for hackers to intercept 
the network traffic. 
 Furthermore, if attackers really want to target an individual, they have ways to do it 
without gaining physical access to the system. With a spearphishing attack, they can 
induce the individual to click on a malicious link that remotely downloads malware. 
 Preventing employees from taking their laptops and information also deprives the 
organization of the key business benefits of using a full-featured portable computing 
device; employees will likely be less productive as a result. So when assessing the 
risks of traveling with mobile devices, an organization needs to think through the 
tradeoff between risk and benefit, including the cost of providing what they believe 
to be a “clean” system and the impact on the user. 
 Building Credibility 
 Ultimately, our ability to influence people’s risk perception depends on our credibility. 
We need to build trusted relationships with executives and specialists across the 
organization to ensure our security concerns are seriously considered rather than seen as 
fear-mongering or target fixation. 
 Trust is built in drips and lost in buckets; it is hard to create and easy to destroy. 
If we create a security scare about a threat that turns out to be irrelevant or overblown, 
we may be seen as just another source of misperception. If business groups think we are 
providing unreliable and exaggerated information, will they trust us to provide 
their security? 
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 We can establish credibility by demonstrating consistency, striving for objectivity, 
and showing that we can accurately predict the real security issues affecting the 
organization, and then communicate them in an effective and timely way. As I’ll describe 
in Chapter  10 , we need to communicate security issues more frequently at C-suite level; 
to do so, we need to be able to clearly explain security issues in terms of enterprise risk. 
 Credibility is also built on the competence that comes from understanding the 
business and technology as well as possessing core security skills. As the scope and 
importance of information security continue to expand, creating this credibility provides 
an opportunity to step into a more valuable, high-profile role within the organization. 
31© Malcolm W. Harkins 2016 
M.W. Harkins, Managing Risk and Information Security, 
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4842-1455-8_3
 CHAPTER 3 
 Governance and Internal 
Partnerships: How to Sense, 
Interpret, and Act on Risk 
 If we are together, nothing is impossible. If we are divided, all will fail. 
 —Winston Churchill 
 To reduce cost, our company’s human resources group wants to move all HR-related 
processes to a SaaS provider, a cloud-based business that’s less than five years old. 
At first glance, this might seem a low-risk decision. There’s a clear business case, and 
outsourcing HR systems doesn’t seem to create risks to corporate information assets such 
as intellectual property. Most businesses regard HR systems as commodity applications, so 
they might select the supplier who can deliver the required functionality at the lowest cost. 
 But there’s more to consider. Employees’ personal information will be transferred 
to the outsourcer, potentially creating new privacy concerns. And imagine the impact 
if thousands of our employees don’t get paid because the supplier experiences system 
problems on payday and lacks adequate disaster recovery  capabilities . 
 Clearly, the HR group owns the HR business processes. However, outsourcing these 
applications and processes can introduce risks for the entire business. The systems 
that support HR processes can create  information risks . Outsourcing also involves 
procurement. The business needs a clear overview of all the factors, including the risks, 
in order to make the best decision. To provide this view, the HR, procurement, and 
information risk and security groups need to work together. 
 A typical organization makes many decisions that require this kind of  internal 
partnership to manage the risk. A product group wants to outsource development work 
to bring a product to market more quickly. A marketing team wants to engage a developer 
for a new social media initiative. 
 Similar considerations also apply to internal  technology transitions such as OS 
and application upgrades. Each new technology introduces new capabilities and risks. 
Sometimes, the technology also includes features or options designed to help reduce 
risk. By carefully analyzing the risk and security implications, including privacy and 
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e-discovery considerations, we can help manage the risk of the transition, and we can 
often capitalize on the new features to improve the risk picture overall. 
 For example, when Intel IT was considering whether to migrate to Microsoft 
Windows 7, the information  security team partnered with other groups in a broad 
evaluation of the OS. We identified several features that could improve security compared 
with previous versions of Microsoft Windows, and these security capabilities were an 
important factor in the decision to deploy Microsoft Windows 7 across Intel’s enterprise 
environment (Fong, Kohlenberg, and Philips 2010). 
 The ability to make these decisions with an accurate view of risk depends on having 
the right organizational structure in place. Because each organization is different, there’s 
no single, standard risk management structure that applies to all organizations. But at any 
organization, building an effective risk management structure involves considering two 
 key areas , which I’ll discuss in this chapter:
•  Clearly defined information risk governance : Governance 
defines who makes decisions, who can block them, and who is 
allowed to provide input. 
•  Strong partnerships and multi-stakeholder collaboration : 
Collaboration between the information risk and security team and 
other internal groups is critical in forming an accurate view of risk 
and managing risk overall. Some partnerships are formally defined 
as part of the risk governance structure; others are informal 
relationships. These formal and informal relationships are so 
important that I’ll dedicate a large part of this chapter to them.  
 Information Risk Governance 
 Governance is about establishing a structure that enables the organization to effectively 
sense, interpret, and act on risk. Traditionally, information risk governance has been 
considered as a component of IT governance. The IT-centric view is encapsulated in a 
definition from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for Information Systems 
Research (MIT CISR): 
 “ . . . A framework for decision rights and accountability to encourage 
desirable behavior in the use of IT. Governance identifies who will make 
key IT decisions and how will they be held accountable.” 
 But as every company becomes to some extent a technology company, we need to 
broaden this definition to include the information risk associated with technology-based 
products and services. Perhaps a better definition for this broader view is “Governance 
identifies who will make key  information risk decisions and how will they be held 
accountable.” 
 Information risk governance focuses on enabling the business while protecting the 
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information, whether it is corporate data or 
personal information about employees or customers. It requires the involvement of the 
entire organization. To achieve effective information risk governance, the information 
risk and security team must work closely with other groups. 
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 A company’s primary areas of information risk are closely intertwined, underlining 
the need for an effective governance structure that embraces all of these areas. For 
example, a hacker might compromise the IT systems used by the company’s product 
developers, and then use those systems as a way to introduce malware into the company’s 
technology-based products. 
 Think about how easily security researchers were able to hack into Jeeps and other 
vehicles over the past couple of years, demonstrating their ability to remotely take control of the 
car with potentially  life-threatening consequences . Clearly, security may not have adequately 
considered such a scenario when the car’s product groups designed those features. Yet any big 
company, including automakers, typically has large teams of people dedicated to managing 
information risk. It seems that in the case of the automakers, the companies perhaps lacked 
an effective structure for managing information risk wherever it occurs, whether that is in the 
company’s products and services or within back-office IT systems. 
 To some people, the word governance may imply unnecessary bureaucracy, or 
perhaps even a  dictatorial approach.  MIT CISR notes that “good governance is enabling 
and reduces bureaucracy and dysfunctional politics by formalizing organizational 
learning and thus avoiding the trap of making the same mistakes over and over again.” 
 Research at  MIT CISR shows that the more businesses leverage the structure, tools, 
and techniques of governance, the greater the potential benefits. In fact, MIT CISR’s 
work suggests that firms with effective IT governance enjoy profits that average at least 20 
percent higher than their competitors (MIT CISR 2012). 
 However, leveraging governance doesn’t imply slavishly following rules and 
procedures. A few years ago, I encountered an IT professional who was regarded by some 
people, including himself, as one of the best managers in IT. He rigorously based his 
project decisions on the prescribed practices and procedures, and gathered the correct 
metrics for reporting progress. Yet the projects he was responsible for generally turned 
out to be large, expensive failures. His obsession with correct procedures often impeded, 
rather than facilitated, the projects he was working on. 
 To use an analogy, if you gave the same recipe to a top chef and an average cook, 
would you expect them to produce exactly the same result? Probably not. Expert chefs 
don’t simply follow the rules; they continually make adjustments using their senses and 
experience to achieve the best results. The temperature of a cooking surface is not exactly 
uniform, so a chef may move the pots until they’re simmering just right. Fresh ingredients 
vary from day to day; the experienced chef is alert to the differences and tweaks the recipe 
and seasonings accordingly. 
 Like  the procedure-obsessed IT project manager, we may scrupulously adhere to the 
rules but fail to achieve the desired outcome. 
 This is one reason that partnerships with other groups are so critical. They provide 
channels for dialogue, helping us sense changing business priorities so that we mitigate 
risk based on those priorities rather than our preconceptions. 
 Without a governance structure that facilitates this dialogue, organizations may take 
too rigid an approach when applying controls to manage and mitigate risks. For example, 
some security groups try to ban the business use of social media due to the risks, but 
attempting to stop the use of external social media web sites is counterproductive and, 
in any case, impossible. At Intel, we found it was more effective to embrace social media 
and shape the way that employees use it, as I’ll describe in Chapter  5 . This approach, 
developed in partnership with other internal groups, enabled the organization to enjoy 
the benefits of social media while managing the risk. 
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 Finding the Right Governance  Structure 
 No single governance structure will fit all companies (see Table  3-1 and the sidebar 
“IT Governance Archetypes”). Furthermore, organizations may shift between different 
risk governance models over time. When most organizations’ information assets were 
primarily managed in centralized IT systems, it was natural for information risk to be a 
centralized function managed within the IT group. But now, information-related risks 
are much more distributed. To drive corporate revenue, many companies are developing 
technology-based products and services more or less independently from the central IT 
organization. At the same time, business groups are shifting to cloud-based applications 
that store corporate and customer information at external cloud providers. 
 Table 3-1.  IT Governance Archetypes. Source: Weill and Ross  2000 
 Style  Who has decision or input rights 
 Business Monarchy  A group of business or individual executives (CxOs). 
Includes committees of senior business executives 
(may include CIO). 
 IT Monarchy  IT executives. 
 Feudal  Business unit leaders, key process owners, or their 
delegates. 
 Federal  C-level executives and business groups; may also 
include IT executives. Equivalent of central and 
state governments working together. 
 IT Duopoly  IT executives and one other group (for example, 
CxO or business unit leaders). 
 Anarchy  Each individual user. 
 IT GOVERNANCE ARCHETYPES
 When considering the right risk governance structure for your organization, it may 
be entertaining to think about how your organization compares with the deliberately 
provocative governance archetypes, ranging from a feudal structure to anarchy, 
identified by MIT CISR in the influential book  IT Governance (Weill and Ross 2000, 59). 
 In practice, organizations may shift between different risk governance models over 
time—from an IT-centric monarchy during the mainframe era, toward a feudal 
model or business monarchy as distributed systems emerged, swinging back to a 
federal model as they recognized there’s a role for centralized IT, then shifting again 
towards a business monarchy with the focus on technology-based products and 
cloud computing. 
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 Today, many organizations may find that it makes sense to establish a  hybrid 
governance model that balances centralized and decentralized risk management 
functions. At the same time, the need for a single, broad view of all information-related 
risks is driving organizations to create an executive role with overall responsibility for 
information risk. The executive often has the title of Chief Information Risk Officer 
(CIRO) or sometimes the  Chief Security and Privacy Officer (CSPO) . The executive’s 
broad responsibilities encompass the roles of Chief Information Security Officer (CISO)/
Chief Security Officer (CSO) and Chief Privacy Officer (CPO). 
 To consider how this model works, let’s first think about all the interrelated risks that 
an enterprise needs to manage. Figure  3-1 shows each primary area and the core elements 
that are common to all of them. The CSPO’s role is to manage this “Rubik’s Cube of risk.” 
 Now consider the governance model, the organization’s framework for managing 
those risks, shown in Figure  3-2 . It consists of four main areas:
•  Oversight : This area focuses on making informed risk decisions 
and reviewing risks. It includes committees and review boards 
that set strategic direction, and review key risk areas such as 
ethics, compliance, and corporate investigations. 
•  Monitoring :  Monitor (sense) risk through external and internal 
sources. External sources include industry research and analysis. 
Internal sources include internal partners who inform us of new 
business risks or legal requirements. These internal sources also 
include our own security technology sensors. 
 Figure 3-1.  Security and privacy : the primary areas of information risk, and the core 
elements of information risk management that apply to each area 
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•  Engagement : Participate in industry workgroups and in 
partnerships and dialogues with trusted peer organizations. 
These external  engagements provide a valuable risk-sensing 
function and help influence key security initiatives. I’ll discuss 
external partnerships in more detail in Chapter  4 . 
•  Operations : Day-to-day risk management activities and 
processes, including risk assessments, incident response, and 
exercises such as war games. 
 Typically, the  corporate governance model should achieve a balance of 
centralization and decentralization. At most large companies, risk is decentralized: at any 
one time, our companies are planning or managing many technology-related initiatives 
and events across practically every part of the business. Therefore, we need decentralized 
risk management processes; too much centralization can mean losing the ability to sense 
threats and respond in an agile way. But at the same time, we need a broad centralized 
view of the dynamic risk landscape and the ability to set organization-wide policies in 
areas such as security, ethics, and privacy. So the model must allow a centralized view 
and ownership of key risk functions, along with the ability for decentralized execution. 
 The CSPO and the information risk and security team are involved in all four 
quadrants of the model. The  CSPO tends to be more focused on oversight and 
engagement, while the team’s members naturally tend to be more involved with 
monitoring and day-to-day operations.  
 Figure 3-2.  A  corporate information risk governance model 
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 For most functions, the CSPO and team work with other parts of the organization, 
either taking primary responsibility or operating in a participatory role. In the Oversight 
quadrant, for example, the CSPO may sit on the ethics committee and participate in 
business unit risk management reviews. In monitoring, the CSPO’s team may have 
primary responsibility for threat landscape reviews and threat indicators, but take more 
of a participatory role in internal audits and assessing business unit risks. In operations, 
the team may own responsibility for the security development lifecycle and privacy 
by design, while participating in change control. It should be apparent that all of these 
functions require collaboration with other groups within the organization. 
 Building Internal Partnerships 
 By providing vehicles for dialogue and decision-making, internal partnerships and multi-
stakeholder collaborations enable  information security teams to become more agile and 
responsive to business needs. The number of potential partnerships has grown as the 
scope of information risk has broadened to include a range of privacy and regulatory 
concerns as well as traditional security threats. 
 In mature and proactive organizations, the information risk and security team 
partners with many internal groups for a variety of functions, including risk management 
decisions, incident response, and monitoring. These groups include legal, finance, 
human resources, physical security, and business groups. 
 Partnerships may include formal structures such as  standing committees as well  as 
 a large number of informal and ad hoc relationships. These are created and maintained 
through everyday communication with people in other groups. We might initially contact 
a business group to understand the potential impact of an emerging area of legislation. 
The business group identifies risks and opportunities that we hadn’t even considered. Our 
initial request thus sparks a dialogue about requirements and controls, and ultimately 
evolves into a partnership that helps us monitor risks and mitigate them. We also gain 
business acumen, which helps us play a more valuable role within the organization.  
 In my roles running risk and security, partnerships and multi-stakeholder 
collaboration have been critical to my success in understanding the broader risk picture, 
helping the organization sense, interpret, and act on risk. Through these relationships, 
other groups can act as additional eyes and ears for the  information security group , such 
as security threats and compliance concerns. For example, the HR legal group might 
alert us to an employment-related regulation that creates new compliance concerns. 
Information about risks flows in the other direction, too: we may alert our partner to new 
threats that we’ve encountered. As we leverage other groups to look out for our interests, 
they can also use us to look out for their interests. We also work with partners to interpret 
this shared information through analysis and decide how to act in response. 
 Internal partnerships may focus on just one of the areas shown in Figure  3-2 , 
or they may intersect multiple areas. For example, we partner with HR for incident 
response (operations) and to learn about new employment laws (monitoring). Multiple 
partnerships may also be required within each focus area: with the growing number of 
regulatory requirements, partnerships with internal groups such as HR, legal, corporate 
security, and internal auditing become increasingly important and valuable in the area of 
operational investigations. 
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 Because no two organizations are identical, each organization may require a 
different set of internal partnerships, depending on its structure and business needs. 
Every partnership should be created with a clear purpose. The organization should 
also clearly define who is involved and who makes the decisions. To determine the 
partnerships your information security group needs, as well as their structure and 
purpose, it may be useful to ask the following questions:
•  Who do we need to partner with and why? To put it another way, 
who do I interact with every day, and why do I interact with them? 
•  What benefits do I receive from that interaction, and what 
benefits does my partner receive? 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I’ll discuss some examples of important partnerships, 
describing how we can use them and the value they provide. I’ll start by examining 
partnerships with  fellow travelers who have complementary roles in managing business 
risk and liability: legal, finance, human resources, corporate security, and corporate risk 
management groups. Then, I’ll examine partnerships with business group managers. 
 Legal 
 Legal groups are among the information security group’s most important partners 
because of the many areas where their roles intersect with ours. They own the 
responsibility for legal compliance and legal review. They interpret laws, analyzing 
the implications and relaying the relevant information to the rest of the organization. 
Key partnership areas include privacy, litigation, intellectual property, contracts, and 
compliance with financial regulations. 
 As companies create more technology-based products and services, their initiatives 
are likely to come within the scope of a broader range of laws and regulations. Health-
monitoring products might fall within the purview of the Food and Drug Administration; 
companies thinking about using drones for photography need to think about Federal 
Aviation Administration requirements. 
 Privacy 
 As privacy regulations continue to grow in complexity and reach, many  organizations 
need to comply with multiple requirements at local, regional, and national levels. Legal 
specialists across the organization can help us understand what’s required in each 
geography, align policies and controls for protecting personal information, and decide 
how to manage responses in the event of a breach. 
 Even local regulations can have implications across the enterprise. For example, 
citizens of European countries are subject to European and national privacy laws and 
regulations. The simple transfer of European employee personnel information to a US-
based server will trigger a need to comply with the EU data privacy laws regarding such 
transfer of employee information. 
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 Litigation 
 As one might expect, it’s essential to partner with legal specialists in situations where 
litigation is possible or already in process. Examples are investigations of security 
breaches, particularly when law enforcement is involved. Another area of partnership is 
in responding to subpoenas and litigation discovery orders; a legal group may need to 
work with the information security team in order to collect the required information. To 
ensure that data is available for discovery when needed, we may also need to collaborate 
with the legal group to implement appropriate data retention policies. 
 Intellectual Property 
 Many organizations use a  data classification  structure to protect intellectual property, 
with the most highly classified information receiving the greatest protection. We work 
with legal groups to specify the classification structure and then implement controls 
on management and distribution of such information to provide the appropriate level 
of protection. We also partner to respond to suspected or known IP thefts. Suppose 
an employee loses a laptop storing the designs of future products; a dialogue with IP 
attorneys is essential to understand the implications and decide how to respond. 
 Contracts 
 Almost every contract with a supplier or customer contains a confidentiality provision, 
which sets expectations about how each party will maintain the confidentiality of the 
business transaction and any shared confidential information. We partner with the 
procurement organization as well as the legal group to define and implement these 
requirements into contracts. 
 If our company decides to outsource a business application to an external supplier, 
we’ll typically work with the procurement organization and legal team to define these 
confidentiality and data security expectations, as well as the evidence we’ll need to 
validate that those controls are operating properly. For example, when hiring a company 
to manage health benefits, we set expectations about how they must protect our 
employees’ personal health information. 
 Our customers have expectations, too. Another company may need to share some 
IP with us to help us integrate our technology into their product. We need to understand 
their requirements and ensure that appropriate controls are implemented. 
 A security technology supplier has to meet customer expectations that go beyond the 
product’s ability to provide protection. As I mentioned in Chapter  1 , one of the irrefutable 
laws of security is that even a security feature can be used for harm. So suppliers must be 
able to discuss their security development lifecyle, privacy by design, and overall state of 
internal controls, all of which could ultimately affect the efficacy of the product. 
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 Financial Compliance 
 In the United States and other countries, public companies are legally required to 
disclose “material events,” those likely to have significant financial impact that could 
affect investor decisions, including IT-related incidents. An important aspect of risk 
governance, therefore, is partnering with legal groups to understand the types of events 
and specific incidents that must be reported. 
 Guidance from the US Securities and Exchange Commission specifically discusses 
the obligation to disclose the impact of cyber attacks, including those that result in IP 
thefts. Companies are also required to disclose material increases in security spending in 
response to an attack, even if the attack didn’t result in a loss of IP (SEC 2011). 
 The legal team cannot do this alone because it lacks the security context of the event: 
the frequency of specific types of attack, the potential impact, and the cost of response. 
Therefore, the security team must be involved. 
 In 2010, Google disclosed that it had been breached in the widely publicized 
Operation Aurora attack. At around the same time, Intel also experienced an incident 
of similar sophistication. This was before the SEC issued its guidance in 2011, but as I 
pondered the potential ramifications of a cyber breach one sleepless night, I realized that 
I should call our SEC legal experts to discuss the incident. Subsequently, we disclosed the 
incident in our financial report for the first quarter of 2010 (Intel 2010). 
 Legal Specialists Within  Business Groups 
 At large companies, each business group may have embedded legal experts. We need 
to work with them for issues directly related to their group. In addition, because of their 
connections within the group, these legal professionals can be extremely helpful in 
influencing the group’s controls and expectations. 
 Marketing groups, for example, usually include individuals who want to explore new 
ways to communicate with users via social media. This appetite for adventure is a good 
thing; it can benefit the business. But at the same time, we have to ensure that content is 
adequately protected and includes appropriate privacy protection and statements. If we 
bring up the issue directly with marketers, we may receive a lukewarm response, as they 
tend to view any controls as restrictions on their ability to move quickly. But the legal 
professionals within the marketing group understand the need for controls. So a good 
way to raise our concerns is to have a conversation with the business group’s attorney, 
who can help persuade others in the group that controls are needed. 
 While I was Chief Security and Privacy Officer at Intel, we implemented a program 
that reviewed all new externally facing online projects and monitors for potential problems 
(see sidebar). The projects ranged from web sites to more sophisticated tools, such as an 
application that users can download and use in conjunction with external social media sites. 
 As part of the review, we asked the project group who their legal contacts were so 
that we could verify that they’d received legal approval. We also asked whether trademark 
and branding teams had reviewed the initiative, which was essential in many cases—
especially if the project was planning to register a new web site. Sometimes the answer 
was no, in which case we facilitated a dialogue with the trademarks and brands team. 
This enabled the trademark and brand people to manage the risk and helped forge yet 
another important relationship within the company. 
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 SECURING INTEL’S EXTERNAL ONLINE PRESENCE
 Intel’s business groups use hundreds of web sites and third-party solutions, 
including social media platforms, to communicate and conduct business with 
customers and business partners. Collectively, these externally facing Intel-branded 
solutions were known as Intel’s  external presence . 
 Until 2006, these web sites proliferated rapidly in response to business needs, 
without centralized oversight. Given this growth and following a number of security 
incidents and the identification of several significant risks, we established the  Intel 
Secure External Presence (ISEP) program to provide appropriate security for Intel’s 
external presence (Leon 2011). 
 The goals of ISEP, which was a part of Intel’s information security group, were to 
protect Intel’s information assets and customers against threats such as loss of 
personal information and malware attacks, and to maintain compliance with laws, 
regulations, and standards. By achieving these goals, we also helped to protect 
Intel’s corporate image. 
 We helped ensure this protection and compliance by reviewing all planned new 
external presence projects and by monitoring existing Intel-branded web sites. 
ISEP review and approval was mandatory for new externally facing online projects. 
We worked with Intel business groups to review planned projects before launch, 
whether they were to be hosted within Intel or by a third party. 
 Any  ISEP-like process for reviewing a company’s external presence should include 
several key aspects:
•  Ensure notification of new projects by working closely with business 
groups and other stakeholders within the company. For example, the 
information risk and security team should be notified when business 
groups request new Internet domain names or seek approval to land a 
new application in the externally facing IT environment.  
•  Work with the business group on each project to review details 
of the planned approach to maintaining security and privacy 
compliance. Verify that the project includes any required mitigating 
controls before giving approval. 
•  Establish an overarching governance board , including senior 
managers from multiple stakeholder groups. This board should have 
enforcement powers including the ability to shut down web sites for 
noncompliance. 
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 Human Resources 
 The human resources group is the organization’s center of expertise on  employee 
procedures,  include legal specialists who are the organization’s experts on employee-
related laws. Because of its responsibilities, the HR group also tends to be heavily involved 
in insider risk considerations and applying action in any cases that are discovered. In some 
organizations, HR is also responsible for other functions, including internal and external 
communications. Because of this broad charter, the security team may form valuable 
partnerships with HR in several areas, including employee policies related to appropriate 
use and protection of information assets, internal communications, and investigations. 
 Setting Employee Expectations in  Security Policies 
 Employees are part of the security perimeter, as I’ll discuss in Chapter  . Their behavior 
can have as much impact on security as the technical controls we use—particularly since 
a growing number of user interactions with the outside world take place on external web 
sites and networks, and on personal devices such as smartphones. 
 It is therefore critical to create employee policies that set expectations for secure 
behavior. If we can influence employees to behave in more secure ways, we can reduce 
risk for the business overall. However, the security team cannot write these policies 
without partnering with HR, including HR legal specialists, to ensure that they comply 
with employment laws and the organization’s existing rules. Then, if an employee 
disregards the policies, we need to work with HR to take disciplinary action. 
 Careless behavior can have highly damaging consequences. Imagine an IT employee 
who decides to store some corporate data on a server at his home so that he can more 
easily work on projects when out of the office. But his home system is open to the 
Internet, and thus the data may be broadly exposed to anyone worldwide. 
 The employee’s action has created a significant security risk. To explain the potential 
impact to HR, it may help to use analogies. We could say it’s like an engineer taking 
critical product designs home and showing them to her neighbors. Or a factory employee 
taking dangerous chemicals home to experiment with them, and creating the danger of 
an explosion in his garage. If we have a good relationship with HR, we can have this kind 
of discussion and determine the appropriate consequences for the employee. 
 Employee Communications 
 The responsibilities of the employee communications group often include employee 
training, employee awareness, and internal distribution of other corporate information. 
This group’s expertise can be very useful when we want to communicate security 
messages to the workforce. The group already has established communication channels 
and knows how to align messages with corporate style guidelines. A good employee 
communications group also knows how to present information in ways that engage 
employees rather than intimidate them. 
 In my prior roles running security and privacy, I always worked extensively with 
the employee communications group to create engaging security awareness messages, 
including interactive content that helps encourage secure practices when using social 
media and the Web. 
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 Investigations 
 Partnership with HR is also essential in internal investigations, including investigations 
into insider  threats responses. In other cases, we may already be pursuing an 
investigation and need help from HR legal specialists to access employee information. 
 Finance 
 The finance group typically takes the lead in managing enterprise-level risk and controls 
for the organization overall. Therefore, we need to partner with the finance group to 
assess the business impact of damage to information assets—a loss of confidentiality, 
integrity, or availability. This applies not only to internal systems that support business 
operations, but also to information technology-based products and services that generate 
revenue. We also work together to determine the required controls. 
 Sarbanes-Oxley  Compliance 
 The corporate finance team usually has overall responsibility for Sarbanes-Oxley ( SOX) 
 infrastructure. We also work with the finance group, as well as legal groups, to determine 
whether we should categorize specific events as material and report them as required by 
SOX. This also includes product- or service-related vulnerabilities and controls that could 
have a material effect on revenue or corporate liability. 
 Working with  Business Groups 
 Each sizeable business group is likely to have a group controller or other financial 
specialist responsible for financial controls. These finance experts can become important 
partners for the security team. 
 Because financial specialists focus on risk and controls, the culture among finance 
specialists has some similarities with the culture of the information risk and security 
teams. This shared focus can make it easier for us to communicate our concerns, 
particularly since the impact of information risk is often measured in financial terms. 
Therefore, the financial specialist can be a key contact point when we need to discuss 
information risk with business groups. 
 Sometimes these risk conversations can evolve into productive multi-way 
partnerships. A recent example: an IT team presented plans for new systems to support 
one of Intel’s new businesses. As we assessed the information risks, we noticed that the 
plan didn’t include fully redundant systems to ensure business continuity. When we 
asked why, it emerged that the business group hadn’t requested redundancy because it 
would add cost. Revenue from this new business was initially expected to be modest, so 
the group’s budget was limited. 
 However, when we discussed the revenue projections with the finance specialists 
who worked on the project, they expected the business to grow rapidly. This growth 
would also increase the information-related risk because a system failure would have a 
much bigger impact on revenue. As we discussed the implications, it became clear that it 
would make more sense to prepare for the anticipated growth by including redundancy 
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from the start. So we suggested that the business group negotiate a higher budget—and 
that’s what happened through a partnership between the business group managers, the 
information security team, and IT finance and business system specialists. The business 
group allocated increased funding that allowed IT to implement a redundancy safety net 
that would protect the growing business. 
 Internal Audit 
 Financial groups are often also responsible for an internal audit, which typically 
includes an IT auditing function—a job with considerable potential for overlap with the 
information security group’s role. If the security team and internal auditors duplicate 
each other’s efforts, we’ll waste resources and annoy business groups. Imagine that we 
contact a business manager to say that we need to conduct a risk evaluation of the group’s 
systems. The next day, internal auditors contact the same group and say they’re planning 
to do an audit, which some business managers might perceive to be essentially the same 
as a risk evaluation. What kind of reception do you think the auditors would receive? 
 We can minimize the overlap by partnering with internal auditors. This partnership 
becomes a mechanism for effectively allocating risk management resources. If the 
information security team has already assessed a system, auditors may be able to increase the 
efficiency of an audit by leveraging the work that the security team has already performed. 
 For effective partnership, our work must be thorough, transparent, and well 
documented so that auditors can see what we have done. We may also swap resources: 
sometimes security experts may act as guest auditors for specific projects because they 
have skills that the financial group lacks. The partnership can also be used for valuable 
dialogue and mutual support. If we’re concerned about a system that internal auditors 
have previously examined, we can ask for their opinion. We’ll sleep better knowing that 
another group of objective, risk-focused specialists has analyzed the system. 
 Corporate Risk Management 
 Most large organizations employ people whose job includes purchasing insurance 
for general business risks, including property and casualty insurance to protect the 
organization in the event of damage to a data center or another facility. When buying 
insurance, the corporate risk management team may need information from us about 
the organization’s IT business continuity and disaster recovery plans. Insurers ask for this 
information in order to set premiums. 
 Today, the corporate risk management team usually focuses on physical risks. But 
their scope is rapidly expanding to include IT-related risks as well as risks associated with 
products and services. Privacy breaches or other compromises can have a major impact 
on a company’s revenue, cost, and brand image. Because of this trend, insurance against 
cyber risks is a rapidly growing category, and we can expect a growing need to partner with 
the corporate risk management team to ensure adequate coverage of information risks. 
 Consider the case of Sony, which suffered a breach of its PlayStation Network—
estimated by the company to cost at least USD 200 million (Perlroth 2011)—and then 
became embroiled in a legal dispute with its insurer, which claimed Sony’s insurance 
policy did not cover cyber risk. The breach at Target, in which hackers stole the payment 
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card accounts and personal information of millions of customers, is estimated to have 
cost the company roughly $250 million. Reportedly, the insurance payout of $90 million 
left the company $158 million in the hole, plus what it paid for cyberattack insurance. 
 Privacy 
 Privacy and security are closely linked. However, increasing security doesn’t always 
enhance privacy. In fact, it can have the opposite effect. Unfettered bulk collection and 
monitoring of the information and activities of users and their machines may be capable 
of increasing security, but it may also intrude on personal privacy. This data store may 
also be an attractive target for intruders. 
 This creates inherent tension between security and privacy interests. This tension 
is apparent at a national level in the way that privacy advocates respond to the use of 
surveillance and data mining. Government security organizations may feel that they 
protect data extremely well, but privacy advocates still object to the fact that information 
is collected and the way it is used. 
 Similar concerns apply at the enterprise level. We need to carefully manage the 
relationship between security and privacy, ensuring that we apply the appropriate level of 
controls to protect information without infringing on personal privacy. 
 The structure of this relationship varies between organizations. While at Intel, the 
information risk group that I managed for over a decade included the privacy team, 
which reported to me as the CISO. Then as we began to see growing confluence of the 
risks shown in Figure  3-1 , I was promoted to a broader role as Chief Security and Privacy 
Officer, to give us an integrated governance and accountability structure. At other 
organizations, privacy is the responsibility of a separate group headed by a Chief Privacy 
Officer who is the CISO’s peer. This arrangement necessitates careful management of 
the relationship between security and privacy teams to manage tension, align policies, 
and control breaches. In organizations with this structure, the security team sometimes 
complains that the privacy team is “getting in their way,” which usually means that the 
security team wants to collect specific information and the privacy team objects. 
 Regardless of the organizational structure, it is the security team that is logically 
responsible for implementing IT controls. It is the product security team that is 
responsible for security development lifecyle ( SDLC ) and  product security incident 
response processes (PSIRT) . Laws define privacy rights; the organization’s interpretation 
of those laws drives compliance requirements. It is the security team’s responsibility to 
determine how to implement controls to support those requirements. 
 Corporate Security 
 The corporate security team focuses on physical security concerns ranging from door 
locks and guards to break-ins, fires, and natural disasters. By partnering with this team, 
we can make sure we’re aligned on protection of key information assets. It wouldn’t make 
sense to implement sophisticated data-protection tools on the servers in the data center 
and then leave the data center doors unlocked. 
 We also need to coordinate on other issues, including incidents that involve law 
enforcement. Not so long ago, assaults and harassment were almost always physical 
incidents handled by corporate security and the police. Today, there’s a much bigger 
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overlap with information security. More crime is moving online, and we may encounter 
other problems, such as cyber bullying. Because of these trends, we may need to help 
assess the impact and drive the response. 
 Business Group Managers 
 Each business group has its own processes and applications, whether it’s a product-
focused unit responsible for generating revenue or an internal group managing finance 
or human resources. The information security team needs to partner with each group to 
implement security controls that protect the group’s applications and information. 
 As the business acumen of our information security team increases, we can better 
fulfill our Protect to Enable mission by focusing on controls that improve security without 
impeding the business.  This applies not only to the systems that support business 
operations, but also to the technology-based products and services the business unit 
creates. For example, we may discover product vulnerabilities through our security 
development lifecycle processes. We can partner with the business group to correct 
vulnerabilities before shipment, and we can work on training to prevent future mistakes 
due to poor coding, design, or architecture. 
 By working with business groups, we can also leverage their strengths. Business 
group managers can help drive decision-making and incident response. They can also 
help improve security by setting the “tone at the top,” publicly setting expectations for 
their employees’ security behavior. Suppose we notice that an increasing number of the 
employees at a specific facility are experiencing laptop thefts. We discuss the trend with 
the general manager and explain that we want to increase employees’ awareness with 
messages about how to prevent theft. The business manager may offer to help by bringing 
up the topic at a site meeting or otherwise directly communicating with employees. This 
management request may exert a more powerful influence on employee behavior than 
messages sent by the security group. 
 HOW TO RESPOND TO EMERGENCIES
 Defining a clear IT incident  response process is an essential aspect of IT governance. 
Similarly, a clear PSIRT is an essential aspect of risk governance for technology-
based products and services. Over time, while I was at Intel, we developed a clearly 
defined crisis management process for responding to emergencies and other 
significant incidents that affect IT infrastructure or services (Fleming and Tomizawa 
2012). The goal of the process was to prevent material impact to the organization and 
its employees. Similarly, the goal of a PSIRT process is to prevent material impact to 
customers or even to society in general, depending on the nature of the risks. 
 Incidents that may trigger the process include cyber events and other information 
security incidents; physical incidents such as fires, leaks, and major outages 
that affect IT systems; and major disease outbreaks. A useful starting point for 
developing the process is the incident management principles based on the US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency’s response to disasters. 
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 Once initiated, an IT emergency response process ( ITERP) • operates with a 
command-and-control structure, led by an incident commander who has overriding 
authority to make decisions across IT for the duration of the emergency. The 
structure consists of a virtual organization staffed on a volunteer basis by people 
from every discipline within IT. When an incident occurs, all team members perform 
their response roles instead of their normal duties until all issues are resolved. 
 Following an incident, the team should quickly identify the state of critical business 
processes that must continue during the crisis. It determines the current status 
of the key steps in the product cycle: design, build, order, ship, pay, and close. It 
assesses the physical state of the infrastructure, and analyzes the legal and other 
impacts if intellectual property or personal information is compromised. Decisions 
about response and remediation are driven by the incident commander and 
determined by business priorities. 
 PSIRT and privacy response processes should be structured along similar lines, 
focused on their respective mission-critical priorities. 
 While I was at Intel, the ITERP team, the PSIRT team, and the privacy incident 
response team proved to be essential components of the successful resolution of 
every crisis management, coordination, control, and communication activity across 
the company during my 13.5-year tenure.  
 Conclusion 
 Information risk has become a major concern for the entire organization. Managing 
information risk therefore requires a clear governance structure that enables the 
organization to make the right security decisions quickly and effectively. 
 Building the right governance structure can sometimes seem like a complex 
challenge. I’ve found that a good way to simplify and focus the thought process is to 
consider the following two cardinal rules. In my experience, these rules apply to all 
organizations, whether large or small, public, private, or non-profit.
•  Rule 1:  Structure drives behavior . Thinking about the behaviors 
that you want to see in the areas of security and privacy will help 
lead you to a structure that encourages those behaviors. 
•  Rule 2:  You get what you measure . Thinking about the desired 
outcomes will help you determine how you should measure your 
organization’s success in managing risk. 
 Think about how your own organization manages information risk. Do you develop 
strategies in close collaboration with business groups? Do you feel that you communicate 
well enough with every group to understand their priorities and implement controls that 
reflect them? Have you clearly defined all of the processes required to respond to a major 
breach or denial-of-service attack? If you answered “no” to any of these questions, you 
may need to improve your information risk governance. 
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 Effective governance relies on partnerships between the information security team 
and other internal groups across practically every part of organization. In this chapter, I’ve 
described some of the most important partnerships and the value we can derive from them. 
 To develop these partnerships, CSPOs as well as Chief Security Officers and Chief 
Privacy Officers need more than just technical skills. We need to communicate in terms 
business people understand and build relationships that enable us to influence people at 
all levels across the organization. As the scope of information security expands, we also 
need extensive management and leadership skills, both to operate at an executive level 
and to coach and inspire our risk and security team. 
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 CHAPTER 4 
 External Partnerships: 
The Power of Sharing 
Information 
 Chance favors the connected mind. 
 —Steven Johnson 
 After spending a day at a conference, I was having dinner with a dozen or so peers when 
a debate began about the dangers and benefits of sharing security information with other 
companies. One person turned to me and asked me whether, if I had information about a 
specific new threat, I would share it with him. 
 “You bet,” I said. 
 “But what if I was your competitor? Would you still share?” he asked. 
 “Our companies might compete for business,” I replied, “but in the security 
arena, my real competitors are the malicious actors who want to harm my company’s 
information systems. Those are my competitors, and they’re your competitors, too.” 
 As soon as I’d said this, several people at the table agreed. This agreement was 
gratifying—and not just because I felt that I had support for my views. The bigger implication 
was that my peers saw the value of sharing information outside their companies. 
 This hasn’t always been the case. Historically, many organizations frowned on the idea 
of sharing security information externally, and more than a few had policies forbidding it. 
 However, attitudes are changing. Although there is still resistance at some companies, 
many organizations now see the value of sharing information and have begun doing so. 
Evidence includes the growth of industry-specific information-sharing communities, 
such as the retail-industry group that formed after Target’s massive customer-information 
breach in 2013. There are also innovative partnerships that have a regional rather than 
industry-specific focus, such as the Arizona Cyber Threat Response Alliance. 
 Supportive actions by the US Government have also helped encourage  information 
sharing . In 2014, the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice issued a 
policy statement indicating that sharing threat information was unlikely to raise antitrust 
concerns. This addressed a key reason that some big organizations had been reluctant to 
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share information. “Cyber threats are increasing in number and sophistication, and sharing 
information about these threats, such as incident reports, indicators, and threat signatures, is 
something companies can do to protect their information systems,” said Bill Baer, an Assistant 
Attorney General in charge of the DoJ antitrust division (U.S. Department of Justice 2014). 
 In 2015, the White House issued a statement encouraging information sharing as a 
way to help safeguard national and economic security, and directing the Department of 
Homeland Security to support the formation of information-sharing groups under the 
umbrella term  Information Sharing and Analysis Organizations (ISAOs) . And in 2015, 
legislation was proposed to promote sharing of threat information, although the effort 
stalled in Congress. 
 Despite the overall shift in attitude, some organizations still have reservations 
about sharing information. There are three major areas of concern. First, organizations 
worry about the legal and regulatory implications of  revealing  information about 
threats. A second, related concern is the public relations  aspect . Both of these fears 
have a valid basis. Information security has become an enterprise risk management 
issue of board-level interest because of the potential effects. Information leaks revealing 
potential intrusions and data breaches can have legal consequences: the organization 
may be required to report the problems in order to comply with financial and privacy 
regulations, for example. If security issues become public, they may also damage the way 
the organization is perceived by customers and by the business community, potentially 
affecting a company’s profitability and its stock price. The third major area of concern 
is privacy. This also has a valid basis. For example, sharing information that identifies 
the victim of an attack, as some security specialists would like to do, clearly can expose 
machine data that can potentially compromise the victim’s privacy. Some people also 
see a risk, following the revelations of National Security Agency eavesdropping, that 
legislation could be used to enable government surveillance. For these reasons, I believe 
that any cybersecurity legislation must include appropriate privacy protection. 
 What’s the payoff from sharing information? My personal experience is that I have 
obtained real value: information shared by others has helped me understand threats 
and take action. I have also seen that it’s possible to share useful information while 
avoiding the issues mentioned above. Companies can share information about attacks 
without revealing personal information about the victim. They can share indicators of 
compromise without revealing confidential information. They can alert other trusted 
contacts during the early stages of investigating a threat, before it’s been determined 
whether a compromise has occurred that requires regulatory disclosure. 
 The growth of information-sharing groups shows that many other organizations now 
share my belief in the value of sharing information  about  threats and best practices. As 
I’ll explain in this chapter, sharing security information can provide considerable benefits 
in managing the risk of moving into new business relationships and adopting new 
technologies. We just need to find ways to reduce the risk of sharing. The solution lies in 
creating trusted information-sharing relationships with other organizations. The more we 
trust the relationship, the more sensitive the information that can be shared. 
 The need to  share security information is being driven by rapidly changing business, 
technology, and threat landscapes. Increasingly, companies are collaborating with a 
broad variety of business partners. We share business information, and often we also 
use the same technology, or we sell or share technology with each other. As we do so, we 
also share risks. Understanding the risks faced by our partners, and the way they manage 
those risks, can help us protect our own organizations. 
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 Looking more broadly across the  technology landscape , all systems and devices are 
to some extent connected, whether they are owned by enterprises, individuals, or service 
providers. Almost every aspect of society depends on a worldwide, rapidly evolving, 
highly complex network of devices and services. This provides the central nervous system 
that supports innovation, economic development, and social interaction worldwide. 
But because we are all inherently interconnected, we share common risks. The threat 
landscape is dynamic, global, and increasingly complex. Threats may originate in any 
country and then spread rapidly across national and enterprise boundaries, causing 
extensive damage to organizations and individuals worldwide. 
 Because threats spread so quickly and the  threat landscape is so complex, it is hard 
for any single organization to gain a clear view of all potential vulnerabilities, threats, 
and attacks. External partnerships can help. They provide additional intelligence that 
we can use to improve our own security posture. By exchanging information with other 
organizations, we gain what I call  outsight , or a better understanding of what happens 
outside our own environment. We learn about new threats before they hit us directly. We 
see how other organizations are managing those threats. We learn about best practices 
for managing security operations. Using the information we gather from external 
relationships, we can increase the organization’s ability to sense, interpret, and act on risk. 
 The Value of External Partnerships 
 Sharing security-related  information  can require initiative and courage. The idea of 
sharing information externally may run counter to the culture of the organization 
overall, including the culture within the security group. Organizations may view security 
information as proprietary and confidential, like intellectual property. Many still have 
policies against sharing information. 
 It’s true that much security information is sensitive, and sharing it can introduce 
risks. Because of this, we need to be careful about what we share and with whom. 
 But think about the broader context of how organizations are increasingly sharing 
information. Most organizations have already recognized that they need to share 
sensitive business information with partners in order to develop, manufacture, and 
market new products. Collaboration with other companies is becoming an integral part 
of many other business processes, too. As organizations share information, they benefit 
from their partners’ insights and expertise. As noted by Steven Johnson, author of  Where 
Good Ideas Come From: The Natural History of Innovation (Riverhead Books 2010), many 
of the best ideas have emerged not through the inspiration of a single mind, but through 
the exchange of ideas. “You have half of an idea, somebody else has the other half, and 
if you’re in the right environment, they turn into something larger than the sum of their 
parts,” Johnson said in a speech at the 2010 TEDGlobal conference (Johnson 2010). “We 
often talk about the value of protecting intellectual property—building barricades, having 
secretive R&D labs, patenting everything that we have, so that those ideas will remain 
valuable … but I think there’s a case to be made that we should spend at least as much 
time, if not more, valuing the premise of connecting ideas and not just protecting them.” 
 I believe that there’s similar value in sharing security information. As we collaborate 
with business partners, we need to understand the threats to their environment, and 
how they manage risk, in order to determine what we need to do to protect our own 
organizations. Each partner in a value chain needs to protect information to a level 
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that is adequate to protect the other partners; the weakest link in the chain can impact 
everyone. Note that throughout this chapter, I use the terms “partner” and “partnership” 
in the colloquial sense, not to imply any specific type of formal legal relationship. 
 There are many other examples of how sharing information can benefit all 
organizations involved. If we are entering new markets through business partnerships, 
we need to understand the nature of the threats in those markets from the companies 
currently operating there. The same logic applies to using new technologies. 
Organizations are extending their environment to customers and becoming suppliers 
of mobile apps and web services in the process. As they do, they can learn from other 
companies’ experience how to manage the risks. Companies are increasingly sharing 
cloud capacity or other data-center infrastructure supplied by external providers, and can 
all benefit by sharing feedback with the provider about risks within the environment. 
 Despite these trends, some organizations still have policies stipulating that employees 
shouldn’t share internal information about risks and threats with anyone outside the 
company. This is sometimes the case even when the same organization willingly shares 
other IT-related information such as helpdesk or e-mail management best practices. 
 Without wishing to discount the real fears driving these policies, the value of sharing 
information often outweighs the risk of doing so. Let’s imagine that a CISO learns of a new 
threat affecting companies in his industry sector. He shares information about the threat 
with a peer at another company and, by doing so, gains insight that helps the organization 
mitigate an attack that has caused massive damage at other companies. By sharing 
information against company policy, the CISO took a personal risk. Yet by doing so, he 
averted the bigger risk of business disruption and damage to the organization’s reputation. 
 Failure to share information with others introduces its own risks. If we don’t share 
with peers, they won’t share with us, so we won’t benefit from their information and 
insights. I’ve seen cases in which information security professionals wanted to participate 
in communities, but weren’t allowed by their companies to share any internal security-
related information. So they attended meetings but couldn’t contribute. Ultimately, their 
peers wouldn’t tolerate a situation in which these people were receiving information but 
giving nothing in return, and they were effectively voted off the island. 
 External Partnerships: Types and Tiers 
 Much of the publicity about information-sharing initiatives has focused on public-private 
partnerships related to critical infrastructure and national security. However, there are 
many other types of formal and informal external information-sharing relationships, 
including 1:1 partnerships and groups comprised solely of private-sector organizations. 
 External partnerships are most often used to share information about specific threats 
and best security practices. But some partnerships focus on other  types of information. 
For example, security specialists within the high-tech sector share information in order to 
develop security standards, which are then implemented in various products. 
 Much of this security information is sensitive. Because of this, we need to be able to 
trust that the partners with whom we share information will treat it appropriately. The more 
sensitive the information, the greater the level of trust required. In general, the level of trust 
can be higher in relationships with fewer people, allowing more-sensitive information to 
be shared. As the number of people increases, there’s a greater chance that information will 
leak, so the level of trust tends to decrease and only less-sensitive information is shared. 
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 Relationships therefore naturally tend to fall into a  tiered pyramid model , as shown 
in Figure  4-1 (Willis 2012). At the top of the pyramid are the most-trusted relationships 
with the fewest partners; these are 1:1 partnerships between two individuals at different 
organizations, or between two security teams. 
 Information-sharing relationships between more than two partners are often 
referred to as communities. Because more people are involved, a legal or peer-enforced 
agreement is usually needed to define the level of trust and confidentiality expected 
among community members. 
 The two middle tiers of the pyramid include groups with intermediate levels of trust, 
sharing information with varying levels of sensitivity. The  targeted tier typically consists 
of public-private partnerships aimed at protecting critical infrastructure. The  confidential 
tier includes many private-sector communities, including regional communities and 
those focused on specific industry sectors. 
 At the bottom of the pyramid is the  public tier , comprised of the largest communities 
with the lowest level of trust. At this level, information is often public and may be broadcast 
via the Internet. This tier might include groups that develop educational information about 
threats for public distribution, or CISOs who share their insights via public webcasts. 
 I should note that there is considerable overlap between these tiers. A group may have 
characteristics of both the targeted and confidential tiers, for example. Also, the number of 
members in groups within each tier (shown in Figure  4-1 ) is just a guideline: communities 
at all levels tend to grow over time as more organizations see the value and join. 
 Figure 4-1.  Tiered pyramid model for trusted information-sharing partnerships and 
communities (adapted from Willis 2012). Source: Intel Corporation, 2012 
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 How can you get involved in information- sharing partnerships? One good method is 
to start by participating in communities in the public tier, where the information shared has 
a relatively low level of sensitivity and therefore involves little risk. In these communities, 
you’re likely to meet peers with whom you can begin to engage in 1:1 partnerships. As you 
become more knowledgeable about the communities that reflect your organization’s key 
interests, you may then become involved in relationships in the middle tiers of the pyramid, 
where more confidential information is exchanged. I have always made sure that my teams 
and I actively participate in partnerships at all the tiers of the pyramid. 
 1:1  Partnerships Tier 
•  Community structure : Direct communication between CISOs at 
two organizations or between their teams 
•  Typical number of partners : 2 
•  Example partnership/community : Any two organizations who 
choose to share information 
•  Example goal : To mitigate shared threats by exchanging 
information with a business partner more quickly and in greater 
detail than would be possible within a larger group 
•  Trust framework : Personal trust and existing business 
relationships 
 Targeted Tier 
•  Community structure : A relatively small number of critical 
information infrastructure owners and operators sharing 
information to protect the infrastructure. Also includes key 
security ecosystem influencers, such as large security service 
providers or vendors. 
•  Typical number of partners : Up to about 50 
•  Example partnership/community : Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs) 
•  Example goal : To prevent advanced persistent threats (APTs) 
within the industrial base by sharing APT signature information 
•  Trust framework : Strong information-sharing frameworks, such 
as national security clearances and nondisclosure agreements, 
are required. Trusted sharing mechanisms, such as encrypted 
web portals with multifactor authentication, are also required. 
 Confidential Tier 
•  Community structure : Communities that represent industry 
sectors or other groupings, such as the banking sector and 
Internet service providers (ISPs), or regional forums 
•  Typical number of partners : Up to about 100 
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•  Example partnership/community : BITS (financial services 
industry), Bay Area CSO Council (regional), Regional CSO 
Summits 
•  Example goal : To enable members to protect against common 
threats and vulnerabilities affecting their industries. For example, 
ISPs might share the command and control Internet addresses 
that botnets use. 
•  Trust framework : Communities typically use trust frameworks 
such as nondisclosure agreements or memoranda of 
understanding. 
 Public Tier 
•  Community structure : A broad range of communities that 
represent all user categories, including consumers, small- and 
medium-sized businesses, and industry in general 
•  Typical number of partners : 100s to 1,000s 
•  Example partnership/community : Forum for Incident Response 
and Security Teams (FIRST), National Cyber Security Alliance 
•  Example goal : To share best practices or informational bulletins 
about widely known threats and vulnerabilities that affect a large 
cross-section of users. 
•  Trust framework : Trust frameworks are not necessary; 
communities typically distribute information broadly through 
mechanisms such as e-mail distribution lists or public web sites. 
 Let’s look at these tiers in more detail. 
 1:1  Partnerships 
 In my experience, 1:1 partnerships are some of the most valuable security relationships. 
They may be formal or informal, established at a corporate level or between individuals. 
 As I explained, a key  advantage of a trusted 1:1 partnership is that we can more safely 
share highly confidential information. We can often create a stronger bond with a single 
individual than with a larger group. As a result, the shared information often has a depth 
and richness that’s lacking in information shared within larger communities. 
 Another advantage is speed. Communication is often fastest in 1:1 partnerships, 
partly due to logistics. It’s much easier to set up a meeting between two people than it 
is to organize a meeting with a dozen people. To exchange information about the latest 
developments, a CISO may be able to simply pick up the phone and have a conversation 
with his or her peer. Quickly sharing information enables a faster response to threats—
and in the security arena, timeliness is often critical.  
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 Here’s an example showing how 1:1 partnerships can develop and benefit both 
partners. Through my participation in a larger security community, I got to know 
the CISO at a fast-growing e-commerce company whose customers were primarily 
consumers. We both would contact each other periodically for advice and information 
as we puzzled over the latest security challenges. Over time, these conversations evolved 
into open dialogues about best practices and benchmarking. 
 The relationship eventually evolved to a point where we both realized we could learn 
a great deal more by bringing our teams together in a face-to-face meeting. The resulting 
half-day meeting proved incredibly valuable to both teams. Our team was able to 
provide insights and experiences about managing security in a large, complex enterprise 
environment. This was helpful to the security team at the fast-growing e-commerce 
company, which was in the process of building an enterprise environment to support 
its fast-growing business. In return, the team at the e-commerce company was able to 
share the security challenges and experiences of operating a large consumer business 
with millions of online customers. This was extremely valuable to us at Intel because we 
were in the process of expanding our external online presence and were beginning to 
encounter some of the same challenges. 
 The partnership thus expanded from ad hoc conversations to a productive relationship 
between teams sharing experiences and best practices at multiple levels. It’s hard to imagine 
that this extensive information exchange could have occurred within a larger community. 
 Another example: I met the CISO of a large manufacturing company at an industry 
event, and we stayed in touch through occasional e-mails. Then, during a period of 
especially large-scale industry attacks, our communications suddenly became much 
more frequent and detailed. It was extremely valuable to be able to pick up the phone and 
simply call a peer to share the latest knowledge about the attacks and responses. 
 I have frequent 1:1 meetings with peers at other companies, sometimes as often as 
several times a week. These meetings can serve several purposes. A few years back, I met 
with a team from a key supplier to discuss our strategy for securing employees’ personal 
(bring-your-own) devices. I shared our best practices with this team, and during the 
question-and-answer discussion, team members also provided information about how 
they were addressing the same problem. The meeting served as a helpful benchmarking 
exercise for all of us. 
 At the same time, the discussion clearly demonstrated each company’s commitment 
to protecting its partner’s business information. It showed the depth of each company’s 
strategy for protecting information—revealing a commitment that extended far beyond 
the desire to comply with contract confidentiality clauses. I felt more confident that if a 
security issue ever arose, I could talk directly to my counterparts at the supplier company 
because their commitment to protecting information would enable a productive 
approach to resolving problems. 
 Another recent discussion, this time with a potential customer, focused on the cloud. 
The organization was concerned about our use of the cloud as part of our infrastructure, and 
also as a part of the service connected to our product. Rather than respond to the lengthy 
survey they had put together, we met with them to discuss how Cylance uses the cloud and 
which data we store there. We discussed the risks that could exist in the cloud infrastructure, 
the potential implications of those risks, and how we manage those risks. We also discussed 
other precautionary steps the customer could take to further mitigate the potential risks. This 
discussion helped develop a relationship that built the most customer trust. 
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 Communities 
 Participating in larger communities may not provide information that’s quite as rich and 
deep as the information you’d obtain from a 1:1 partnership with a peer. But communities 
provide value in other ways. 
 Because they contain more people, communities provide breadth and diversity 
of perspective that help us make balanced risk decisions. With a larger number of 
participants, there’s a better chance that one of them will have developed a solution to a 
problem, or can provide valuable new information about an industry attack. 
 Some communities focus on sharing threat-related information; others on 
benchmarking and best practices, influencing legislation, developing security standards, 
or public education. 
 Communities can also present great networking opportunities. Through 
participation in communities, I’ve met several people with whom I’ve subsequently 
developed closer 1:1 partnerships. 
 Community Characteristics 
 Like all groups, communities require a structure and a set of ground rules to be effective. 
Successful communities typically have the following characteristics:
•  Clear goals : The community shares clearly defined common 
goals that benefit members, such as mitigating an industry-wide 
threat. A community may have several goals. 
•  A strong framework of trust, such as a legal or peer-enforced 
agreement, that addresses risks related to information sharing 
among community members : For example, the Industry 
Consortium for the Advancement of Security on the Internet 
(ICASI) has a strong multilateral nondisclosure agreement, while 
other communities, such as the Bay Area CSO Council, rely on a 
peer-enforced trust framework. 
•  Trusted communications channels : Members can safely 
contribute and access shared information using an effective 
trusted communications channel or mechanism, such as a secure 
web site. These channels are not always electronic; some regional 
groups conduct face-to-face meetings to further reduce the risk of 
compromise. 
 An organization is most likely to benefit from joining communities if those 
communities align with the organization’s security goals. This means it’s important to 
first clearly define those organizational security goals. To do this, some organizations 
have found it helpful to use a structured approach; they can more clearly categorize their 
goals by mapping them to a standard risk management model, such as the “defense in 
depth” model. Once an organization clearly understands its own security goals, it can 
identify communities whose objectives align with these goals. 
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 Because there is such a diverse range of organizations, security threats, and goals, it 
is unlikely that any single information-sharing community structure meets all the needs 
of a large organization. For example, a company might participate in one community for 
benchmarking and another to tackle industry-specific threats. 
 Information-sharing communities thrive only when the participating organizations 
feel they’re receiving valuable information, creating incentives to continue to share 
information with others. 
 What  constitutes valuable information ? A common definition is that information 
should be timely, specific, relevant to participants’ concerns, and provides a suitable level 
of detail while protecting individual privacy (ENISA 2010). In practice, “valuable” usually 
means the information helps you achieve your security goals, whether those goals are 
long-term and strategic, or short-term and operational. Information useful for strategic 
goals might include an early warning that attackers are expected to target a specific 
industry. This helps members of the community plan their defenses. Information useful 
for operational goals typically includes more specific details, such as an attack signature. 
This helps organizations more quickly identify an attack and respond when it occurs. 
 As shown in Figure  4-1 (the targeted tier), some communities consist of government 
agencies working alongside an industry in what are usually known as  public-private 
partnerships (PPPs) . These PPPs can be particularly important for protecting critical 
information infrastructure. Internationally and within many nations, this infrastructure 
is largely owned and operated by the private sector, including carriers and network 
service providers. Sharing information about  threats and attacks among public and 
private agencies therefore can help ensure security and resiliency of this infrastructure. 
Because the shared information is highly sensitive, these PPPs usually have strong trust 
frameworks including national security clearances. 
 An example of a much broader public-private community is InfraGard, a partnership 
between the FBI and private- and public-sector sector organizations that shares 
information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts against the U.S. 
 Other communities are primarily comprised of  private-sector organizations . Some 
are industry-specific: members of an industry get together to  share threat information 
and best practices, helping to reduce risk for each company while enhancing the 
industry’s reputation overall. Others involve sharing across industries, such as Evanta’s 
CISO Coalition, a cross-industry group of executives from large organizations. The 
Coalition is designed to facilitate secure, real-time interaction among members to vet 
critical information security issues, and then share best practices for resolving them. As a 
part of my efforts to expand my external partnerships, I was fortunate enough to become 
a founding member of this group’s advisory board. Another cross-industry group is the 
Security Advisor Alliance, a cybersecurity nonprofit dedicated to aligning CISOs to help 
one another, supporting the information security community (including startups), and 
giving back to schools and nonprofits. 
 Some communities are regional, aimed at security professionals from private and 
public-sector organizations located within a specific area. These  regional communities offer 
the advantage of convenience. It takes less time, effort, and expense to attend a regional event, 
which makes participation more attractive. Examples of regional groups and forums include 
ACTRA (see sidebar) and the San Francisco Bay Area CSO Council, described shortly. 
 New communities arise frequently. A community may form in response to a specific 
threat because companies are strongly motivated to share information about the threat in 
order to develop effective defenses. For example, the Conficker Work Group was formed 
specifically to address the risk posed by the Conficker worm. 
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 ARIZONA CYBER THREAT RESPONSE ALLIANCE
 Innovative new models for information-sharing communities are springing up as the 
value of sharing security-related information becomes more widely recognized. An 
example is the Arizona Cyber Threat Response  Alliance , Inc., a regional public-private 
partnership. This cross-sector group shares information about threats and other 
issues among partners from industry, academia, law enforcement, and intelligence. 
 ACTRA grew out of relationships developed with FBI’s InfraGard, the public-sector 
 Arizona Counter Terrorism Intelligence Center (ACTIC) , and the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security. A key difference is that ACTRA is a nonprofit company with 
a full-time president in addition to voluntary participants including a board and 
technical subject matter experts. The goal is to improve security for members with a 
flat, responsive organizational structure and without adding a burdensome layer of 
process. The group disseminates information ranging from alerts in near real time to 
white papers that provide insights and highlight best practices.  ACTRA has grown to 
include representatives from 14 critical infrastructure sectors. The group has found, 
based on discussions with its members, that multi-sector sharing improves threat 
visibility beyond the single-sector focus of industry-specific groups. 
 Community Goals 
 Communities may focus on narrowly defined goals, such as mitigating a specific threat, 
or they may have broader information-sharing goals, such as benchmarking security 
techniques. A single community may pursue several goals. The most well-known types of 
goals are sharing information about threats (to help member organizations mitigate those 
threats) and sharing best practices (to improve efficiency). I’ll describe sharing goals next. 
 Sharing Information about Threats and  Vulnerabilities 
 Perhaps the best-known function of communities is to provide a trusted mechanism for 
sharing information about threats and vulnerabilities. Members of the community can 
use this information to improve their tactical and strategic situational awareness. 
 I’m often asked by peers how I measure the value of the information obtained 
from external partnerships. A key metric is whether the early threat information has 
helped enable us to reduce risk. A single piece of information might make participation 
worthwhile if it helps us better mitigate risk and protect the company. 
 Information from the community can also be useful for corroborating evidence 
that we’ve already identified internally. If we observe a potential new threat within our 
environment, we may not feel that we have enough evidence to justify taking action. But 
we can often discuss the issue within a community. If others are experiencing the same 
problem, we can be more confident that it’s a real issue. This gives us enough reason to act. 
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 Some examples of communities that share threat information include
•  Information Sharing and Analysis Centers ( ISACs ) : ISACs are 
trusted industry-specific communities established by owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure resources. ISACs exist for 
a number of industry sectors, including communications, retail, 
electrical utility, health, and public transit. Services provided by 
ISACs include risk mitigation, incident response, and alert and 
information sharing. 
•  Bay Area CSO Council : This is a regional community that focuses 
on improving the sharing of intelligence and best practices 
among CISOs in the San Francisco Bay Area. The Council 
serves as a vehicle for CISOs to safely and securely share their 
attack experiences. Members may share artifacts, such as attack 
signatures, that they can then build into their organizations’ 
detection and defense mechanisms (Jackson Higgins 2010). The 
forum uses a peer-enforced trust model rather than a formal legal 
framework. The group also creates subgroups to work on more 
highly classified information. 
 Sharing Best Practices and Benchmarking 
 Many communities also serve as a forum for exchanging best practices and for 
 benchmarking operations . By sharing security best practices, we may be able to increase 
the efficiency and effectiveness of our own operations. 
 Tapping into the expertise of others can help us avoid reinventing the wheel. A 
typical example: A  CISO is trying to create a bring-your-own device policy for her own 
organization. So she sends a message to community members and receives detailed 
advice from others who have already been through the process. This gives the CISO a 
head start in creating a policy that meets her organization’s needs. 
 Besides  enabling informal exchanges , communities may also operate formal 
benchmarking exercises. Some of the best-known examples are the security-related 
programs run by benchmarking firm CEB, Inc., which conducts studies and generates 
reports that compare companies in a variety of areas, from user security awareness to 
controls maturity (CEB 2015; also see the discussion of security awareness programs in 
Chapter  5 ). Benchmarking information generated by communities can also be useful for 
demonstrating the efficiency of security operations to other internal groups within your 
organization, such as an audit committee. 
 Some benchmarking  information is sensitive and closely held because organizations 
feel that it could reveal too much information about their security operations. Other 
information is more general and is sometimes publicly available, such as the webinars 
and presentations published online by Intel and others. Even this general benchmarking 
information may yield risk insights. Observing what other companies are focusing on, 
and how they are allocating resources, can help security professionals think about how 
they need to manage risk within their own organizations. 
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 One of the most established communities is the Forum for Incident Response and 
Security Teams ( FIRST ). This international group focuses on sharing best practices among 
computer security incident response teams. Trust relationships are peer-enforced. The group 
publishes a series of detailed best-practices guides and other documents for public use. Other 
activities involve the exchange of information for cooperative incident management. 
 Technology is helping to make information exchange more automated and therefore 
easier and faster, due in part to the adoption of standards for representing (STIX) and 
communicating (TAXII) information about threats. Platforms are emerging that use these 
standards for rapid, secure information sharing. 
 Many years ago, I was asked to manage Intel’s first major IT benchmarking activity. 
It was a big task that entailed analyzing cost, quality, and other aspects of operations 
across our entire IT environment. 
 One of the first challenges was determining which organizations we should 
benchmark ourselves against. At the time, the conventional wisdom at most 
organizations was that you should compare yourself with similar businesses. The 
logic was that because these businesses were the most directly comparable, this 
approach would yield the most meaningful results. So the expectation was that I’d 
benchmark our operations against a collection of other big high-tech companies. 
 But I didn’t want to benchmark our operations against only high-tech companies. 
Instead, I wanted to benchmark against a broad base of companies in industries 
such as retail, banking, manufacturing, consumer goods, and utilities. 
 The time came to present my selection of peer groups in a meeting with senior IT 
management. By this time, I’d already started the benchmarking process, and as I 
described the diversity of the companies included in the benchmark comparison, I 
could sense the atmosphere becoming increasingly hostile. Practically everyone felt 
that my approach was completely wrong. In fact, if there had been rotten tomatoes 
in the room, a few people would have been throwing them at me. 
 So I asked for a moment of quiet so that I could explain. If we were an airline that 
wanted to benchmark operations, who would we compare ourselves with?” I asked. 
Several people said they’d benchmark against other airlines. 
 “What do you think we would learn from that comparison?” I continued. “My guess 
is not much. We’d all have grown up in the same industry, and we’d probably have 
similar business processes. Many of our employees would have worked for the other 
companies and vice versa, so they’d probably implement similar practices. We might 
learn about minor efficiency improvements, but I wouldn’t expect any breakthroughs.” 
 BENCHMARKING: WHO SHOULD YOU COMPARE 
YOURSELF WITH?
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 “If I really wanted to dramatically improve the way I manage airline gate operations, 
I’d benchmark against a Formula 1 pit crew. Those crews can service a car and get 
it back on the road in 20 seconds or less. I’d think about what we could learn from 
studying their processes, their technologies, and their ability to communicate and 
organize, and I’d try to figure out which aspects could cross over into airline data 
operations. If we want to make dramatic improvements, we need to look at people 
who operate in an extreme operational environment—not at other airlines.” 
 I’m happy to say that the managers in the room recognized that there might be 
value in the approach I was suggesting, even if many of them still disagreed with 
it. Ultimately, benchmarking against companies in a broad range of industries did 
help us achieve some dramatic improvements, and I received an internal award for 
the initiative. The lesson is that sometimes we can learn more by looking outside a 
narrowly defined, traditional peer group. People in the same industry may be facing 
the same problems as we are and dealing with them the same way. For a fresh 
perspective, it can be worth looking farther afield. 
 Influencing  Regulations and Standards 
 All of us operate within an increasingly complex regulatory environment, and we’re all 
affected by evolving technology standards. 
 It’s important to stay abreast of legislative developments. That can be a difficult and 
time-consuming job for any single organization, and so it may be helpful to become 
involved in a community whose goals include tracking regulatory activity. 
 In addition, communities can sometimes help influence public policy more 
effectively than a single organization can do alone. There’s strength in numbers, and 
communities often include some of the biggest companies in an industry. 
 An example of a community that focuses on policy is BITS ( www.bits.org ), the 
technology policy division of The Financial Services Roundtable, which represents 100 
of the largest integrated providers of consumer financial services. Members of BITS 
cooperate on issues such as critical infrastructure protection, fraud prevention, and 
the safety of financial services. The organization works to influence public policy by 
communicating with public agencies. It also publishes reports for use across the industry, 
including a financial services security assessment. Thus, communities that focus on 
policy may help all participating companies and the reputation of the industry overall. 
 Businesses who offer services in multiple countries have a particular interest in the 
international regulatory environment. These include multinationals, of course, which are 
directly affected by the complex web of regulations at international, national, and local levels. 
 However, these regulations affect a surprisingly large number of other companies, 
including many that don’t have employees or facilities physically located in other 
countries. Today, almost any business with a web-based service consumed in multiple 
countries is effectively operating in a multinational environment. Regulations in those 
countries have impacts that stretch beyond geographical boundaries. For example, 
regional and local regulations such as the California data breach bill (SB1386) and 
European privacy guidelines require compliance by any company that stores information 
about residents of those areas, no matter where the company is located. 
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 Corporate Citizenship 
 At many companies a large number of employees volunteer in ways that benefit their 
neighborhood or a wide variety of worthy causes. Businesses often provide support to 
help employees do this. There’s a growing trend to leverage the organization’s talent and 
expertise in volunteer corporate citizenship initiatives that are more closely related to the 
organization’s goals and employees’ technical expertise. Examples might include offering 
expert security advice to nonprofits or helping security initiatives in other countries. 
 Security-related corporate citizenship initiatives include the National Cyber Security 
Alliance, whose mission is to educate and empower society to use the Internet safely and 
securely (see  staysafeonline.org ). The sponsors of the alliance include large high-
tech companies such as Intel. Senior managers at those companies also are among the 
directors of the organization. 
 Conclusion 
 The knowledge we acquire via external partnerships can help us protect our own 
organizations. I’ve experienced this first hand; indicators of compromise shared by others 
have helped me understand and respond to threats. The growth of information-sharing 
groups shows that many organizations are coming to the same conclusion. As Ken 
Athanasiou, Global Information Security Director at American Eagle Outfitters, said in a 
statement supporting the formation of the new retail ISAC: “Cyber-criminals work non-
stop, and are becoming increasingly sophisticated in their methods of attack … by sharing 
information and leading practices and working together, the industry will be better 
positioned to combat these criminals” (Retail Cyber Intelligence Sharing Center 2015). 
 Industry-specific groups such as the financial and industrial control ISACs have 
been widely acknowledged as helping companies quickly learn about threats and 
specific measures for combating them. Other groups provide different kinds of valuable 
information. The Evanta CISO Coalition has published metrics that its members can use 
for security benchmarking and dashboarding. Members of IASAP share information that 
helps them improve their awareness programs. 
 The  security landscape has become increasingly complex and dynamic, and 
it’s difficult to track and manage the risks without help from others. Sharing security 
information is also becoming more important as organizations increasingly collaborate 
with business partners and adopt new technologies. Understanding the risks faced 
by our partners, and the way they manage those risks, can help us protect our own 
organizations. As businesses move into new markets and use technology in new ways, we 
need to understand our biggest exposures and how to allocate resources most effectively 
to minimize business risk. Therefore, sharing information can help businesses remain 
competitive and successful. 
 Organizations have often been reluctant to share security information, but if we 
want help from other people, we have to be prepared to share information ourselves. By 
carefully using trusted partnerships that align with our security goals, we can increase our 
organization’s ability to sense, interpret, and act on risk. 
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 CHAPTER 5 
 People Are the Perimeter 
 There’s a difference between interest and commitment. When you’re 
interested in doing something, you do it only when circumstances permit. 
When you’re committed to something, you accept no excuses, only results. 
 —Art Turock 
 A few years ago, a senior manager began bringing his corporate laptop into the cafeteria 
at lunchtime. Typically, he’d find an empty table, set down the laptop, and then walk out 
of sight to get his lunch. As he perused the salads and main courses, made selections, and 
paid for his food, his laptop sat unattended in plain view of hundreds of people using the 
large cafeteria. 
 My security team noticed the neglected laptop and pointed it out to me. I discussed 
the issue with the manager a few times, but he continued leaving the laptop unattended. 
So eventually, I began taking the laptop and leaving my business card in its place. 
 Not surprisingly, the manager became somewhat annoyed. “Nobody’s going to steal 
the laptop because there are all these people around,” he said. 
 “Okay,” I responded. “I’ll never take your laptop or complain again on one condition. 
If you really trust everybody here, you’ll take off your wedding ring and leave it on top of 
the laptop. If you do that, you’ll never hear from me again.” 
 He thought about this for a while. Then he said, “You made your point.” And he never 
again left the laptop unattended. 
 The  Shifting Perimeter 
 This incident helped crystallize in my mind a new perspective about how we should 
approach information security. It demonstrated how each person’s daily decisions can 
affect the risk dynamics of the company overall. 
 The traditional enterprise security paradigm, often expressed in castle-and-
drawbridge terms, described a wall of technology that isolated and completely protected 
the workers behind it. To protect our people and information assets, we focused our 
efforts on fortifying the network perimeter and the physical perimeter of our buildings. 
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 Today, however, a growing number of  user interactions with the outside world 
bypass the physical and network perimeters and the security controls these perimeters 
offer. They take place on external web sites and social networks, on laptops in coffee 
shops and homes, and on personal devices such as smartphones. As the Internet of 
Things unfolds, those interactions will also take place on many more “things,” such as 
wearables, cars, and even household appliances. 
 This changing environment doesn’t mean the security perimeter has vanished. 
Instead, it has shifted to the user. The laptop left unattended in the cafeteria was clearly 
inside the physical perimeter, but the corporate information it contained was still 
potentially at risk due to the manager’s actions. People have become part of the perimeter. 
Users’ decisions can have as much impact on security as the technical controls we use. 
 Over the past few years, the idea of the people perimeter has won wider recognition 
and acceptance. Accordingly, organizations are placing more emphasis on employees’ 
security awareness and behavior. 
 One reason for this is the rash of high-profile insider exploits, such as the leaks by 
National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden. Another is that technical controls 
have not kept pace with the attackers. Many exploits are reaching users because technical 
controls, particularly those on endpoint devices, have failed to prevent them. We are 
therefore more reliant on the user’s ability to detect suspicious activity. We also have 
been forced to deploy more back-end detection and response tools and staff to handle 
the flow of malware penetrating the corporate infrastructure. These ever-growing security 
operations teams, which become another layer of the people perimeter, typically are 
unable to keep up with the flood of malware and commit errors due to “alert fatigue.” 
 There’s a continuing emphasis on  phishing attacks ; the  2015 Data Breach 
Investigations Report found that the percentage of users deceived by phishing actually 
increased from previous years, with 23% opening phishing messages and 11% clicking on 
attachments (Verizon 2015). 
 Older  social-engineering techniques are also still effective, apparently. At hedge fund 
Fortelus Capital Management in London, the chief financial officer received an alarming 
phone call one Friday afternoon. The caller said he was from the company’s bank, and 
warned of possible fraudulent activity on the account. The CFO reluctantly agreed to 
generate codes enabling the caller to cancel 15 suspicious payments. When he logged 
into the firm’s bank account the following Monday, $1.2 million was gone. The CFO lost 
his job and was sued by his firm for failing to protect its assets (Chelel 2015). 
 As almost every company becomes a technology developer as well as a technology 
consumer, employee security awareness behavior will become an even bigger issue. 
Security lapses by the employees working on technology-based products can have far-
reaching impacts, creating vulnerabilities in the digital services and physical products 
delivered to millions of customers. 
 Compliance or  Commitment ? 
 Each day, employees make decisions that can affect the company’s information risk. Do 
I leave my computer unattended or not? Do I post this information on social media? Do I 
install this software on my device? Do I report this suspicious looking e-mail? When I’m 
in a coffee shop, do I connect to the corporate infrastructure via a secure virtual private 
network, or do I engage directly over the Internet? 
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 We could view each of these decisions purely in terms of the potential for increased 
risk. However, there’s also a positive side. If users become more aware of security and make 
better decisions, they can strengthen the organization’s defenses by helping identify threats 
and prevent impact. Among CISOs surveyed recently by best-practices firm Corporate 
Executive Board, 50% said that insecure behaviors cause more than half of all breaches; but 
they also said employees are key to uncovering suspicious activity (CEB 2015). 
 Therefore, as information security professionals, we are in the behavior modification 
business. Our goals include creating a more security-conscious workforce so that users 
are more aware of threats and vulnerabilities, and make better security decisions. 
Furthermore, we need to influence employees’ behavior both within the workplace and 
when they are home or traveling. 
 If the manager was comfortable leaving his laptop unattended in our cafeteria, 
would he also leave it unattended at the local coffee shop? At the airport? Or somewhere 
else where the risk of loss was even greater? My belief is he probably would. When trying 
to influence this person’s behavior, I wanted to achieve more than a level of compliance. I 
wanted to initiate a feeling of commitment. 
 The term  compliant behavior implies making the minimum effort necessary to 
achieve good performance to a predefined standard. It’s like checking boxes on a list of 
security compliance items. Ultimately, employees feel they are being compelled to follow 
someone else’s list of instructions. Because of this, compliance requires supervision and 
policing, and employees may sometimes engage in lengthy recreational complaining. 
If employees are simply following a checklist, what happens when they encounter a 
situation that’s not on the list? They stop and await further instructions, or perhaps they 
are even unaware of the threat or ignore it. 
 In contrast,  committed behavior is intrinsically motivated and self-directed. Being 
committed implies that people are emotionally impelled to invest in security; they 
take responsibility and ownership. When people feel committed, they tend to deliver 
above and beyond the bare minimum. Rather than simply following a predefined list of 
instructions, they are empowered to make decisions and judgment calls in real time, with 
a focus on how their actions affect others as well as themselves. 
 If we can create this sense of commitment in our users, we can implement security 
not as a wall but as a collective security force that permeates the entire organization. 
Individually and as a group, every person in the corporation uses their skills in security to 
protect the organization, handling known attacks today as well as quickly adapting to new 
threats tomorrow. 
 When I needed to influence the manager’s behavior, I looked for a way to establish 
this level of commitment. I sought to change the way he felt about the laptop, and to do 
this I tapped into his emotional connection to his wedding ring. 
 Creating a culture of self-motivated commitment rather than compliance can make 
a big difference, as shown in studies by management guru Dov Seidman. His group 
looked at behavioral differences between businesses with a culture of self-governance, 
in which an organization’s purpose and values inform employee decision-making and 
behavior, and those with a culture of blind obedience based on command-and-control 
and coercion. Organizations based on self-governance experienced three times more 
employee loyalty and half as many incidents of misconduct, compared with organizations 
based on blind obedience (Seidman 2011). 
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 The implications for enterprise security are clear. As the boundaries between 
personal and corporate computing dissolve, employees may be accessing information 
from any location, on any device. If users behave in an insecure way while they are in 
the office, it’s likely they will also exhibit insecure behavior when they’re elsewhere. 
Conversely, if we can create a feeling of commitment that causes them to own 
responsibility for security, there’s a better chance they will behave more securely both 
within the workplace and when they are outside our physical perimeter. This change 
in behavior improves the security of the device they are using, the information they are 
accessing, their personal lives, and the enterprise.  
 Examining the  Risks 
 Before discussing ways that we can modify user behavior, I’d like to briefly mention some 
examples of what can happen if we don’t influence the ways that users think and act. 
 As an experiment, the US Department of Homeland Security secretly dropped disks 
and thumb drives in the parking lots of government and private contractors’ buildings. 
Their goal was to see whether people would pick them up and plug them into their 
computers. As reported by Bloomberg News (Edwards et al. 2011), up to 60 percent of the 
people who picked up the items inserted them into their office computers. That number 
rose to 90 percent if the item included an official-looking logo. Clearly, the security 
behavior of employees at these facilities left quite a bit to be desired. 
 Insider threats unfortunately continue to make the news. A former JPMorgan Chase & 
Co. employee was arrested by the FBI on charges of stealing customer data and trying to sell it 
to an undercover informant. As noted by  CSO , similar incidents have occurred multiple times 
at the bank over the past few years, illustrating the company’s inability to account for insider 
threats despite its substantial annual spending on security technology (Lambert 2015). 
 Think about what can happen with newer, more sophisticated exploits. A 
sophisticated attack targeted government departments using fake voice-mails to 
distract users while malware downloaded in the background. Using social engineering 
and targeted e-mails, the attackers tricked users into visiting web sites harboring self-
extracting archives. The archives contained a recording media file purporting to be a 
voice-mail from a female journalist seeking information for a news story, alongside other 
files that downloaded malicious content (CNET 2015). 
 As in the example above, today’s threats may arrive in the form of carefully personalized 
spearphishing communications designed to win the trust of targeted users. These users then 
unwittingly provide access to the information the attackers want. In essence, trust—in this 
case, the organization’s trust in the user—has become the attack surface. 
 Let’s say a company is looking to hire a credit analyst with a very specific set of skills. 
Attackers notice this and apply online, using a résumé that lists the exact skills required for the 
job and contains the terms the company’s résumé-scanning software is likely to be looking 
for. Suitably impressed, the company’s human-resources specialists forward the application 
to the company’s credit-department manager, who has access to all the systems storing 
customer financial data. The manager trusts this communication because it has been sent 
from another department within the same company. So she clicks on the link to the résumé. 
Unfortunately, that action triggers the execution of malicious code. The human-resources 
team effectively acted as an infection agent, ensuring the attack reached its real target. 
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 Social media accounts can become sources of risk even when they haven’t been 
compromised. There have been several examples in which senior executives accidentally 
revealed information that was confidential or problematic in other ways. In November 
2014, Twitter’s CFO accidentally publicly tweeted a plan to buy another company, 
including the fact that he wanted help to make the deal happen at a meeting the following 
month. The CFO was apparently trying to send the message privately (Frier 2014).  
 At Houston-based fashion retailer Francesca's Holdings, a former CFO frequently 
shared his thoughts via a personal blog, Facebook page, and Twitter feed (Silverman 
2012). Unfortunately, he also shared information that caused problems for his employer. 
The company fired him because he "improperly communicated company information 
through social media.” 
 Users frequently post information on external social-media sites that attracts the 
attention of competitors or the media. To boost their job prospects, interns mention 
product features they helped develop during their summer job at a well-known company; 
sales representatives reveal the names of major clients; even senior executives have 
been known to unintentionally disclose key corporate strategies. In fact, services exist 
that specialize in aggregating apparently minor snippets of information from social-
media and other web sites to build an accurate view of a company’s size, geographical 
distribution, and business strategy, including hiring patterns that indicate whether the 
company is expanding and which new areas it is moving into. 
 Adjusting Behavior 
 To counter these risks, we need to make employees aware and empowered so they act 
as an effective part of the security perimeter. Increasing recognition of this need has led 
to the development of a small ecosystem focused on increasing security awareness and 
 changing behavior , ranging from companies offering best practices to groups focused on 
internet safety for children. This includes companies that train users to avoid phishing 
exploits, using simulated phishing scenarios and other tools. Security awareness 
professionals have come together to share best practices (see sidebar). 
 While I was Intel’s CISO and then Chief Security and Privacy Officer, we focused on 
building security and privacy protection into the corporate culture, getting employees 
to own responsibility for protecting enterprise and personal information. Achieving 
this required a lot of effort, and we realized that it took just as much work to maintain a 
culture of security and privacy as to build it. 
 Training is a key part of security efforts at most companies, and Intel is no 
exception. We supplemented general training, which fulfills most legal requirements, 
with specialized training for employees who have specific roles or access to sensitive 
information. Another effective technique was to embed security and privacy training into 
business processes. When an employee requested access to an application that handles 
sensitive information, they were automatically prompted to take training that focused on 
the related security and privacy concerns. We also used online training including video 
and other visually stimulating material as well as entertaining, interactive tools to help 
engage users (see Figure  5-1 ). 
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 However, it is not enough to create good training. If nobody takes the training, the 
effort is wasted. We found that incentives such as public recognition helped ensure 
employees underwent training and absorbed the lessons. Ultimately, if people continued 
to avoid security training, we escalated compliance efforts by directly contacting them 
and their managers. 
 We also found we could help maintain and increase awareness by publishing security-
related articles on Intel’s primary employee portal. Many of these articles included a 
personal aspect, such as preventing identity theft, keeping children safe online, and home 
wireless security tips. The focus on personal concerns recognized that the way employees 
behave outside the office is as important to enterprise security as their behavior in the office. 
 How did we know our security efforts paid off? We accumulated a variety of 
evidence, including independent benchmark results from Corporate Executive Board 
(2011), which indicated that Intel employees consistently ranked in the top 10 percent 
of companies for secure behavior. We also observed that employees acted as part of the 
security perimeter by alerting us to suspicious text messages or e-mails they’d received. 
 Figure 5-1.  Intel’s internal “Find the Phish”  interactive training tool helps employees spot 
web scams. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012 
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 A Model for Improving Security Awareness 
 Some of the industry’s most valuable work to advance organizational understanding of 
 security awareness comes from best-practices firm CEB. The company offers a security 
awareness service that includes surveying key security-related employee behaviors at 
member organizations, and benchmarking the results against other organizations. The 
program attempts to understand the psychological reasons for insecure behavior; it then 
focuses on those psychological drivers when suggesting tactics to change employees’ 
behavior. To date, CEB has collected some 300,000 employee responses from over 400 
organizations. 
 The program has found that despite the importance of secure employee behavior, 
most organizations deliver only moderate amounts of  training : just over an hour per year, 
on average, and only three to four employee communications per month. Survey results 
suggest that organizations can increase training time to as much as six hours a year before 
experiencing diminishing returns. 
 CEB emphasizes that organizations need to use an understanding of psychology to 
tailor their awareness efforts; awareness programs must target the specific root causes of 
employees’ risky behavior in order to be effective. The company initially identified five 
psychological factors influencing security awareness and behavior: lack of knowledge of 
policy, lack of self-interest in security, inadequate perception of the risk to the organization, 
a low emotional commitment to security, and a perception that secure behavior imposes a 
high burden. It recently added a sixth factor: the ability to display good judgment. 
 CEB’s findings suggest that the perceived burden of secure activities affects employee 
behavior more than any other psychological driver. That’s the bad news. The good news 
is organizations can fix the perception of the burden both by reducing the burden itself 
and by addressing the other drivers. For example, employees’ emotional commitment 
to security increases if their managers engage with them directly to emphasize the risks. 
Clear enforcement of policy compliance increases employees’ self-interest in secure 
behavior and heightens their perception of risks. 
 Based on survey data collected over the years, CEB has developed a model that 
organizations can use to help plan and assess their security awareness programs. 
The model presents a four–stage progression toward higher security awareness and 
commitment, from basic check-the-box compliance to active involvement in security. It 
recognizes that in a complex threat environment, we can no longer rely only on policies 
that prescribe specific employee behaviors: we also need to enable employees to actively 
support security activities including breach detection. 
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 Employee awareness programs at Level 1 (Check the Box) simply respond to external 
regulatory requirements and don’t explicitly aim to change specific employee behaviors. At 
Level 2, programs try to  encourage users to adopt specific, simple behaviors, such as avoiding 
sharing passwords and sending sensitive information to their own personal e-mail addresses. 
 The third and fourth levels display greater levels of  judgment and commitment . 
At Level 3, employees are able to make good judgment calls in the moment, especially 
in situations where the right answer is not immediately obvious. For example, they 
remember to pause before clicking to check whether an e-mail comes from a legitimate 
source or contains a phishing link. At Level 4, employees become an extension of the 
information security organization; they not only avoid security risks, but also notify 
information security when they see something suspicious. A key behavior here is an 
increase in reporting events such as spearphishing attempts. 
 The  encouraging news is that that CEB surveys show a gradual improvement; the 
percentage of employees avoiding insecure behaviors such as password sharing has 
slowly increased over the past six years. Resistance to phishing has improved faster, 
though from a lower base. “I think at progressive companies the aspiration is changing,” 
says CEB practice leader Jeremy Bergsman. “Most companies have been moving 
from Level 1 to Level 2 over several years, and are starting to think about Level 3. But 
progressive companies are moving beyond employee behavior as a risk to be reduced, 
and working on ways to make employees a control—an early warning system (Level 4).” 
 For example, a large  telecommunications firm that participated in the CEB security 
awareness program wanted to empower employees to act as controls supporting 
information security. It provided each employee with a weekly report tracking his or her 
behavior, including the documents they accessed, and the devices and external locations 
used to connect to corporate systems (Figure  5-3 ). Employees were responsible for 
reading the reports, thus sharing responsibility with information security for detecting 
 Figure 5-2.  A  four-stage model for programs seeking to improve security awareness and 
behavior. Source: CEB Inc., 2015 
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breaches. The firm found that employees detected suspicious activities faster than would 
have otherwise been the case; users also proactively improved security by suggesting 
other activities that should be tracked and added to future reports. 
  INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITY 
AWARENESS PROFESSIONALS
 Exchanging ideas with other security professionals can help improve security 
awareness programs. The International Association of Security Awareness 
Professionals ( www.iasapgroup.org ) is an independent association of corporate 
security specialists who are seeking to do just that. IASAP is a non-profit, fee-based 
association dedicated solely to security awareness programs. Its goal is to serve 
as a trusted forum of security awareness professionals collaborating to improve 
employee security behavior. “Clear guidance has not been as available for employee 
security behaviors as it has been for technology solutions,” says IASAP board 
member Michael Diamond. “Several awareness professionals noticed this gap, and 
that ultimately led to the formation of IASAP.” 
 Some members have built programs from scratch; others inherited established 
programs in need of fresh ideas and new energy. Members meet in person two to 
three times per year to learn about other members’ security programs and present 
their own. There’s also a members-only sharing platform supporting Q&A, feedback, 
benchmarking surveys, member polls, guest speaker webinars, and teleconferences. 
Some members feel comfortable posting program resources that are available to 
other members for re-branding within their own programs. 
 Figure 5-3.  Example of weekly  tracking report showing employees their activity. 
Source: CEB Inc., 2015 
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 Broadening the  Awareness Model 
 I think that the CEB four-stage model shown in Figure  5-2 is a very useful tool. One 
limitation, in my opinion, is that the model is based on the traditional organizational 
view of information security. I believe that we need to expand the model to capture a 
more complete view of information risk. You might think of the following two additions as 
Levels 3a and 4a, respectively, of the model. 
•  Privacy awareness, which has become a critical concern. Just 
consider the number of breaches that have targeted personal 
information at retail, healthcare, and government organizations.  
•  A specific focus on engineers and other technology professionals, 
including those creating technology-based products and services. 
If engineers don’t have a foundational understanding of privacy 
and security, they cannot design privacy and security into the 
technology they produce. As a result, a company’s products may 
contain vulnerabilities that introduce significant risks for the 
business and its customers. 
 The  Security Benefits of Personal Use 
 Employees use an ever-growing variety of  personal devices every day, both inside and 
outside the physical workplace. This trend started with smartphones and laptops; it 
also includes wearable devices such as smartwatches and fitness monitors. Information 
security specialists naturally tend to focus on the security risks of using these devices for 
business purposes. As I discussed earlier in the book, I’ve found that the productivity 
benefits of personal devices often outweigh the risks. But even the security implications 
are not as one-sided as they might seem at first glance. I believe that, in some respects, 
allowing personal use may actually encourage better security. 
 In general, people are likely to take better care of their own possessions than 
someone else’s. They feel a stronger connection to their own car than to one provided 
by their employer. If people are using their own computing device, they may take better 
precautions against theft or loss. And they may feel the same way if they are storing 
personal information on a corporate device. At Intel, we allowed reasonable personal use 
of corporate laptops, and therefore many employees stored personal as well as corporate 
information on their laptops. Because of this, they had a personal stake in ensuring the 
devices didn’t get lost or stolen. I believe this sense of ownership contributed to our 
lower-than-average laptop loss rates. 
 Another company’s experience provided some empirical evidence supporting this 
idea. The company conducted a tablet pilot deployment in which, for the first time, it 
allowed personal use of corporate devices. The company found that breakage and loss 
rates were dramatically reduced compared to its past experience with mobile devices. 
The CIO’s conclusion was that employees simply take better care of devices when they 
use them for personal purposes. 
 Perhaps we should be similarly open-minded when considering the security 
implications of wearable devices. I met with managers at a large company who were 
pondering the security implications of smartwatches and fitness monitors, which 
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employees were already bringing into the workplace. Understandably, some people at the 
company wanted to make sure the devices could not interact with the corporate network. 
I observed that in the future, wearables could be harnessed to help identify users in ways 
that are less cumbersome for users than traditional controls such as passwords. Fitness 
devices, including some smartwatches, count the user’s steps and monitor heart rate, and 
could therefore be used as biometric security devices in the future. As the devices evolve 
and accumulate more user data over time, they may become more adept at identifying 
each user’s physiological and behavioral “signature.” In addition, some smartphones 
include fingerprint recognition, which in itself can be a powerful authentication 
mechanism if the technology has been properly designed and implemented. 
 As security professionals, shouldn’t we think about taking advantage of the benefits 
these technologies offer? We should seek to integrate into security strategies the broader 
variety of existing devices, which have useful features such as cameras and voice recognition 
and also contain data about our use patterns. Many of these devices already communicate 
with each other; why not take the next step and use the technology to eliminate the pain of 
using passwords? Why not find a way to reduce risk and cost, while providing a much better 
user experience, by using these devices to authenticate us automatically? 
 It may also be worthwhile to reexamine other assumptions about the security 
implications of personal devices. Some companies have policies forbidding the use of 
cameras in their offices. However, a smartphone includes a camera that employees can 
use to capture the off-the-cuff design sketches often scrawled on whiteboards during 
brainstorming sessions. This intellectual property can then be stored and encrypted on a 
hard drive within the enterprise. Is it safer to allow employees to photograph the image, 
or to copy it onto a piece of paper, or to leave it on the whiteboard where anyone might 
see it? Companies may come to different conclusions, depending on their culture and 
appetite for risk. But this is another illustration of the importance of considering all the 
possible business benefits as well as the risks when making technology decisions.  
 Roundabouts and Stop Signs 
 To try to reduce driving accidents at a dangerous curve in Chicago, the city painted a 
series of white lines across the road. As drivers approached the sharpest point of the 
curve, the spacing between the lines progressively decreased, giving the drivers the 
illusion they were speeding up, and nudging them to tap their brakes. The result was a 36 
percent drop in crashes, as described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein in their book 
 Nudge (Yale University Press, 2008). 
 This  traffic-control method succeeded in making drivers more aware and improving 
safety while keeping the traffic flowing with minimum disruption. I think this example 
provides a useful metaphor for information security. Some security controls are like stop 
signs or barriers: we simply block access to technology or data. But if we can shape the 
behavior of employees rather than blocking them altogether, we’ll allow employees, and 
therefore the company, to move faster. 
 To use another traffic metaphor, a roundabout at an intersection typically results in 
more efficient traffic flow than an intersection with stop signs, because drivers don’t have 
to come to a complete halt. The roundabout increases drivers’ awareness, but they can 
proceed without stopping if the way is clear. Statistics have shown roundabouts are often 
safer than intersections. 
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 Of course, we need to block access in some situations, such as with illegal web sites. 
But there are cases where it’s more efficient and productive to make users aware of the 
risks, yet leave them empowered to make the decisions themselves. 
 Consider the case of a large multinational company whose business relied heavily 
on its significant intellectual property. To protect that proprietary IP, the company 
implemented data-loss protection software, including an application on employees’ 
laptops. But instead of simply blocking transmission of information flagged as sensitive, 
the company configured the software to warn employees whenever it detected potentially 
insecure behavior. If an employee tried to transmit a confidential document, the software 
displayed a message that explained the potential risks and suggested ways to protect 
the information, such as encryption. After all, users may have good reasons for sending 
confidential documents, and preventing transmission could be detrimental rather than 
beneficial to the business. The company found that this warning caused 70% of users 
to change their behavior, representing a major reduction in risk. Yet because of the way 
the software was configured, users didn’t complain about the security burden. The 
roundabout approach reduced risk without interfering with users’ productivity. 
 Here’s another  hypothetical example. It may make sense to warn users visiting 
certain countries that they may be accessing material that is considered unacceptable. 
A US employee traveling on business might be working in a local office of a country with 
strict religious guidelines. The employee has a daughter who’s in a beauty pageant, so it 
would be natural to check the pageant web site from time to time. But the images could 
be offensive in the country, so it makes sense to warn the employee to exercise caution. At 
Intel, we found that when we warn users in this way about potentially hazardous sites, the 
vast majority heed the warnings and don’t access the web sites.  
 In the case of information security, there’s an additional benefit of making controls 
as streamlined as possible. We all know if controls are too cumbersome or unreasonable, 
users may simply find ways around them. We kept this concern in mind when developing 
a social media strategy at Intel IT (Buczek and Harkins 2009). We were well aware of the 
risks associated with social media, but attempting to stop the use of external social media 
web sites would have been counterproductive and, in any case, impossible. We realized 
that if we did not embrace social media and define ways to use it, we would lose the 
opportunity to shape employee behavior. 
 As part of our initial investigation, we conducted a social media risk assessment. 
We found social media does not create new risks, but can increase existing ones. For 
example, there’s always been a risk that information can be sent to inappropriate people 
outside the organization. However, posting the same information on a blog or forum 
increases the risk by immediately exposing the information to a much wider audience. 
 So we developed a social media strategy that included several key elements. We 
determined that we could reduce risk by implementing social media tools within the 
organization, so we deployed internal capabilities such as wikis, forums, and blogs. 
Initially, employees used these tools mainly to connect socially rather than for core 
business functions; we later integrated the tools into line-of-business applications to 
achieve project and business goals. We also worked with Intel’s human-resources groups 
to develop guidelines for employee participation in external social media sites, and 
developed an instructional video that was posted on a public video-sharing site. The 
video candidly explained that Intel wanted to use social media to open communications 
channels with customers, partners, and influencers, to encourage people to adopt the 
technology, and to close the feedback loop. The information also included guidance 
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about how to create successful content and general usage guidelines. We also used 
technology to help ensure that employees followed the guidelines. We monitored the 
Internet for posts containing information that could expose us to risks, and we also 
monitored internal social media sites to detect exposure of sensitive information and 
violations of workplace ethics or privacy.  
 The Technology  Professional 
 So far, I’ve focused mainly on the security roles of end users. But think about the 
broadening roles that technology professionals play at many companies. Historically, 
 technology professionals have performed back-office IT roles at most companies, such 
as managing infrastructure and internal applications. Many also work on web sites and 
online services. We’re now moving into a future in which companies in all industries will 
become creators of technology embedded in physical as well as digital products, and 
they’ll hire developers to create that technology. These technical professionals are also 
part of the people perimeter, and their actions can have major positive or negative effects. 
 We’ve already seen several well-publicized problems caused by vulnerabilities in 
products. Fiat Chrysler recalled Jeeps in 2015 after researchers showed they could hack 
into a 2014 model and hijack its steering, brakes, and transmission. The researchers used 
an unsecured communications port to execute the attack (Dark Reading 2015). Similar 
concerns prompted the FDA to order organizations to stop using older drug infusion 
pumps made by Hospira when it was found that an unauthorized user could hack into 
them and change the dosage the pump delivers. 
 In traditional IT roles, technical professionals manage almost every element of the 
technology spanning our networks, data centers, and users’ computing devices. They 
develop and install software. They configure, administer, and monitor systems. Their 
actions or inaction can make the difference between a system that is vulnerable and one 
that is reasonably secure.  
 Those systems include servers, which are still the IT assets most commonly attacked 
and robbed of data. An attacker may initially gain access to your company by compromising a 
user’s laptop, but the biggest prize—databases of corporate intellectual property and personal 
information—still reside on the enterprise servers. To steal that information, attackers now 
typically often use a compromised end-user device to search the network for servers with 
inadequately configured access controls. Surveys show many attacks continue to exploit 
security holes that organizations could easily have fixed. Among organizations surveyed for 
the 2015  Data Breach Investigations Report , more than 30 of the exploited vulnerabilities had 
been identified as long ago as 1999, yet presumably not addressed at the victim organization. 
As the report notes, “Apparently, hackers really do still party like it’s 1999.” 
 Similar trends can be seen in the incidence of software errors. Many of the most 
serious, frequently exploited vulnerabilities in software are due to well-known errors that 
are “often easy to find, and easy to exploit,” as noted in the 2011 CWE/SANS Top 25 Most 
Dangerous Software Errors (CWE/SANS 2011). Furthermore, the situation does not seem 
to be improving. As David Rice, author of  Geekonomics (Addison-Wesley Professional 
2007), puts it, most software is not sufficiently engineered to fulfill its designated role as 
the foundation for our products, services, and infrastructure (Rice 2007). This is partly 
due to the fact that incentives to improve quality are “missing, ineffectual, or even 
distorted,” he concluded. To compete, suppliers focus on bringing products to market 
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faster and adding new features, rather than on improving quality. Rice estimated, based 
on government data, that “bad” error-ridden software cost the United States a staggering 
USD 180 billion even back in 2007. 
 Not surprisingly, the typical recommendations for improving IT security often 
sound remarkably familiar. That’s because they address problems already known to most 
organizations, but not fully addressed. As the Data Breach Investigations Report notes, 
the question is not which vulnerabilities should be patched (all of them should): “The 
real decision is whether a given vulnerability should be patched more quickly than your 
normal cycle or if it can just be pushed with the rest.” Previous editions of the report 
have recommended basic precautions such as ensuring passwords are unique; regularly 
reviewing user accounts to ensure they are valid and properly configured; securing 
remote access; increasing employee awareness using methods such as training; and 
application testing and code review to prevent exploits such as SQL injection attacks and 
cross-site scripting, which take advantage of common software errors. 
 The fact that these measures do not appear to be rigorously applied at many 
organizations takes us back to a key theme of this chapter: that the commitment 
of employees is as important as the policies and procedures you have in place. If 
administrators and developers are committed rather than just following directives, if 
they feel personally responsible for the security of the enterprise, and they will be more 
conscientious about ensuring the right technical controls are in place. 
 Insider Threats 
 High-profile national security breaches by insiders such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea 
Manning have made insider threats a considerably more prominent issue during the 
three years since the first edition of this book was published. 
 Among the 557 organizations participating in the 2014 Cybersecurity Watch 
Survey (CSO et al. 2014), 28 percent of cybercrime events were attributed to insiders. 
Furthermore, insiders accounted for the highest percentage of incidents in which 
sensitive or confidential information was stolen or unintentionally exposed. 
 Insider attacks also cause additional harm that can be hard to quantify and recoup, 
such as damage to an  organization’s reputation . Insiders have a significant advantage 
because they can bypass physical and technical security measures such as firewalls and 
intrusion detection systems that were designed to prevent unauthorized access. The 
organization’s trust in the insider is used as the attack surface. In at least one case, the 
insider was the person one might least suspect: the head of information security at the Iowa 
state lottery, who hacked his employer's computer system, and rigged the lottery so he 
could buy a winning ticket in a subsequent draw. By installing a rootkit on a lottery system, 
he could secretly alter the lottery's random number generator, enabling him to calculate 
winning numbers in advance and buy a winning ticket in advance (Thomson 2015). 
 Unfortunately, even  security firms are not immune to compromise; well-known 
cybersecurity company FireEye hired an intern who was later discovered to be a 
top Android malware developer. Unfortunately, his job at the security firm involved 
researching and analyzing Android malware, which raises the concern that he could have 
used his inside knowledge to develop malware capable of evading technical controls 
(Fox-Brewster 2015). 
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 Yet surveys have also suggested that many insider attacks are opportunistic, rather 
than highly planned affairs. Many insiders take data after they’ve already accepted a job 
offer from a competitor or another company, and steal data to which they already have 
authorized access. In some cases, misguided employees may simply feel they’re entitled 
to take information related to their job. 
 Clearly, all organizations need to be aware of the insider threat. It may not be 
possible to thwart all insider exploits, but we can take actions to reduce their likelihood 
and impact. Perhaps the biggest step we can take is to instill a culture of commitment. 
User behavior analytics technology can also help by detecting behaviors or access 
privileges that are outside the norm; perhaps technology could have prevented the 
case in which a former nursing assistant at an Orlando health network inappropriately 
accessed about 3,200 patient medical records, with no apparent motive. Besides 
disclosing the breach, the health network had to notify the affected patients and offer 
support, fire the employee, reeducate the workforce, and increase its efforts to audit and 
monitor access (Brinkmann 2015). 
 To help manage insider threats, consider a  three-part approach : deter, detect, and 
discipline. Remember that successful implementation will require the involvement of the 
entire organization. 
 Deter 
•  Build security awareness and instill a culture of commitment, 
using the techniques discussed in this chapter. 
•  Make your company a great place to work. Employees are less 
likely to get disgruntled, and therefore less likely to seek ways to 
harm the company. 
•  Let people know you’re watching. Technology can help monitor 
users’ activity. Showing users their activity reports can help 
involve them in protecting the business. It also lets potentially 
malicious insiders know they’re being watched. 
 Detect 
•  See something, say something. A committed workforce will tell 
you if they see something suspicious. 
•  User behavior analytics tools are becoming more and more 
effective at finding anomalies in access permissions and user 
activity, and identifying whether a user’s actions are far enough 
outside the norm that they merit investigation. 
•  Form a team that focuses on insider threats and investigations. 
This should operate as a cross-functional team with involvement 
from human resources, legal, physical security, and information 
security groups. 
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 Discipline 
 When an insider incident occurs:
•  If it’s an honest mistake without a big impact, immediate remedial 
training may be the best remedy. 
•  If the impact was low, and the incident seems more an error of 
judgment than a malicious act, a less heavy-handed approach 
may be appropriate—perhaps a written warning or a comment in 
the person’s performance review.  
•  If the intent is clearly malicious, or the impact is significant, 
consider the options of termination and even engaging law 
enforcement. 
 Finding the  Balance 
 One reason that organizations are focusing more attention on security awareness is 
that their technical controls have failed to prevent attacks from reaching employees 
and thus the core of the enterprise. Rapidly evolving new exploits, often involving social 
engineering as well as malware, have outstripped the capabilities of the security tools 
companies have relied on in the past. 
 Now, innovative security technology is becoming available that uses machine 
learning and artificial intelligence techniques to prevent malware much more effectively, 
on every type of device. This is great news for all consumers of technology. The adoption 
of this technology should result in a substantial reduction in risk, due to a precipitous 
drop in malware. The danger is that some will see this as an opportunity to dial back 
their security awareness efforts. I think this could be a mistake. We will always need to 
maintain a level of diligence and discipline in security and privacy awareness. However, 
we may be able to shift the emphasis of training toward prevention and future risks, and 
focus on how we should design, develop, and deploy technology that better protects 
privacy and resists attacks. 
 No matter how good our technical controls are, we will still need people to act as part 
of the perimeter. We need to create a sense of personal commitment and security as well 
as privacy ownership among our employees. If we succeed in this goal, we will empower 
employees to help protect the enterprise by making better security decisions both within 
and outside the workplace. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
 Emerging Threats and 
Vulnerabilities: Reality and 
Rhetoric 
 Curiosity is lying in wait for every secret. 
 —Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 These days it’s hard to read an online news source, pick up a newspaper, or watch TV 
without seeing reports of new threats: cybercrimes, data breaches, industrial espionage, 
and potential destruction of national infrastructure. These reports inevitably leave the 
impression that we are drowning in an inexorable tide of new and terrifying threats. 
 One has to question how much of this is  rhetoric , and how much is reality. There are 
political and profit-driven motives for making threats seem bigger and more imminent 
than they really are. US government officials have warned that cyber attacks potentially 
can be “devastating, approaching weapons of mass destruction in their effects” 
(Levin 2010). Such warnings have been used to justify requests for increased national 
cybersecurity funding, as well as proposed restrictions on private networks. It’s not 
surprising, therefore, that some experts have expressed skepticism about the real extent 
of the threat. In fact, academics at the George Mason University Mercatus Center have 
warned, “the United States may be witnessing a bout of threat inflation similar to that 
seen in the run-up to the Iraq War” (Brito and Watkins 2012). 
 On the other hand, common sense tells us new cyber threats really are emerging 
and growing. More data is online and vulnerable to attack, and millions of new Internet-
connected devices are inevitably introducing new risks. Malware production has matured 
into a sizable industry. Government agencies and businesses have suffered real attacks 
attributed to nation-state actors: in 2014, for example, the US Government charged five 
members of the Chinese military with stealing information from SolarWorld and other 
companies, during a trade dispute over solar-energy products. 
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 Given the flood of  often-conflicting information , how can we get an accurate picture 
of the threat landscape so that we can develop an appropriate security strategy? How do 
we determine which threats directly affect our organizations, and distinguish them from 
those that are irrelevant? How do we decide which threats require immediate defensive 
measures, as opposed to those that attract attention but don’t yet present significant risks? 
 In this chapter, I’ll describe methods for identifying the real threat and vulnerability 
trends among the rhetoric. I’ll also discuss some key areas of threat activity that have been 
analyzed using these methods. My goal is to help information security groups stay ahead 
of the attackers and focus their limited resources on mitigating the most important threats. 
 Structured Methods for Identifying Threat Trends 
 To identify the real trends in emerging threats among the mass of news and speculation, 
we need to carefully examine the available information using a structured, analytical 
approach. Unfortunately, many security groups absorb information about emerging 
threats using methods that are unstructured and sometimes almost haphazard. 
 A typical process looks something like this. The  security team  relies on external 
sources, such as news feeds and alerts, as well as informal anecdotes, to gather 
information about emerging threats. Based on this information, the team holds 
brainstorming sessions to review the threat landscape. The output from these sessions is 
a list of “top risks.” Security resources are then focused on mitigating the items on the list. 
 There are several problems with this approach. Information comes from a narrow, 
limited range of sources, resulting in a  blinkered security perspective that tends to stifle 
creative thinking. Also, the information is usually fragmented, making it difficult for the 
team to identify trends and gaps in the data. These deficiencies continue through security 
planning and implementation. Because the team lacks a full view of the threat landscape, 
it’s hard to determine which threats require immediate attention and how much of the 
limited security budget they deserve. As a result, risks are incorporated into plans on an 
ad hoc basis, and not all risks are adequately mitigated. Finally, security teams often don’t 
have a structured process for communicating threat information to other people within 
their organizations. Because of this, people outside the security group remain unaware of 
emerging risks and don’t know how to respond when they experience an attack. 
 I realized the limitations of this approach several years ago, and began trying to inject 
more rigor into the  risk-sensing strategy . Over time, those efforts progressively developed 
into a more structured risk-sensing process that helps identify threats, prioritize them, 
plan responses, and deliver actionable information to those who may need it. Through 
continued use, risk sensing can become a systemic process within any organization. 
 The process for  analyzing emerging threats includes several valuable techniques 
that may be unfamiliar to some security groups. I have used a product life cycle analogy 
to track threats as they mature from theoretical risks into full-blown exploits. I have also 
used nontraditional analysis techniques, such as war games and threat agent profiles, 
to encourage creative thinking and identify threats that might otherwise be missed. I’ll 
discuss these methods in more detail later in this chapter. 
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 The process can be managed by a small core team, supplemented by a broad set 
of experts (including people outside the security group) across an organization. This 
arrangement ensures continuity while enabling the team to mine a diverse variety of 
sources to get a more complete picture of immediate and future threats. 
 Security team members should research a wide range of security topics in depth. 
This diversity of perspective and discussion essentially creates a crowd-sourcing of 
intelligence and reduces the influence of any single person’s bias. Team members 
use typical sources, such as external feeds and analysis; they also mine academic 
research and hacker discussion forums, and connect with security professionals at 
other organizations. Other team members may scan the regulatory horizon to identify 
upcoming laws and regulations with potential impact, or analyze internal investigations 
and other near-miss incident data. 
 The team should hold regular meetings to analyze the  threat landscape . At these 
meetings, each security domain expert explains his or her findings to other members 
of the security team. For each security topic, the discussion should include a review of 
recent events and a look ahead to the future. This helps identify the key trends and the 
factors driving those trends, provides context that can be used to analyze the current 
state, and predicts the likely evolution of each threat. The structured evaluation uncovers 
emerging risks that the team might otherwise miss. It’s also useful to look back at previous 
predictions to see which ones were accurate, and to analyze the reasons why threats may 
not have materialized in the way that was expected. 
 It’s important to communicate the findings to stakeholders across your organization 
in regular reports and briefings, including a wide-ranging annual assessment of the threat 
landscape. This communication provides further opportunities to get feedback from 
across the organization and its business units, which can then be used to refine your  risk-
sensing analysis . 
 The  Product Life Cycle Model 
 I have found that a product life cycle model is a useful way to track and prioritize 
emerging threats as they evolve and begin to present real risks to the enterprise. Almost 
all security groups have a limited budget, so they need to focus their resources on 
effectively mitigating the  highest-priority threats . 
 This model, shown in Figure  6-1 , recognizes that many threats initially emerge as 
theoretical risks, but are on a path to exploitation, and we need to evaluate and monitor them. 
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 Often, researchers or hackers first reveal a possible attack or vulnerability at a 
security conference or publish information about it online. Next, attackers begin testing 
the use of this technique and making their results publicly available. Once the method 
has been proven, the threat enters the production phase as attackers start exploiting it in 
earnest. Ultimately, the threat becomes a mature  commodity—source code is often freely 
available, many variants exist, and organizations treat the threat as part of the everyday 
landscape and build defenses accordingly. 
 This life cycle model enables security teams to systematically track the evolution of 
threats. It helps us determine when to allocate resources to fighting each threat. As each 
threat approaches maturity, we can examine how it is likely to affect our organizations 
and plan appropriate mitigation. 
 In addition, this model provides a great way to communicate actionable information 
to business groups using terminology they already understand (the product life cycle). 
When we provide regular threat landscape assessments to stakeholders, each security 
topic should include a description of the activity at each life cycle phase, thus providing 
a context that helps the security team inform business groups about how they should act 
on each of these emerging risks. 
 L et’s examine some examples showing how this model can be used in real life. 
Figure  6-2 illustrates the evolution of threats targeting smartphones and other handheld 
devices. Researchers and hackers began to take notice of handheld devices almost a 
decade ago, demonstrating weaknesses and theoretical avenues of exploitation. Initially, 
they focused on what were then known as personal digital assistants. As smartphones 
 Figure 6-1.  The product life cycle model for tracking the  evolution of threats. 
Source : Intel Corporation, 2012 
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took off, attackers shifted their attention to this bigger market, which rapidly became 
a major area of threat activity. Monitoring trends at these earlier stages enables 
organizations to prepare. As threats mature and employees begin using smartphones 
more widely at work, well-prepared organizations are in a better position to develop risk 
mitigation measures including technical controls and incident response plans. 
 Figure 6-2.  How an organization could use the product life cycle model to track and 
respond to  smartphone security threats  
 By visually comparing activity across multiple threat areas, as shown in Figure  6-3 , 
we can quickly identify major areas of activity and see the likely timing and extent of their 
impact. This chart also shows us areas in which there are numerous proof-of-concept 
tests and other activities that suggest major problems in the near future. And it indicates 
areas of focused research that may ripen into active exploitation over the long term. 
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 Although the depth of detail in Figure  6-3 is valuable to the security team, I have 
found a simpler, consolidated view such as the chart in Figure  6-4 can help communicate 
the essential trends to a broader audience, supplementing  other  threat analysis materials . 
These simpler charts are based on the activity identified using the product life cycle 
model, but add further trend analysis and group the activity areas into four main clusters, 
depending on their level of activity and maturity potential and on their potential impact 
to the company. These clusters are 
•  Sustained drivers : These are areas that already have a high 
impact or otherwise cause considerable concern. Typically, 
they are characterized by commoditized distribution and active 
exploitation by multiple threat agents. Today, examples include 
malware and web attacks. 
•  Critical trends : These areas have begun undergoing active 
exploitation, with growing adoption beginning to shift toward 
commoditization. Current examples include social computing 
and smartphones. 
•  Emerging trends : These areas have a low current level of 
exploitation, but considerable research and proof-of-concept 
activity. Examples include embedded and cloud computing. 
 Figure 6-3.  A visual comparison of  security-related activity across different technology 
areas. Data are for illustration purposes only. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012 
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•  Disruptive trends : These are areas with little or no active 
exploitation, but significant research activity and the disruptive 
potential to cause a major security problem. Frequently, they are 
discussed as theoretical risks, and because of this, many people 
in the industry would be caught off guard by a significant event. 
Examples include virtualization, an area in which potential 
threats and vulnerabilities have been exposed and a successful 
exploit could cause far-reaching damage. 
 I have found that clustering threat analysis information in this way enhances 
communication with stakeholders. Representing the information in easy-to-understand 
charts helps to convey the key trends and their potential impact to a broad cross-section 
of people, helping them quickly assess whether they need to make  adjustments  to 
security strategy. 
 ASSESSING HOW TO RESPOND TO A NEW THREAT 
REPORT
 A continuous stream of new threat reports emerges from agencies, intelligence 
services, and vendors. It can be hard to determine what to do with all the new 
information—especially since most security organizations have limited resources. Here 
are five questions you can ask yourself the next time you see a published  threat report .
 Figure 6-4.  Clustering areas of threat activity to highlight trends. 
Source: Intel Corporation, 2012 
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 1.  Are we immediately affected? Are the indicators of compromise 
shared in the report found in our environment? If so, we have an 
incident that we must deal with. 
 2.  If we’re not already affected, what is the likelihood that we 
will be a future target? We’re more likely to be targeted if we 
work in the same industry as a previous victim, or if we are 
connected to them in another way (as a supplier, customer, or 
partner). If the attackers are hactivists or politically motivated 
threat actors, we are more likely to be targeted if we align with 
the victim’s philosophy. Note that we may be a target even if 
there’s no obvious linkage to the victim. 
 3.  How were the victims attacked? What compensating controls do 
I have in my security stack to mitigate the risks across the kill 
chain of a similar attack?  
 4.  Have we seen the same malware used, or families derived from 
it, against our assets? 
 5.  Were any interesting tools, techniques, or procedures used that 
I should capture and share with my security team? This part of 
the report can be used to educate responders, architects, and 
risk managers so they can make better decisions. 
 Based on a blog post by Steve Mancini, Director of Information Security at Cylance 
(Mancini 2016). 
 Understanding Threat Agents 
 Besides the product life cycle analogy, there are other techniques that can help us think 
creatively about  threats and identify risks we might otherwise miss. 
 Behind every threat is a human agent. To effectively plan defenses, it helps if we can 
understand why and how these agents operate: their motives, typical methods, and targets. 
However, I realized several years ago that we lacked agreed-upon definitions of threat 
agents, as well as a clear understanding of which agents actually pose the biggest risks to us. 
 Some agents and their activities attract considerable publicity, resulting in the “TV news 
effect” in which the most-publicized agents appear to be the biggest threat, so they often 
receive a disproportionately large percentage of limited mitigation resources. In reality, a 
wide spectrum of threat agents exists, some of which may be less well-known but pose bigger 
threats. For example, hactivists often want to publicize their activities as much as possible 
to draw attention to their cause. This publicity makes them appear to be a bigger threat than 
other groups, such as organized crime syndicates, which try to conceal their exploits. 
 In addition, terms often are used without clear agreement about what they mean. The 
phrase  advanced persistent threat has become a buzzword whose exact meaning depends 
on who is using the term. It usually implies adaptive, long-term strategies employing a 
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variety of stealthy techniques and used by attackers with considerable resources. However, 
it’s important to remember that a variety of agents may be capable of generating this type 
of threat. One thing that all these threat agents have in common is the use of malicious 
code to achieve their goals. But to understand and predict their likely motives and 
methods, it is useful to clearly define the agents, whether they represent nations or other 
powerful groups, such as organized crime. To solve this problem, Tim Casey, a member 
of my security team at Intel at that time, developed a standard threat agent library that 
provides a consistent, up-to-date reference describing the human agents that pose threats 
to our information assets (Casey 2007). The library helps risk management professionals 
quickly identify relevant threat agents and understand the importance of the threats.  
 The library acts as a collection point for information about each agent, making it 
easier to share information across your organization. It includes profiles of agents such 
as disgruntled employees, opportunistic employees, industrial spies, and politically 
motivated attackers. The library also catalogs agents’ typical targets, objectives, skill 
levels, current activity, and exploit outcomes. When used as part of regular threat 
assessments, this model can help determine which agents pose the biggest risks to your 
organization. The security team can then use the information about their typical methods 
and exploits to help plan its strategy. The library helps the team understand why specific 
events and attack trends occur and what might happen next. 
 NSA’S CHIEF HACKER EXPLAINS HOW TO DEFEND 
AGAINST THREATS
 It’s hard to imagine someone who is better placed to provide advice about defending 
against advanced adversaries than Rob Joyce, who heads the National Security 
Agency’s  Tailored Access Operations (TAO) elite hacking unit. So the audience 
listened closely when he took the stage for an eye-opening talk at the 2016 Usenix 
Enigma conference. “My talk is to tell you, as a nation-state exploiter, what can you 
do to defend yourself to make my life hard,” he said. 
 Joyce said that six intrusion phases comprise what is typically referred to as the 
“kill chain:” reconnaissance; initial exploitation; establish persistence; install tools; 
move laterally; and collect, exfiltrate, and exploit the data. Organizations can thwart 
attackers by disrupting the transition between any of these phases. For example, 
to help prevent reconnaissance turning into initial exploitation, you can reduce the 
attack surface by locking down or disabling devices that are unused or don’t need to 
be open to access. “Don’t assume a crack is too small to be exploited,” he said. “We 
will look for that esoteric edge case.” 
 Contrary to popular belief, advanced adversaries don’t rely exclusively on zero-day 
exploits, Joyce added. Most intrusions occur via easier vectors: e-mail, web sites 
(using techniques such as waterholing—infecting web sites that are frequently 
accessed by users at the target organization), and removable media like USB drives. 
Joyce noted that you can’t rely on users not to click, even with the best security 
policies and education (see my Irrefutable Laws of Information Security in Chapter 
 1 ), so you need technical controls that will prevent the execution of malicious code. 
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 Once advanced attackers have established a beachhead, they try to steal credentials 
that enable them to maintain a presence, install tools, and move laterally to the 
prized assets they seek. Techniques such as segmenting the network, limiting 
administrator privileges, and forcing two-factor authentication can help make this 
more difficult. Joyce also said that he liked some of the new ideas emerging from 
the industry such dynamic privileges, which is analogous to the granular trust model 
described in Chapter  7 : the level of access provided depends on factors such as the 
device you’re using and your location. 
 Finally, he stressed the need to continually evaluate and improve your defenses. An 
organization with static defenses will drift to the back of the herd, where it is easily 
picked off by a predator (see Irrefutable Law #6). “Don’t be that easy mark,” he said.  
 Playing War Games 
 I like to conduct war games a few times a year. War games are intense role-playing exercises 
in which employees take on the role of attackers and attempt to compromise key assets using 
any feasible methods. I have found war games are particularly valuable for analyzing threats 
that may have major consequences but whose vulnerabilities are not well understood. 
 This technique provides the most comprehensive method of assessing threats to 
key assets because the people playing the role of our adversaries are essentially allowed 
to use any method to achieve their goals. However, because of this, it is also resource-
intensive and should be used selectively. 
 Typical war games that I have overseen take one and a half days and may involve 
eight to ten staff from a variety of roles, such as factory workers, business process 
leads, salespeople, and technical experts. Some war games can take much longer; in 
 Wargaming for Leaders , written by wargaming experts at management-consulting firm 
Booz Allen Hamilton, (Herman, Frost, and Kurz 2009), the authors discuss games that 
may last weeks and involve many more players across an organization. 
 A typical game focuses on a specific target or scenario, such as disabling a key facility 
or stealing trade secrets. You can use war games to examine potentially catastrophic 
events that have a low probability of occurrence, but a high probability of causing damage 
if they do occur. Team members are instructed about the threat agents involved and draw 
on archetypes from a threat agent library or descriptions provided by the game architect. 
Led by a facilitator, the team takes on the attacker’s perspective and postulates ways to 
achieve the attack’s objectives. 
 Because the team can propose any attack method, they often identify risks that might 
be overlooked using conventional methods. As the authors of  Wargaming for Leaders put 
it, “We create the environment, the players engage, and what comes out of team play often 
surprises and even stuns everyone involved.” For example, a malicious group might attempt 
a devastating attack by purchasing a small but essential technology provider and inserting 
malware into their products in order to infect their customers. After each game, security 
analysts examine the results to determine how to address newly identified vulnerabilities. 
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 I also like to examine the cyber consequences of large physical events as part of 
disaster recovery planning. These could include earthquakes and tsunamis that damage 
data centers, or even solar flares that disrupt the communications that the business relies 
on. Exercises can include drills that last a day or more. 
 A large organization can justify the considerable effort involved in conducting these 
exercises because of the enormous potential benefit of mitigating the threats. In fact, 
some organizations hire professionals to create and facilitate these games. Booz Allen 
Hamilton, for example, has an extensive war gaming practice covering diverse subject 
areas including market dynamics, cybersecurity, geo-political events, and even real war 
scenarios. 
 But smaller organizations can also benefit by considering extreme events and 
formulating response plans. If you prepare for the extreme, you’ll be more prepared 
to deal with everyday events. Planning doesn’t need to be as resource-intensive as a 
full-blown war game. It can be as basic as bringing team members together to discuss 
likely scenarios and responses in a shorter tabletop exercise lasting just a few hours. 
This method enables members to get a feel for what it would be like to work together in 
the event of a real disaster. Considering these extremes can also provide motivation for 
introducing simple yet effective measures to reduce the risk that catastrophes will occur. 
You might realize it is worth increasing investment in user education to reduce the risk 
of social engineering compromises, or becoming more diligent about analyzing logs and 
network traffic to identify patterns that indicate suspicious activity. 
 Trends That Span the Threat Landscape 
 I’ve described some of the methods that can be used to analyze emerging threats. Now 
I’d like to turn to some key themes that have emerged from such threat analysis. These 
themes paint a  broad-brush picture of threat and vulnerability trends spanning multiple 
technologies across the threat landscape. 
 Trust Is an Attack Surface 
 As the technology industry erects new technical defenses, attackers seek to bypass these 
controls by exploiting user trust, typically using social engineering techniques such as 
 phishing . 
 If an attacker can win a user’s trust with a sufficiently convincing e-mail or fake web 
site, the user will make it easy for the attacker by clicking a link or downloading a file. 
These actions usually undermine even the most rigorous system-level controls, initiating 
a chain of compromises that ultimately can result in major damage. 
 Whenever users place their trust in a new technology, attackers quickly follow. 
Studies have shown that users trust social media services more than other information 
sources. A user is more likely to click a link if it appears to have been sent by a social 
media “friend.” Exploiting this trend, attackers have spread malware via social computing 
circles of trust such as friend networks. 
 Attackers have also been quick to take advantage of the trust users place in their 
 smartphones and in other appliances such as game consoles. The exploitation of trust 
also extends to the relationships between systems. Once configured, communications 
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between systems often operate autonomously, without manual oversight. Smartphones 
are set to automatically update applications from trusted app stores; other systems 
blindly trust firmware updates and dutifully install them. This automation provides 
convenient opportunities to insert malicious code, abusing trust without the need to 
directly involve the user. 
 In the near future, I anticipate trust will become a commodity that is bought and sold. 
The digital reputation of systems and services will become critically important. In the past, 
tokens of trust, such as digital certificates and social computing credentials, were stolen 
for immediate use. In the future, they will be stolen so they can be sold in underground 
markets. The value of these tokens depends upon the access they grant and the other circles 
of trust they can be used to penetrate. Already, attackers are using stolen digital certificates 
to sign their malware in an attempt to avoid detection by operating system defenses. 
 I expect  social engineering attacks will continue to present significant risks because 
they exploit human weaknesses and will adapt to take advantage of new technologies. 
So we, as security professionals, need to focus on the role of users as part of the security 
perimeter, as I discussed in Chapter  5 . To reduce the risk to the enterprise, we need to 
make users more security-aware and influence them to act in more secure ways. But it’s 
also important to note that a successful phishing exploit is also ultimately a technology 
failure that allowed malicious code to execute. 
 Barriers to Entry Are Crumbling 
 Our adversaries gravitate toward the path of least resistance. They tend to select targets 
that are easy to access and analyze, and they typically use the most readily available and 
cheapest tools. 
 They are much less likely to use methods with high barriers to entry such as the need 
for specialized expertise, expensive hardware or software, or access to extensive compute 
capacity. However, several of these barriers have begun to crumble as a result of trends 
such as cloud computing, lower-cost communications components, and commodity 
malware toolsets. This trend ultimately is likely to result in new types of attack. 
 A key factor is that security researchers are sharing not only their knowledge but also 
the tools they design as part of their research. Recently publicized tools, such as rogue 
base stations and Bluetooth sniffers, provide attackers with more accessible, low-cost 
ways to intercept network traffic. Researchers have uncovered vulnerabilities in femtocell 
devices (miniature, low-cost cell towers) that can be used to take control of the devices, 
lowering the barriers to attacks targeting cell phone data traffic. 
 Ultimately, lower barriers to entry mean increased risk to enterprises. However, 
because several of these areas are still at the research stage, it will take time for them to 
mature into active exploitation. 
 The Rise of  Edge Case Insecurity 
 Each day, the environment becomes more complex with millions of new devices, each 
running its own operating system and collection of applications. This complexity generates 
new edge cases—problems or situations that occur only in unexpected or extreme situations. 
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 Edge cases can include unlikely interactions between two familiar objects. A hacker 
team recently demonstrated that, with a popular smartphone, a paperclip (used to pop 
out the phone’s SIM card at the critical moment), and a little patience, it’s possible to 
gain access to contact information, phone call logs and voice mail, e-mails, and other 
information stored on the phone. 
 Overall, the growing number of third-party plug-ins and widgets introduce edge 
cases that are hard for developers to anticipate even if they use secure design techniques. 
 Interoperability between programs has resulted in a new category of hybrid attacks 
where malicious objects are concealed in innocent-looking ones to thwart detection. 
One proof of concept in 2011 demonstrated it was possible to conceal a fully functioning 
Trojan in an e-mail plug-in. 
 Some of these hybrid attacks have shown they can circumvent new security features. 
As web browsers and search engines try to protect users from malicious links, attackers 
are responding by hiding links in image search results, where they cannot be detected 
using standard tools. Research into network intrusion methods has discovered over a 
hundred methods of evading detection by manipulating traffic to remain functional but 
undetectable by typical tools. 
 There is no silver-bullet solution for eliminating edge-case insecurities. It’s unlikely that 
even the most rigorous testing could ever uncover them all. The best approach may be to 
exercise caution when adopting new technologies with the potential to generate edge cases. 
 The Enemy Knows the System 
 The technology industry has often relied on security through  obscurity:  the idea that if 
attackers can’t see the insecurities in code or other technology, they won’t exploit them. 
 Over time, it has become clear that security through obscurity is poor security. To 
quote the maxim coined by Claude Shannon, one of the founders of modern computing, 
“The enemy knows the system.” 
 It’s now relatively easy for attackers to get access to the same tools enterprises use, 
such as web hosting services and smartphone application development tools. Hackers 
can now more easily engineer malware and attacks that take advantage of these elements. 
The fact that static platform controls tend to become less effective over time (one of the 
Irrefutable Laws of Information Security noted in Chapter  1 ) is partly due to the ability of 
malware authors to pretest their malicious code against technical controls. They can do 
this by obtaining code from malware repositories that have already been tested against 
existing controls, or by actually purchasing the technical controls. 
 Even the success of social engineering demonstrates that the attackers’ knowledge 
of the target greatly increases the likelihood of successful deception. Today, competitors 
and other threat agents learn a great deal about a company and its employees by simply 
searching information publicly available on web sites or social media accounts. 
 Because we cannot assume insecure technology is safe just because it is hidden, we 
need to design with security in mind. The ineffectiveness of security through obscurity is 
also an argument in favor of standards and open-source solutions. This idea may initially 
seem counterintuitive, but the fact that open source is exposed to public scrutiny requires 
it to be secure. At a minimum, we should ensure devices are rigorously tested against 
industry standards because the attackers will do so. 
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 Key Threat Activity Areas 
 Threats are evolving in many technology areas, from embedded systems to cloud 
computing. I’d like to discuss a few areas experiencing significant developments with 
implications for enterprise IT. 
 The Industry of Malware 
 Malware has become a profitable industry that increasingly resembles the legitimate 
software market, with market leaders, mergers, licensing agreements, real-time support, 
and open source. The organized business activity in this market reflects the extent to 
which well-crafted malware has become a viable career pursuit for members of the 
criminal underground. 
 Today, malware development and malware use may in some cases be distinct 
activities carried out by different groups or individuals. Malware authors are producing 
standardized toolkits, which have made life much easier for would-be attackers. These 
attackers can now simply buy or acquire a toolkit rather than expending the effort to 
identify vulnerable web sites and develop their own exploits. 
 The Zeus malware family provides a useful case study showing how complex this 
industry has become and how hard it is to accurately track developments. Sold mainly 
in underground forums, Zeus has been used extensively for theft by creating botnet 
nodes. During 2011, a code merger was reported between Zeus and another popular 
crimeware kit, complete with assurances of future support for the customers of both 
products. Around the same time, Zeus toolkit source code was made publicly available. 
Since then, multiple new variants have appeared and been used for a variety of attacks. At 
one point, security researchers attempting to monitor Zeus exploits discovered a server 
they believed was the hub of a Zeus botnet. However, the server was the equivalent of 
an espionage honey pot, allowing the botmasters to turn the tables by spying on the 
researchers who were attempting to analyze the hub. 
 Ransomware has also become a profitable activity for some organized crime 
elements. Ransomware was mostly at the validated proof of concept stage when I wrote the 
first edition of this book in 2012; it has since progressed to active exploitation with some 
commoditization. Today’s ransomware exploits typically exploit system vulnerabilities 
using Trojans and other methods, then lock or encrypt information so users cannot 
access it and hold people and organizations hostage until they pay. In February 2016, a 
Los Angeles hospital paid a ransom in bitcoin after staff were locked out of the hospital’s 
own network for more than a week; during the same month, one ransomware variant was 
reported to be infecting more than 90,000 PCs per day (Fox-Brewster 2016). 
 The Web Expands to the Internet of Things 
 The Web continues to present a huge attack surface. And this attack surface is growing 
rapidly as it expands to include the Internet of  Things , encompassing  nontraditional 
devices such as appliances and control systems, cars, wearable and medical devices, and 
the “smart” grid. Each of these is a potential source of risks. 
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 Recent headlines have highlighted the growing threat activity focused on  IoT . 
Researchers hacked into a Jeep via its Internet-connected entertainment system and 
remotely controlled the vehicle’s functions, including turning off the transmission and brakes 
while someone was driving (Greenberg 2015). Other researchers showed that thousands of 
devices in hospitals are vulnerable to attack, including x-ray machines, MRI scanners, and 
drug infusion pumps, partly because medical equipment is increasingly connected to the 
Internet so that data can be fed into electronic patient records systems (Pauli 2015a). Yet 
another researcher demonstrated the ability to hack into FitBit fitness trackers via Bluetooth 
(Pauli 2015b). Many IoT devices, including cars, wearables, and home appliances,  include 
wireless capabilities, so exploitation doesn’t require a physical network connection. 
 Clearly, we should expect continued growth in IoT threat activity. However, should 
be noted that the activity to date has generally has been at the research or early proof-of-
concept phase (see Figure  6-1 ). As the IoT expands and matures, we will see a progression 
to advanced active exploits over the next few years; given the rapid pace at which IoT 
is evolving, if companies don’t use good privacy and security design principles when 
building their products, the time from research to active exploitation could be much 
shorter than has typically been the norm. 
 Many  embedded devices that are already installed in businesses are similarly 
vulnerable. Companies have a history of deploying specialized devices without adequate 
security controls, often because of the perception that specialized devices are “dumb” and do 
not have a full set of capabilities. In reality, the opposite is often true: devices marketed for a 
specific function are often capable of much more. Printers contain processors, use wireless 
connections, and may be capable of acting as file servers, for example. As a result, embedded 
devices can introduce as much risk, or more, to an organization as a traditional computing 
device since they lack security controls and administrators are generally unaware of the 
danger. New devices may be vulnerable to new attack methods: recent research showed 
that the sounds 3D-printer nozzles make as they cross the machine bed can be recorded by 
smartphones, analysed, and then used to duplicate prototypes (Nelson 2016). 
 The vulnerabilities in embedded  industrial control systems were exposed by 
the widely publicized Stuxnet malware, which was used to sabotage the systems that 
supported Iran’s uranium enrichment capabilities. The incorporation of computer-based 
control and automation technology into the existing electrical power infrastructure—
resulting in the “smart grid”—is another source of potential vulnerabilities. The US 
government has warned of increasing threats to the grid, noting that many embedded 
systems lack adequate security controls and are susceptible to known techniques such as 
cross-site scripting attacks (US GAO 2012). 
 We might also see logical attacks as precursors to physical attacks. On a macro scale, 
a nation state might attack another nation’s cyber infrastructure before staging a physical 
attack. This approach might also be applied at a more personal level. A burglar might 
remotely disable an Internet-connected alarm system before sneaking into a house, or 
perhaps even use the system’s video cameras to watch the owners and note when they 
leave the house unattended. 
 Here are two more potential future  IoT scenarios in which innovative technology 
designed to do good could be exploited for harm, unless designed with strong security 
and privacy protection. Last year, doctors for the first time inserted an artificial “eye” that 
enabled a blind person to see. The device is a retinal implant that receives signals from 
a video camera integrated into eyeglasses. Think ahead a few years, to a time when the 
implants are more sophisticated and can see in much higher resolution, and also include 
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software to automatically interpret visual information, such as QR codes. Then imagine 
that a malicious actor creates a QR code that triggers the vision system to download 
malware. Like the PC malware that paralyzed Sony’s network in 2014, the malware then 
demands a ransom to re-enable the person’s vision. Now consider the example of a 
cement company that’s embedding sensors in the concrete mix used to build a new road, 
thus enabling local authorities to monitor traffic patterns and adjust signals to optimize 
the flow of vehicles. If the technology is not securely designed and implemented, all that a 
malicious person needs is the ability to execute malicious code, in order to falsify the traffic 
pattern in such a way that vehicles converge on the scene of a planned bomb attack. 
 Smartphones 
 Smartphones are attracting almost as much malicious interest as desktop and laptop 
platforms. However, even though smartphone sales have outstripped PC sales, 
smartphone malware isn’t yet as prevalent as PC malware and doesn’t cause the same 
kind of widespread damage. That’s partly because most valuable corporate and personal 
data is still held on PCs and servers. Another factor is that smartphone vendors have 
somewhat greater control over applications, since users generally access them via 
vendor-controlled app stores. 
 Just as in legitimate software markets, malware authors are likely to maximize the 
value of their code by using tools that allow their software to run on multiple devices. 
They are increasingly targeting applications, a trend also seen on other platforms. 
Attackers have purchased copies of applications, incorporated their malicious content 
into the otherwise legitimate software, and then redistributed their code under a new 
name or as a “free” version of the original. On one smartphone platform, autodialing 
malware was found in more than 20 applications. Variations of a Trojan were found in 
dozens of applications and are believed to have been downloaded by at least 30,000 users. 
 A further development is the use of smartphones as bridges to traditional networks, 
resulting in the potential for enterprise network attacks that originate from within mobile 
networks. 
 In the future, we could see greater exploitation of location-based services to deceive 
users. Because smartphones contain location sensors such as  Global Positioning System 
(GPS) chips, knowledge of the phone’s location can be used to present targeted ads 
and useful information. For example, a user in a supermarket aisle might be presented 
with online coupons for products on nearby shelves. But this information could also be 
exploited to present fake coupons that are all the more convincing because they suggest 
that the sender knows the user’s preferences. 
 Attackers could also exploit other smartphone capabilities to take advantage of the fact 
that the devices are carried into confidential meetings and other highly sensitive situations. 
Imagine being able to remotely control a device that has a microphone, a camera, or other 
recording capabilities. Or think about a vulnerability in any of the popular web-conferencing 
services that people use for confidential discussions and to exchange information. 
 Current trends in the mobile platform space indicate that attackers are most 
interested in stealing personal data. This trend is partly due to the increasing use of 
smartphones for financial and banking transactions, which provides new opportunities 
for identity thieves and other criminal groups. As a result, it is now important that 
smartphone hardware and software developers focus on protecting personal data. 
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Software developers should adopt the same discipline and commitment to following 
secure design principles as traditional platform developers. Today, more and more 
people are becoming app developers, creating software, and posting it online for others 
to use. One has to question how much security testing and validation has been applied 
to these applications. As users move more of their everyday activities onto smartphones 
and other small devices, the consequences of poor or insecure designs will have greater 
impact on individuals and their employers. 
 Web Applications 
 Web applications , primarily comprising client browsers and server-based applications, 
continue to be heavily attacked. Threat analysis indicates that this area is experiencing 
full exploitation activity and moving toward commoditization. There is also considerable 
research in this area, suggesting the number of attacks will continue to grow. 
 Attackers have adopted new techniques to hide their intentions and deceive users 
long enough to achieve their aims. As web browsers and search engines try to protect 
systems from malicious links, attackers are instead obfuscating their links in image search 
results, where they may not be detected. 
 Techniques for hiding messages within images have been used within the security 
realm since long before the invention of information technology. Now, this technique, 
known as  steganography , is being used to hide malware and botnets on publicly used 
image hosting sites. 
 Search poisoning has also become a common method. Attackers using search 
poisoning tend to focus on events and topics of popular interest, optimizing their web 
pages to achieve high search engine rankings. After a search query, the victim clicks a link 
among the search results. They are redirected multiple times and eventually land on a 
page that is used as a vector to deliver malware. 
 Conclusion 
 In this chapter, I’ve outlined some of the real threat trends and described methods 
information security groups can use to analyze the threat landscape as it continues to evolve. 
 No doubt, new and more sophisticated types of exploitation will continue to emerge, 
and we need to stay aware of them. As Mustaque Ahamad, director of Georgia Tech 
Information Security Center, noted in 2011, “We continue to witness cyber attacks of 
unprecedented sophistication and reach, demonstrating that malicious actors have the 
ability to compromise and control millions of computers that belong to governments, 
private enterprises, and ordinary citizens.” 
 Yet, as we try to make sense of the deluge of news about attacks and vulnerabilities, 
it’s essential to retain a sense of perspective. Most threats do not take place using exotic, 
obscure methods. Instead, they take the path of least resistance, exploiting well-known 
vulnerabilities. Therefore, business can mitigate many of these threats by implementing 
basic, established security measures. To put it another way: when you hear hoof beats, 
think horses—not zebras. 
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 Social engineering will continue to be a key attack method because it takes 
advantage of user trust and is hard to prevent using technical controls. Therefore, as I 
discussed in Chapter  5 , we need to continue to focus on educating users to become more 
security-aware. By doing so, we can reduce the risk to the enterprise. 
 Ultimately, while doing our best to prevent compromises and breaches, we must 
remember we cannot control the threat actors and their exploit attempts. Because 
all threat categories use malicious code in some way, advanced preventive tools that 
effectively stop the execution of malicious code can greatly reduce the potential of 
compromise. But all organizations face the possibility of some level of compromise, 
making defense in depth as essential as ever. Losers ignore the trends. Winners survive by 
being able to predict, prevent, detect, and respond. 
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 CHAPTER 7 
 A New Security Architecture 
to Improve Business Agility 
 An organization’s ability to learn, and translate that learning into action 
rapidly, is the ultimate competitive advantage. 
 —Jack Welch 
 Some  Star Trek episodes feature suspense-filled battles in which adversaries use 
sophisticated phase-shifting weapons that can be rapidly adjusted until they find a way 
to penetrate static force-field defenses. For a beleaguered starship, the only effective 
response is to use similarly adaptable and fast-changing shields. 
 As information security professionals, we also need extremely agile defenses that 
quickly adapt to meet new demands. Attackers are continually adapting, and defenders 
also need to continually adapt. But rapidly evolving threats are only part of the challenge. 
We also need to continually adapt our defenses to a rapidly changing technology 
landscape. 
 As information risk and security groups consider the future, it’s clear that we need 
to radically change our approach in order to face the challenges ahead and support the 
Protect to Enable mission. 
 One problem in recent years has been that most of the protection offered by the 
industry has not kept up with the attackers. Because these tools have failed to prevent 
harm, many companies have defaulted to a detect-and-respond approach. This means 
they continue to expose themselves to high risks and higher long term costs since they are 
reactively responding to attacks that have already breached the organization’s defenses. 
 We also need to consider whether our existing control architecture improves or 
impedes business agility and velocity. It’s important to recognize that controls can 
place a “drag coefficient” on the business. By hindering users, they can stifle business 
velocity and innovation. Users react to this control friction by circumventing the controls 
whenever possible; as a result, the controls can actually introduce new risks, as discussed 
in Chapter  2 . 
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 As we move forward, we will need an agile security architecture that quickly and 
automatically learns and adapts to new challenges as they emerge. A learning system is 
harder to defeat because it can more quickly predict and thus prevent new attacks. The 
pace of change is so rapid that we cannot predict all the challenges we will face, and 
manual or semi-manual processes will not be enough to keep up. We will need solutions 
that can learn to manage what we don’t know. 
 The right  control architecture will enable flexibility that helps the business move 
more quickly, allowing us to rapidly adopt new technologies and emerging usage models 
while continuing to provide security in the ever-evolving threat landscape. 
 A few years ago, after intense brainstorming sessions, the information risk and 
security team I led at Intel devised a new security architecture for the company. This 
architecture represented our implementation of the Protect to Enable strategy, using the 
technologies that were current at that time. With the benefit of hindsight, I believe that we 
got many things right—but there were also some omissions because we didn’t have a full 
understanding of the controls that would be needed. 
 In this chapter, I’ll provide a high-level overview of a new security architecture and 
describe how it meets some key challenges. Some of this overview is based on the work at 
Intel a few years ago, but I have added a new perspective on controls that I have realized 
is lacking in the industry. An important aspect of this new perspective is the concept of 
control friction. As I’ll explain later in the chapter, I’ve developed a simple framework 
called the 9 Box of Controls, which takes control friction into account when assessing the 
value of security controls. 
 I believe that the architecture includes some  novel approaches that may be valuable 
to many organizations facing these universal challenges. My conversations with peers 
at other companies have validated this view. Many of them are considering similar 
strategies and in some cases have begun implementing them. 
 Any future security architecture must provide better prevention, and it must also be 
more flexible, dynamic, and granular than traditional enterprise security models. This 
will helps us all accommodate future evolving usage models. We can provide users with 
different levels of access depending on factors such as the devices they are using and their 
location. To achieve this, the architecture dynamically adjusts a user’s access privileges 
as the level of risk changes. For example, an employee should have more limited access 
to our systems when using a less-secure device than when using a more hardened or 
perhaps fully managed enterprise-class system. 
 The new  architecture greatly improves  threat management . As new attacks appear, 
we need to be able to recognize good from bad in milliseconds, so that we can stop the 
bad and allow the good. For any attack that gets past the preventive controls, we need to 
learn as much as we can without compromising the user’s computing performance or 
privacy. This information enables us to investigate what occurred, so we can quickly take 
action to mitigate the risk and also learn how to prevent similar attacks in the future. A 
control architecture should assume that attempts at compromise are inevitable, but we 
should also understand that it’s possible to achieve real prevention for 99% or more of 
malicious code. We can apply artificial intelligence and machine learning to analyze the 
features of files, executables, and binaries to stop malicious code prior to execution. For 
the remaining attacks, representing less than 1% of malware, we need to focus heavily on 
survivability. 
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 The 9 Box of Controls, Business Trends, and 
Architecture Requirements 
 Before diving into the specifics of the architecture, I’ll explain the 9 Box of Controls. Then 
I’ll recap some of the key business and technology trends, focusing on how they drive the 
need for specific capabilities in security technology. 
 9 Box of Controls 
 There are three primary types of security controls: prevention, detection, and response. 
Prevention occurs when an action or control prevents a risk before it affects users or 
the environment. Detection is identifying the presence of something malicious that 
has already entered the environment. Response is a reaction. From a risk perspective, 
prevention focuses on minimizing vulnerability and the potential for harm, while 
detection and response focus on minimizing damage. 
 There are also three primary levels of control automation: automated, semi-
automated, and manual. Automated control occurs entirely through machines. Semi-
automated involves some level of human intervention. Manual controls are managed 
entirely by hand. 
 The combinations of these control types and automation levels comprise the cells of 
the 9 Box, as shown in Figure  7-1 . Risk increases as we move from prevention to detection 
to response. Cost increases as we move from automated to semi-automated to manual 
controls. 
 Figure 7-1.  The  9 Box of Controls 
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 However, there is a third dimension to the 9 Box: control friction. As we know, 
friction is the force that causes a moving object to slow down when it is in contact with 
another object. Similarly, controls can impose a “drag coefficient” on business velocity—
they can slow the user or a business process. However, friction is not a fundamental, 
immutable force like gravity or electromagnetism. Instead, we have the ability to 
determine how much control friction we apply. Apply too much control friction, and 
business users will go around IT and its security controls. This adds cost: IT is no longer 
managing the technology; data and business silos are created, and the organization 
loses its volume purchasing power. It also adds risk: because the security team lacks 
visibility into the technology, it cannot prevent compromises, detection is difficult, and 
in many cases response after the fact becomes the only option. If a business adheres to 
high-friction controls, the effect can be to generate systemic business risk. High-friction 
controls can hinder business velocity; the organization can lose time to market and the 
ability to innovate, and over the long term it may even lose market leadership. 
 IT Consumerization 
 As I discussed in Chapter  5 , consumerization is a major IT theme with ever-broadening 
impact. It includes several trends, including the adoption of new applications and 
support for consumer devices. 
 Many highly mobile employees want to use their own consumer devices, such as 
smartphones, wearables, and tablets, for work. This increases productivity by enabling 
employees to collaborate and access information from anywhere, at any time. To support 
this, organizations provide access to corporate e-mail and other applications from 
employee-owned smartphones and tablets. 
 Some people believe that in the future, all devices will be consumer-owned, and that 
enterprises will no longer purchase devices for their users. I believe this might be the case 
in some work environments, but I doubt that it will suit all organizations. For a company 
providing call center services, with most employees working from home, it might make 
sense that employees exclusively use their own personal systems for work. But this 
strategy could be more risky for a financial services company whose employees handle 
highly sensitive information that is subject to extensive regulatory requirements. 
 Nevertheless, the consumerization trend continues to grow at almost all 
organizations. Accordingly, we’ll need to provide employees with a level of access to 
resources from an expanding continuum of client devices, some of which may have much 
weaker security controls than today’s enterprise clients (see sidebar). 
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CONSUMERIZING ENTERPRISE IT AND “ENTERPRISING” 
THE CONSUMER
 Discussions of  IT consumerization tend to draw a clear line between business 
devices that can be managed and trusted, and personal consumer devices that are 
essentially unmanaged and untrusted. 
 However, not all consumer devices are created equal. From a security standpoint, 
it may be more valuable to think about a device’s capabilities than to categorize it 
based solely on whether it’s marketed as an enterprise device or a personal device. 
The security of a device depends on the inherent features of the hardware, operating 
system, and applications, and on whether it enables us to add further security and 
manageability capabilities that mitigate the risks of enterprise use. 
 As the variety of consumer devices, such as smartphones and wearables, continues 
to expand, users may choose from dozens of models with different levels of security 
capabilities. Greater security and manageability means that IT can place greater trust in 
the device and provide a correspondingly greater level of access to enterprise resources. 
 Extending this idea further, the information security group could evaluate the 
security of available consumer devices and provide guidance about the level of 
enterprise access that users will be allowed with each device. Users may prefer to 
buy a more secure device because it will provide them more access. With greater 
access, they can use the device for more of their daily work activities. This ability in 
turn enables them to be more productive. 
 At the same time, employees increasingly expect to have available to them at work 
the types of consumer services and cloud applications that they use in their personal 
lives. These include social computing applications such as blogs and wikis, video-sharing 
sites, and file-sharing services. 
 We need a security architecture that enables us to more quickly support new devices 
and provide access to a greater range of applications and data, without increasing risk. We 
need to be able to dynamically adjust the levels of access we provide and the monitoring 
we perform, depending on the security controls of the client device. 
 New  Business Needs 
 Nearly all companies now rely on a growing network of business partners, and conduct 
many of their interactions with those partners online. Many organizations are also 
expanding into new markets through both organic growth and acquisitions. Because of 
these business trends, most organizations will need to provide access to a broader range 
of users, many of whom are not employees. Many organizations also need to be able 
to smoothly integrate acquired companies and provide them with access to resources. 
In general, we need to quickly provide new users access while minimizing risk and 
providing selective, controlled access only to the resources they need. 
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 Cloud Computing 
 Most organizations are already using cloud services in some form to achieve benefits 
such as greater agility and lower cost. Some are also implementing a private cloud 
based on virtualized infrastructure while using external cloud services for noncritical 
applications. In the future, I expect greater use of hybrid clouds that use both internal and 
external resources, especially for organizations that are anchored to legacy environments. 
Organizations able to let go of their legacy environments will predominantly use the 
cloud, with limited internal infrastructure. 
 This trend means that IT services at many organizations will be provided by a 
mixture of traditional and cloud-based internal and external services. During a typical 
day, employees may access a variety of different services, some of which are internal and 
some external. Ultimately, they should be able to easily move between these services 
without needing to log in multiple times or even know where the services are located. 
 Securing access to cloud-based services presents challenges that aren’t easily 
addressed using conventional security controls. In cloud environments, systems and 
their data are virtualized and may migrate dynamically to different network locations. 
This makes it difficult to effectively restrict access using traditional security controls such 
as firewalls, which rely on fixed locations of systems and a more static nature of the data. 
We need much more granular and dynamic controls that are linked to the resources 
themselves rather than just their network location. 
 Changing  Threat Landscape 
 The threat landscape is evolving rapidly. Increasingly, attackers have taken a stealthy 
approach, creating malware that quietly gains access and attempts to remain undetected 
in order to maintain access over time. This has been possible because the security 
solutions deployed on endpoints in most organizations today do not adequately prevent 
malicious code from executing. As the number of threats increases and new types of 
malware emerge, we need to focus on the 9 Box of Controls and seek new prevention 
methods reduce risk, reduce cost, and reduce control friction. 
 Traditional enterprise security architectures have relied largely on protective 
controls such as firewalls located at the network perimeter and signature-based antivirus 
at the end points. At the same time, our focus has shifted to providing controlled access 
to a broader range of users and devices, rather than simply preventing access. Combine 
this with a continually changing threat landscape, and we can assume that attempts to 
compromise the environment are inevitable. Although existing perimeter controls such 
as firewalls will continue to have some value, we need tools that can dramatically increase 
the ability to prevent attackers from gaining access to the environment, but in way that 
does not introduce a cost burden or a high degree of control friction. 
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 Privacy and Regulatory Requirements 
 The growing emphasis on privacy requirements and the increasingly complex regulatory 
environment have many implications for the way we manage information. Some 
regulations create the need for more control over where information is stored and require 
specific levels of protection and tracking. Our architecture must provide this assurance, 
allowing us to build a high-security environment and access controls appropriate for the 
protection of highly regulated information. In addition, the security controls themselves 
must not introduce privacy risks. 
 New Architecture 
 To meet these rapidly changing requirements, we need a highly flexible and dynamic 
architecture. The architecture should enable us to more quickly adopt new devices, use 
models, and capabilities; provide security across an increasingly complex environment; 
and adapt to a changing threat landscape. 
 Key goals include helping increase  employee productivity while supporting new 
business requirements and technology trends, including IT consumerization, cloud 
computing, and access by a broader range of users. At the same time, the architecture 
should be designed to prevent risk, reduce our attack surface, and improve survivability—
even as the threat landscape grows in complexity and maliciousness. 
 The architecture moves away from the traditional enterprise  trust model, which 
is binary and static. With this traditional model, a user is in general either granted or 
denied access to resources; once granted, the level of access remains constant. The 
new architecture replaces this with a dynamic, multi-tiered trust model that exercises 
more fine-grained control over identity and access control, including access to specific 
resources. This means that for an individual user, the level of access provided may vary 
dynamically over time, depending on a variety of factors—such as whether the user is 
accessing the network from a highly secure managed device with advanced anti-malware 
capabilities or an untrusted and perhaps unmanaged device. 
 The architecture’s flexibility allows us to take advantage of trust based on real proof 
that malware execution is being prevented. Increasingly, devices may include some level 
of  hardware-enforced security designed to ensure the integrity of the applications and 
data on the device. The architecture takes this into account when determining whether to 
allow access to specific resources—a more-trusted platform can be allowed greater access 
than a less-trusted one. The architecture is based on four cornerstones:
•  Trust calculation : This unique element of the architecture 
handles user identity and access management, dynamically 
determining whether a user should be granted access to specific 
resources and, if so, what type of access should be granted. The 
calculation is based on factors such as the user’s client device 
and location, the type of resources requested, and the security 
controls that are available.  
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•  Security  zones : The infrastructure is divided into multiple 
security zones that provide different levels of protection. These 
range from trusted network zones containing critical data, with 
tightly controlled access, to untrusted zones containing less-
valuable data and allowing broader access. Communication 
between zones is controlled and monitored; this helps ensure 
users can only access the resources for which they have been 
authorized and prevents compromises from spreading across 
multiple zones. 
•  Balanced  controls : To increase flexibility and the ability to 
recover from a successful attack, the model emphasizes the need 
for preventative controls but also to balance them with detection 
and response. 
•  User and data  perimeters : Recognizing that protecting the 
enterprise network boundary is no longer adequate, we need to 
treat users and data as additional security perimeters and protect 
them accordingly. This means an increased focus on the endpoint 
device and prevention of malicious code, in addition to increasing 
user awareness and building data protection into the information 
assets. 
 I’ll describe each of the four cornerstones in more detail. 
 Trust Calculation 
 The trust calculation plays an essential role in providing the flexibility required to support 
a rapidly expanding number of  devices and usage models . The calculation enables us to 
dynamically adjust users’ levels of access, depending on factors such as the devices and 
networks they are currently using. 
 It calculates trust in the interaction between the person or device requesting access 
(source) and the information requested (destination). The calculation consists of a source 
score and a destination score, taking into account the controls available to mitigate risk. 
As shown in Figure  7-2 , the result of this calculation determines whether the user is 
allowed access and the type of access provided.  
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 Source Score 
 Trust in the source, or requestor, is calculated based on the following factors:
•  Who : The identity of the user or service requesting access and 
our confidence level in the authentication mechanism used; how 
confident are we that users are who they say they are? 
•  What : The device type, its control capabilities, our ability to 
validate those controls, and the extent to which IT manages the 
device. 
•  Where : The user’s or service’s location. For example, a user who is 
inside the enterprise network is more trusted than the same user 
connecting through a public network. There may also be other 
considerations, such as the geographical region where the user is 
located. 
 Figure 7-2.  Trust calculation. Source: Intel Corporation, 2012 
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 Destination  Score 
 This is calculated based on the same three factors, but these are considered from the 
perspective of the destination (the information the source is trying to access):
•  Who : The application that stores the requested data. Some 
applications can enforce greater controls, such as enterprise 
rights management (ERM), and therefore provide a higher level 
of trust. 
•  What : The sensitivity of the information being requested 
and other considerations, such as our ability to recover it if 
compromise occurs. 
•  Where : The security zone in which the data resides. 
 Available Controls 
 The trust calculation also takes into account the security controls available for the zone. 
If the only controls available are controls that simply block or allow access, we might 
deny access due to lack of other options. However, if we have extensive preventative 
controls with highly granular levels of access, detailed logs, and highly tuned security 
monitoring—as well as the ability to recover from or correct problems—then we can 
allow access without creating additional risk. 
 Calculating Trust 
 The  trust calculation adds the source score and the destination score to arrive at an initial 
trust level. The available controls are then considered to make a final decision about 
whether access is allowed and, if so, how. This calculation is performed by a logical entity 
called a  policy decision  point (PDP), which is part of the authentication infrastructure and 
makes access control decisions based on a set of policies. 
 Based on the results of this calculation, the PDP makes a decision, allocating a trust 
level that determines whether the user can access the requested resource and the type of 
access that is allowed. Broadly, the decision will fall into one of the following categories:  
•  Allow access 
•  Deny access 
•  Allow access with limitations or mitigation 
 This trust calculation therefore allows us to dynamically apply granular control 
over access to specific resources. For example, employees using IT-managed devices 
with additional hardware features such as a  trusted platform module (TPM) ,  global 
positioning system (GPS) , and full disk encryption would be allowed access to more 
resources than when using devices that lack those features. 
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 Employees directly connected to the network would typically get greater access than 
when using a public network. If we are unable to verify the location of a high-security 
device such as a managed PC, we would allow less access. 
 The trust calculation also can be used for more fine-grained distinctions between 
different device models. For example, we could provide different levels of access based 
on manageability, hardware-enabled authentication and encryption, and installed 
applications. 
 We anticipate situations in which the trust level is not adequate to allow any access, 
but there is still a business requirement to allow a connection or transaction to occur. In 
these conditions, the result of the trust calculation could be a decision to allow access 
with limitations or with compensating controls that mitigate the risk. For example, a 
user might be allowed read-only access or might be permitted access only if additional 
monitoring controls are in place. 
 Today, the trust calculation makes decisions based on information gathered from 
components at multiple levels of the infrastructure, such as network gateways, access 
points, and user devices. Once the trust calculation mechanism is in place, we can extend 
it to include information from a broader range of sources. 
 The trust calculation can be used to determine access to internal systems by  business 
partners as well as employees. Let’s say we’re collaborating with another company on 
the design of a new product. An engineer at that company wants access to a specific 
document. We can add a variety of criteria to the trust calculation for deciding whether to 
grant access. Did the engineer’s request originate within the business partner’s enterprise 
network? Is it consistent with the type of request that we’d expect from an engineer? If so, 
we have a higher level of trust in the requestor. 
 If we cannot establish an adequate level of trust in the user’s device, but other factors 
provide enough confidence to grant access, we might provide one-time access for a 
specific job. We could do this by allowing a document to be downloaded, but only within 
a container that ensures the document is completely removed from the user’s device once 
the job is completed. 
 Longer term, the trust calculation could become a mechanism that is used to 
determine access to both internal and external resources, including cloud-based 
 applications . 
 Security Zones 
 The architecture divides the IT environment into multiple security zones. These range 
from untrusted zones that provide access to less valuable data and less important systems 
to trusted zones containing  critical data and resources . 
 Because the higher-trust zones contain more valuable assets, they are protected with 
a greater depth and range of controls, and we restrict access to fewer types of devices and 
 applications , as shown in Figure  7-3 . However, devices allowed access to higher-trust 
zones also have more power; they may be able to perform actions that are not allowed 
within lower-trust zones, such as creating or modifying enterprise data. 
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 Aligning the infrastructure in this fashion provides an excellent way to right-size 
security controls so that security resources are utilized effectively. It also helps improve 
the user experience by enabling employees to choose from a wider range of devices, such 
as smartphones, for lower-risk activities. However, all devices should have, at a minimum, 
advanced endpoint capabilities that prevent more than 99% of malware from executing. 
 Access to zones is determined by the results of the trust calculation and is controlled 
by  policy enforcement points ( PEPs ).  PEPs may include a range of controls, including 
firewalls, application proxies, intrusion detection and prevention systems, authentication 
systems, and logging systems. 
 Communication between zones is tightly restricted, monitored, and controlled. 
We separate zones by locating them on different physical or virtual LANs; PEPs control 
communication between zones. This means that if one zone is compromised, we can 
prevent the problem from spreading to other zones or increase our chances of detection 
if it does spread. In addition, we can use PEP controls, such as application proxies, to 
provide devices and applications in lower-trust zones with limited, controlled access to 
specific resources in higher-trust zones when required. 
 The architecture includes three primary categories of security zones: untrusted, 
selective, and trusted. Within the zones, there are multiple subzones. 
 Untrusted Zones 
 These zones host data and services (or the interfaces to them) that can be exposed to 
untrusted entities. This allows us to provide widespread access to a limited set of resources 
from non-managed consumer devices, without increasing the risk to higher-value resources 
located in other zones. Untrusted zones might provide access to enterprise resources, such 
as corporate e-mail and calendars, or they might simply provide Internet access. 
 These zones are regarded as “shark tanks,” with a high risk of attack and compromise. 
Therefore, detective and corrective controls are needed to mitigate this risk. These 
controls might include a high level of monitoring to detect suspect activity and correction 
capabilities such as dynamic removal of user privilege. 
 Figure 7-3.  As the value of an asset increases, the depth and span of controls increase, 
while the number of allowed devices, applications, and locations decrease. Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012 
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 We anticipate a need to provide controlled access from these zones to resources 
in higher-trust zones. For example, an employee using an untrusted device might be 
allowed limited, read-only access to customer data located in a trusted zone; or their 
device might need access to a directory server in a trusted zone to send e-mail. We expect 
to provide this controlled access using application proxies. These proxies act as secure 
intermediaries, evaluating the request from the device, gathering the information from 
the resource in a trusted zone, and passing it to the device. 
 Selective Zones 
 Selective zones provide more protection than untrusted zones. Examples of services in 
these zones include applications and data accessed by contractors, business partners, 
and employees, using client devices that are managed or otherwise provide a level of 
trust. Selective zones do not contain critical data or high-value intellectual property. 
Several selective subzones provide access to different services or users. 
 Trusted Zones 
 Trusted zones host critical services, data, and infrastructure. They are highly secured 
and locked down. Examples of services within these zones are administrative access to 
data center servers and network infrastructure, factory networks and devices, enterprise 
resource planning (ERP) applications, and design engineering systems containing 
intellectual property. Accordingly, we might only allow direct access to these resources 
from trusted systems located within the enterprise network, and all access would be 
monitored closely to detect anomalous behavior. 
 Many organizations have implemented secure high-trust zones as part of their 
transition to an enterprise private cloud. Implementing these zones is a key step in 
allowing several types of applications to be moved onto virtualized cloud infrastructure, 
including applications requiring high security. The security features in these trusted 
zones include application hardening and increased monitoring. 
 
NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN ACTION: A DAY IN 
THE LIFE OF AN EMPLOYEE
 This example (illustrated in Figure  7-4 ) describes how the new security architecture 
could enable an organization’s sales force to access the information they need in the 
course of a day. At the same time, the architecture protects security by dynamically 
adjusting the level of access provided, based on the user’s device, its location, and its 
capabilities for preventing malicious code, and by monitoring for anomalous behavior. 
 The employee travels to a customer site. The employee is using a personal 
smartphone with limited security features and so is allowed access only to services 
in untrusted zones. From here, the employee can view limited customer information, 
including recent orders, extracted from an  enterprise resource planning (ERP) 
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system in a trusted zone—but only through an application proxy server, which 
protects the trusted zone by acting as an intermediary, evaluating information 
requests, accessing the ERP system, and relaying the information to the user. 
 If a smartphone requests an abnormally large number of customer records—an 
indication that it may have been stolen—further access from the smartphone is 
blocked. To help understand the reason for the anomalous access, there is increased 
monitoring of the employee’s attempts to access the system from any device. 
 The employee reaches the customer site and logs into the enterprise network 
from a company-owned mobile business PC. Because this device is more trusted, 
the employee now has access to additional capabilities available in selective 
zones, such as the ability to view pricing and create orders that are relayed by an 
application proxy to the ERP system in a trusted zone. 
 The employee returns to the company’s office and connects to the corporate 
network. Now the employee is using a trusted device from a trusted location and 
has direct access to the ERP system in a trusted zone. 
 Figure 7-4.  The new security architecture dynamically adjusts the user’s access to 
information, based on factors such as the  user’s device and location . Source: Intel 
Corporation, 2012 
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 Balanced Controls 
 Over the past decade, enterprise security has focused heavily on controls such as 
firewalls, signature based antivirus, and intrusion detection systems such as behavior-
based anomaly detection tools. As we have seen so often in the past few years, this 
approach is not working. At many companies, the default belief is now that prevention is 
not possible and we can only correct problems after they have occurred. 
 However, the new security model requires that we understand the implications of 
the 9 Box. Preventative controls should not only stop malicious code from executing 
but do so in a way that lowers our overall cost of controls and with low friction. More 
effective prevention will reduce the alert fatigue within due to the “whack-a–mole” effect 
associated with over-reliance on detective (monitoring) and response controls. Detection 
capabilities will also be more effective because effective prevention reduces the “noise” in 
the environment. Over the long term, this approach will free up resources that can then 
be applied to other corrective controls. 
 By using the 9 Box to guide the control philosophy, and demanding solutions that 
continually shift down and to the left (reducing risk, cost, and control friction), we will be 
able to change the risk dynamics in the industry. 
 
USING  SECURITY ANALYTICS TO DETECT SUSPICIOUS 
BEHAVIOR
 Almost all organizations have experienced security issues involving both 
external attackers and insiders, including attempts to steal intellectual property. 
Investigations have identified markers and indicators that are frequently associated 
with these events. If we can spot these indicators sooner, we can respond and 
mitigate the threats more quickly. 
 Security analytics technology can be used to detect suspicious behavior as 
the environment becomes more complex and attackers become more adept at 
concealing compromises. The technology automates the process of analyzing large 
volumes of data to detect and monitor anomalous activity, allowing companies to 
detect problems that they might otherwise miss. These capabilities are similar to 
those already implemented by financial institutions to prevent fraudulent credit-card 
transactions, and by online consumer services to prevent theft of user data.  
 On a large scale, logging data generated by servers and sensors across the network 
can be collected into a database for analysis. Security business intelligence can also 
be applied at the level of individual users and devices, as long as we are careful to 
protect users’ privacy. 
 The balance between preventative, detective, and corrective controls will vary, 
depending on the security zone. In high-trust zones, we implement extensive monitoring 
to detect possible attempts to steal data or compromise critical systems. Redundancy 
within each type of control can be used to provide additional protection. 
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 The following includes possible examples of using detective and  preventative 
controls:
•  An employee attempts to send a confidential document to an 
external e-mail address. Monitoring software detects the attempt, 
prevents the document from being sent outside the firewall, and 
asks the employee if he or she really intended to do this. If the 
employee confirms that this was intended, the document may 
be transmitted, or if the document is highly sensitive, a redacted 
version may be sent. 
•  Inappropriate use of a document protected with enterprise rights 
management technology results in revocation of access to the 
document. 
•  The system allows access to specific documents but tracks the 
activity. A user can download a few documents without causing 
concerns. However, if the user attempts to download hundreds 
of documents, the system slows down the speed of delivery (for 
instance, only allowing ten to be checked out at a time) and alerts 
the user’s manager. If the manager approves, the user is given 
faster access.  
•  The detection of an infected system places the system on a 
remediation network, isolating the system and restricting access 
to enterprise information and applications. The system may 
retain some ability to access corporate assets, but all activity is 
closely logged to enable incident response if necessary. 
•  When a system is found to be compromised, we examine all its 
recent activities and interactions with other systems. Additional 
monitoring of those systems is automatically enabled. 
 
USING MACHINE LEARNING TO IMPROVE  ANTI-MALWARE 
TECHNOLOGY 
 Traditional antivirus software relies on recognizing characteristic signatures to 
identify specific malware families. But today, adversaries have access to off-the-
shelf malware toolkits that make it easy to create custom malware variants that 
signature-based antivirus products cannot recognize. This custom malware sails 
past traditional antivirus products as if they didn’t exist. 
 Machine learning technology provides a solution to the problem. Rather than relying 
on humans to identify malware signatures, machine learning technology can 
automatically analyze and classify hundreds of thousands of characteristics per file, 
breaking them down to an atomic level to discern whether an object is “good” or 
“bad” in real time. 
CHAPTER 7 ■ A NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE TO IMPROVE BUSINESS AGILITY
115
 The process works like this. A machine learning platform continuously collects 
vast amounts of data from many sources. It analyzes the data and extracts 
DNA-level features that the machine learning platform itself determines are 
unique characteristics of good and bad files. Most of these characteristics are 
so microscopic that human malware researchers and reverse engineers don’t 
understand their importance. The software constantly adjusts to the real-time 
threatscape, thus learning to make higher-fidelity decisions. For each file, the 
platform assigns a threat score that is used to automate policy-based protection 
decisions—ignore, alert, block, or terminate file/process execution. A mathematical 
model encapsulating the platform’s intelligence is then periodically extracted and 
incorporated into an anti-malware solution that is installed on endpoints. Using this 
solution, it’s possible to stop more than 99% of malware before execution.  
 Users, Data, and the Internet of Things: The New 
Perimeters 
 The concept of balanced controls also extends to the protection of users and data. 
 Traditional network security boundaries are dissolving with the proliferation of new 
devices and users’ expectations that they should be able to access information from 
anywhere at any time. Users are under direct assault from a barrage of attacks designed to 
trick them into taking actions that can compromise the information on their devices or on 
enterprise systems. These trends mean that we need to think more broadly about how we 
protect information, as well as the users of this information. 
 While we continue to implement enterprise network controls, such as perimeter 
 defenses and the detective controls described earlier, we need to supplement these 
controls with a focus on the users and on the primary assets we are trying to protect such 
as intellectual property. The new architecture therefore expands our defenses to two 
additional perimeters: the data itself and the users who have access to the data. 
 Data Perimeter 
 Important data should be protected at all times: when it is created, stored, and 
transmitted. This becomes increasingly challenging as we move data to more and more 
devices and let more people access it. How do we  protect information when it’s located 
outside the physical perimeter on a personal device? 
 One approach is to use technologies that closely integrate protection with high-value 
data so that the data remains protected as it moves to different devices and locations. 
Technologies such as enterprise rights management and data leak prevention can be 
used to watermark and tag information so that we can track and manage its use. With 
enterprise rights management, the creator of a document can define exactly who has 
access rights throughout the life of the document and can revoke access at any point. 
Data loss prevention is used to tag documents, track their movements, and prevent 
transfer outside the organization if necessary. 
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 User Perimeter 
 As I described in Chapter  5 , people are part of the security perimeter, and we need to treat 
them as such. Users can become security risks for a variety of reasons. They are targeted 
more frequently in social engineering attacks, and they are more vulnerable to these 
attacks because their personal information is often readily available on social networking 
sites. They may also click malicious links in e-mail, download malware, or store data 
on portable devices that then are lost. A combination of training, incentives, and other 
activities can help instill information  security and privacy protection into the corporate 
culture and successfully encourages employees to own responsibility for protecting 
enterprise and personal information. 
 Internet of Things 
 The  Internet of Things can be viewed as an extension of the user and data perimeters into 
new connected devices and systems such as cars, wearables, and smart buildings. IoT 
devices should be included in the security architecture; for example, the trust calculation 
could be applied to access from IoT devices, so that the security of the device is a factor 
in determining the level of access provided. For machine-to-machine communications, 
each communicating machine can be considered conceptually as analogous to a user; 
the security architecture focuses on preventing, detecting, and responding to behavior 
that it identifies as anomalous. 
 Conclusion 
 This chapter describes a new control architecture designed to support the Protect to 
Enable mission. With this approach we can lower risks, lower costs, and lower control 
friction. It will also allow for faster adoption of new services and capabilities because it 
helps prevent risk and improve survivability. I believe that this architecture can be used 
to meet a broad range of evolving requirements, including new usage models and threats. 
The architecture’s flexibility and granular trust model should also make it easier for the 
security team to identify and contain anomalous activity that signals potential insider 
threats. By publishing information about the architecture , I hope to encourage others 
to take advantage of these ideas. I also hope that making this information available will 
stimulate more discussion and ideas, and that others will build on these concepts to 
create further innovations that benefit all of us. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
 Looking to the Future: 
Emerging Security 
Capabilities 
 Learn from yesterday, live for today, hope for tomorrow. The important 
thing is not to stop questioning. 
 —Albert Einstein 
 The Web has existed for two decades, yet it’s only in the last few years that we’ve gained a 
clearer picture of what the Internet may become, and how the emerging capabilities may 
shape the future. 
 As early as 1993, companies like AOL started offering access to online newsgroups, 
soon followed by dial-up Internet access using early web browsers. As laptops became 
more affordable, many people started accessing the Internet while on the move. The 
rise of smartphones introduced built-in sensors, such as cameras, global positioning 
system receivers, and touch-sensitive screens, into consumers’ everyday computing 
experiences. Businesses began using the information gathered from users’ devices to offer 
personalized experiences, ranging from location-based driving directions to selected 
advertisements. The variety of Internet-connected devices rapidly expanded to include 
tablets, home DVRs, appliances, and cars. Devices also became smarter, with improved 
voice and gesture recognition. 
 We’re now entering a world in which these elements will be combined to create 
much richer context-aware experiences for users and new opportunities for businesses. 
Our devices will know us, and they will know other devices. In fact, devices may almost 
become part of us: many companies are already shipping wearable computers, including 
smart athletic garments that work with smartphone apps to monitor your biometrics and 
suggest ways to improve your performance. 
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 Each day, billions of computing devices will perform functions on our behalf, often 
communicating among themselves to get the job done. Much more information will be 
collected from sensors such as cameras, microphones, and GPS receivers embedded into 
the user devices. This data will be combined with other information to create context-
aware experiences that are far more personalized and compelling. Already, cameras and 
image recognition technology, combined with behind-the-scenes analytical software, 
can be used to identify a user’s age bracket and gender, and tailor their experience 
accordingly. Early applications based on this technology are being piloted and in some 
cases deployed by large companies, including retailers (see sidebar). 
 Estimates of the projected size of the context-aware computing market continue 
to grow. When the first edition of this book was printed, Gartner, Inc. (2011) expected 
context-aware technologies to create huge business opportunities affecting an estimated 
$96 billion in annual consumer spending worldwide by 2015. In 2013, forecasts suggested 
the market would reach $120 billion by 2018 (MarketsandMarkets 2013). And a report in 
late 2015 forecast the market will swell to $185 billion by 2020 (Global Industry Analysts 
2015). During this period, it’s expected that a significant percentage of all payment 
transactions will be validated using contextual information. 
 RICHER EXPERIENCES IN THE  RETAIL ENVIRONMENT 
 As people buy more goods online, retailers are seeking to entice shoppers into brick-
and-mortar stores by using technology to create richer, context-aware experiences. 
 Macy’s and some other big-name stores are already using beacons, which detect 
the smartphones of nearby shoppers and, if they have opted in, send them targeted 
offers or mobile games with gift-card prizes (Tode 2015). Brands including Kate 
Spade and Levi’s use smart display tables and shelves that sense when customers 
pick up a product and engage them with relevant videos and product information. 
The technology tracks every interaction, so stores can analyze shopper behavior and 
measure the impact on sales (Perch Interactive 2016). LEGO stores use augmented 
reality video screens to show kids what they can build with each LEGO box. The 
screens recognize each box and display a 3D image of a toy that can be created 
from it, blended into a real-time video of the child in the store. Canadian sports 
retailer Sport Chek’s flagship stores integrate hundreds of screens in displays up 
to 16 feet tall, using gesture, touch, and RFID to sense customer input and display 
customized interactive content. 
 As an Advertising Age column noted, technology may ultimately help transform the 
physical store into a venue for interactive experiences that increase brand affinity—
acting as an event space, gallery, help desk, or even a test kitchen. If that happens, 
online sales may work in tandem with, rather than as a substitute for, a physical 
store (Fulford 2015). 
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 These new technologies also introduce new risks, as I described in the discussion 
of emerging threats and vulnerabilities in Chapter  6 . The sensors and other new 
capabilities embedded into millions of intelligent new devices can be exploited for 
dangerous  purposes . Malicious individuals might be able to remotely access home 
security surveillance systems to determine when you’re not at home. Researchers have 
already demonstrated the ability to remotely control the brakes and other functions of 
an  Internet-enabled car . After remotely hijacking a Jeep Cherokee driven by a reporter, 
researcher Charlie Miller commented, “Right now I could do that to every [Chrysler] 
car in the United States on the Sprint network (Pagliery 2015).” The hack prompted Fiat 
Chrysler to recall 1.4 million vehicles to fix the issue (Greenberg 2015b). 
 As  security professionals , we may tend to focus obsessively on this darker side of 
the picture. Looking for threats and vulnerabilities is part of our role. We’ve seen that 
attackers find ways to exploit new technologies almost as soon as they appear. Analysis 
of emerging threats by many firms indicates that this trend will continue. As attackers 
adapt, we must adapt, too. Our role will be more important than ever. As more aspects 
of people’s daily lives are based on technology, it will become increasingly important to 
secure the technology. The Protect to Enable mission will expand accordingly; in fact, it is 
becoming a corporate social responsibility, as I will explain further in Chapter  9 . 
 The positive news is that new technologies can also be used to enhance security. 
As information risk becomes an even more high-profile concern, suppliers are building 
more security into their products and services. Devices will include a greater level of 
baseline security hardening to reduce the likelihood of compromise and minimize the 
impact. 
 Context-aware computing also introduces new privacy concerns. By definition, 
context-awareness involves taking advantage of information about the user to create 
personalized experiences. This makes it even more important to appropriately protect 
users’ information and privacy. A clear organizational commitment to privacy will be 
important to ensure this protection. A growing number of other organizations have 
formally committed to complying with a single set of privacy principles worldwide—
although this is becoming difficult due to the proliferation of localized privacy laws and 
the elimination of the EU safe harbor agreement (see Chapter  1 ). 
 An  organization’s privacy commitment must also extend to applications and 
systems. Suppliers are becoming increasingly aware of this, and some are already taking 
additional steps to ensure user data is collected anonymously. The new baseline security 
capabilities built into products, such as  hardware-enforced protection and  accelerated 
encryption , may also help enhance privacy by protecting user data. In addition, the 
information provided by sensors can be used to create  context-aware security . Today, 
some cars can automatically adjust seat, mirror, and pedal positions to suit different 
drivers. They adjust these settings when they detect the presence of the driver’s personal 
car key. In the future, as cars become more intelligent and include more sensors, they 
might identify the driver using a camera and microphone. If they don’t recognize the 
driver, they might disable the car and alert the owner via their built-in wireless Internet 
connection. Cars might include a maintenance mode that lets mechanics drive it while 
when it’s being serviced, but only within a radius of a few miles. Similarly, as I’ll discuss 
later in this chapter, the sensors in an enterprise-class device, such as a business laptop 
PC, could be used to prevent theft and help protect the information it contains. 
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 From the perspective of the  enterprise information security team, these emerging 
capabilities will allow increased trust in users and their devices. When we have a 
higher level of trust, we can provide the user with greater access to sensitive enterprise 
information and other resources. 
 I believe that this dynamic evaluation of trust is a key capability that new security 
architectures should include, as I discussed in Chapter  7 . Employees may want to access 
our systems from a variety of devices and locations, including personal smartphones and 
tablets as well as business PCs. When a user requests access to  enterprise systems , the 
architecture should dynamically calculate trust based on contextual information such as 
the user’s identity, the security features of the device they’re using, their physical location, 
and the resources they’re trying to access. The architecture then will decide whether to 
grant access and the level of access that should be allowed. As manufacturers increase the 
security capabilities in their devices, the model will be able to take this into account. We’ll 
have increased trust in a device, and we’ll be able to provide a correspondingly greater 
level of access. 
 In this chapter, I’ll take a closer look at some of the emerging security capabilities 
that we can expect in products and services. First, though, I’d like to set the stage by 
examining some of the key underlying trends that make these security capabilities both 
necessary and possible. 
 Internet of  Things 
 Many everyday objects are becoming more intelligent. They’re acquiring processors, 
sensors, software, and the ability to communicate. This trend is made possible by  Moore’s 
Law : processors and other hardware components continually become faster and less 
expensive, and, therefore, ubiquitous as a result. This accelerating trend is creating the 
Internet of Things, a massive expansion of the Internet as it swells to include billions of 
devices and household objects. Intelligent devices in cars, home electronics, and other 
“things” will far outnumber those in more conventional computing platforms and even 
those in mobile devices such as smartphones. Gartner, Inc. estimates that during 2016, 
5.5 million new “things” will be connected every day. Juniper Research expects 38.5 
billion connected devices by 2020 (Loechner 2015); Cisco expects an even higher number 
of 50 billion (Cisco Systems 2015b). 
 Gartner, Inc. (2011b) identifies several key technologies and capabilities contributing 
to this trend, including sensors, image recognition, and wireless payments using  near 
field communications ( NFC ) technology. Sensors that detect and communicate changes 
in their environment are being embedded not just in mobile devices, but in an increasing 
number of places and objects. Emerging applications will take advantage of this 
information. For example, camera-based image recognition technologies are expanding 
from mainly industrial applications to broad consumer and enterprise uses. These 
systems gather information about users and then analyze this information to personalize 
the user experience.  Wireless NFC , based on a communications standard analogous to 
the Radio Frequency Identification ( RFID )  technology used for product-tracking, lets 
users make payments by waving a mobile phone or smartwatch in front of a compatible 
reader. 
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 With technologies such as NFC, the concept of the Internet may broaden to include 
an even wider variety of “dumb” objects, like drink cans or fertilizer bags (Gartner 2011b). 
This trend will provide opportunities for innovations that were not previously possible. 
Today, items in stores may include 2D bar codes that can be read by smartphones. In 
the future, store items may include NFC on the packaging or shelf label allowing them to 
wirelessly identify themselves to nearby devices, such as a  shopper’s smartphone . The 
shopper will then be able to learn not only about the product, but also alternatives, and 
could even view cross-selling and up-selling suggestions. 
 Devices such as the  Nest Learning Thermostat have provided a glimpse of the future. 
This home heating controller is designed to be intuitive and simple to operate, replacing 
complex menus and instructions with a single big button and a dial. Users can remotely 
monitor and set the temperature from their smartphones, so they know the house will be 
warm by the time they get home. But perhaps the most interesting capability is that, as 
its name suggests, it can learn. The Nest monitors use of the heating system and attempts 
to learn the user’s preferences—when the heating is switched on and off, and the desired 
temperature. After studying the use patterns for a while, the Nest begins to predict and 
autonomously set the temperature and timing itself. Since Nest launched many other 
companies have followed suit with similar devices not only for home heating but also for 
other sensors and alarms, including water sensors, motion sensors, and do-it-yourself 
internet-based home security systems. 
 I believe that devices like this are early examples of a much larger trend. As 
the Internet of Things grows, more interactions will occur directly between devices, 
rather than between people and device. Devices and objects will interpret and act 
on information provided by other objects. This will enable much more intuitive and 
streamlined experiences in many different fields. Consider the following scenario, 
described by Plantronics CTO Joe Burton (2012). A doctor visits a patient in a hospital 
room. A smart device the doctor is wearing turns on the doctor’s workstation in the room, 
then authenticates the doctor to the patient management system, detects which patient 
is near the doctor, and pulls up the patient’s record. When the doctor leaves the room, the 
information accumulated during the visit is saved and the workstation powers down. 
 Consistent User Experience Across Devices 
 Users now demand the same quality of experience in the workplace that they’ve become 
accustomed to in their personal lives. This includes the ability to access information 
across a continuum of devices, including PCs, smartphones, and tablets. They expect 
to be able to move from one device to another. They also expect intuitive applications 
on all of these devices, with the application’s features tailored to the device’s size and 
capabilities. 
 IT therefore needs to provide users with a  consistent experience across devices and 
the ability to seamlessly transition between them. As enterprise information security 
professionals, we need to focus on the user experience and on enabling this broader 
range of devices while managing the risks. 
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 Cloud Computing 
 The cloud is as much a new business model as it is a technology shift. The ability to 
obtain flexible IT services on demand lets businesses operate more dynamically—quickly 
taking advantage of business opportunities and growing or shrinking infrastructure 
capacity to meet demand. Cloud services can also potentially reduce cost. 
 However, cloud computing can also add new security complexities and data-
protection concerns. Organizations may use multiple cloud providers, while also 
operating a private cloud for the most sensitive applications. Users need to be able to 
easily access services delivered from any of these multiple environments. From the 
enterprise perspective, we need to enable a seamless user experience while minimizing 
risk. This implies a federated model in which the user needs to log in only once; the 
user’s credentials can then be used to access multiple applications. However, this also 
means that an attacker may only need to gain access once in order to compromise several 
environments. 
 Big  Data Analytics 
 Businesses have quickly realized the value of analytical tools for real-time analysis of 
massive amounts of unstructured data. In the future, these analytic capabilities will 
increasingly be used to interpret data from sensors as well as from databases, social 
media, and other sources. The analysis of this information will then be used to create new 
personalized experiences, like the retail examples discussed in the “Richer Experiences in 
the Retail Environment” sidebar. 
 This analysis can also  be  integrated with existing enterprise systems to create 
sophisticated customer-focused services. Here’s a scenario described by Accenture 
(2012): a rental car company automatically detects when an accident with one of its cars 
has happened, initiates emergency services if needed, and issues a replacement rental 
car to meet the renter at the scene, greatly improving the chances of creating a loyal 
customer for life. 
 Artificial Intelligence 
 Artificial intelligence is rapidly maturing, and it’s now clear that AI will help all of us in 
a variety of ways, both in business and our personal lives. AI is already used to identify 
meaningful patterns in data for many purposes, including information security, and 
to understand and translate speech. AI will certainly play a role in self-driving cars. 
Over time, AI will become capable of taking on broader and greater responsibilities. 
As Alphabet Inc. executives Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen put it: “Eventually it will 
be possible to give a computer unstructured data—say, spreadsheets used to manage 
business records—and receive quality advice on improving operations.” (Schmidt and 
Cohen 2015) In our personal lives, perhaps we’ll have a helper like Jibo, a “social robot” 
that recognizes your face, converses with you, helps manage your calendar and basic 
tasks, and learns your preferences so it can adapt and help you better. 
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 Business Benefits and Risks 
 By now, it should be apparent that the richer experiences enabled by these capabilities 
are as important to businesses as they are to users. New,  context-aware experiences may 
attract customers and create new revenue. Furthermore, focusing on the user experience 
may be essential for business survival. If we don’t provide rich and appealing user 
experiences, customers may gravitate toward competitors that do. 
 Our challenge is to manage the risks associated with these new experiences. The 
good news is that new security capabilities are emerging to help us do so. 
 New Security Capabilities 
 The IT ecosystem is increasingly focusing on  building security into hardware, software, 
and services. We’ll all be able to take advantage of this security to protect users and the 
enterprise. I think of these capabilities as the equivalent of termite-resistant building 
materials used in construction. They may not prevent termite attacks altogether, but 
they can stop some of them and minimize the impact of others. For example, Dell is 
using technology from Cylance to protect the BIOS firmware in its business PCs. The 
technology is designed to check if systems are secure when users boot them up; after the 
PC boots, the software checks a hash of the BIOS against a known good version stored in 
a secure cloud. 
 Suppliers will need to frequently enhance these defenses to ensure they remain 
effective. As I noted in Irrefutable Law #6 in Chapter  1 , security controls operate in a 
dynamic environment in which attackers are constantly learning and adapting their 
approach. Unless the defenses also adapt, they will lose their effectiveness over time. 
 I expect the ecosystem will increasingly view these security features as a way 
to differentiate products to meet the needs of distinct categories of customers. As a 
parallel, think about how the auto and other consumer industries developed. Initially, 
manufacturers focused on getting the public to buy cars en masse. Accordingly, the focus 
was on mass-producing just a few models at the lowest cost. As Henry Ford famously 
said, "Any customer can have a car painted any color that he wants so long as it is black" 
(Ford and Crowther 1922). Ford’s  mass-production strategy was enormously successful 
in popularizing cars among the American public. By 1918, half of all cars in the United 
States were Model Ts (The Henry Ford Museum 2003). But once consumers became 
more familiar with cars, they started demanding models that met specific needs. As 
manufacturers responded, the industry began to develop the huge variety of models that 
we see today. 
 In the same way, suppliers will offer a range of products or services with differing 
levels of security, including higher-security versions for the most sensitive enterprise uses 
and less-secure versions for consumers. This trend has already been evident for some 
time in products such as servers and PCs, and we’re beginning to see it in cloud services. 
 In a closely connected trend, we’ll see increasing use of contextual information to 
improve security. Some of this context will be provided by the sensors built into devices, 
such as cameras and GPS receivers. In addition, analytical and monitoring tools will be 
able to gather valuable  contextual information from the environment. For example, they 
may examine databases containing information about users’ access history and other 
relevant data. 
CHAPTER 8 ■ LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: EMERGING SECURITY CAPABILITIES
124
 Baseline Security 
 A greater level of baseline,  hardware-enforced security features will be important in all 
categories of devices, from smartphones to full-featured PCs. These capabilities will 
protect the information on the device itself, and the information that is accessed from the 
device. They’ll enable greater trust in the device, and because of this trust we’ll be able 
to provide users of the device with access to more resources, as I described in Chapter  7 . 
The potential business benefits include increased user satisfaction and productivity. 
 I believe that these features will become particularly valuable as the Internet of 
Things takes shape. Many new, connected devices and objects won’t be powerful enough 
to run traditional software security controls. Do I expect the computers that control my 
car or my home to run full intrusion prevention systems or traditional antivirus suites? 
No, but it is possible to run lightweight AI-based agents that can determine good from 
bad in milliseconds. This capability has already been demonstrated: in the summer 
of 2015, Cylance showed its AI-based anti-malware agent running on a Raspberry Pi 
platform, which is based on the ARM processors that are in many appliances and other 
IoT devices (Bradley 2015). I also believe that many of these new devices should include 
protection that limits their functions to the desired purpose, reducing the risk that they 
could be successfully attacked and manipulated via the Internet or a wireless network. 
 For enterprise security, these baseline hardware security capabilities will provide 
help in key focus areas, including threat management, ID and access management, 
data protection, and remote monitoring. Some expected baseline capabilities include 
protected environments, encryption, hardware acceleration, enhanced recovery, and 
integration with security software, as described next. 
 Protected Environments 
 Increasingly, hardware will provide protection for essential functions and data in the form 
of trusted layers and execution environments. I think of this approach as analogous, at the 
hardware level, to the way organizations are implementing network security zones within an 
enterprise environment (as described in Chapter  7 ). The most valuable and critical functions 
receive the greatest protection, as well as increased monitoring and recovery capabilities. 
 Attackers have become increasingly adept at compromises using tools, such as 
rootkits, that operate at or below the operating system level, making them harder to detect 
and prevent by most traditional security applications. Implementing protection at the 
hardware level can help prevent compromise of firmware, operating systems, hypervisors, 
and other fundamental system components. Hardware-level protection can also help 
alert security professionals to attempted attacks and aid in system recovery . However, 
hardware-level protection must be designed, developed, and implemented correctly or 
it could actually do more harm than good, because compromise at this level can give 
attackers wide-ranging access to the software and data on the system. Concerns have 
already begun to surface and are growing. Researchers demonstrated the ability to hack 
the microcontroller inside flash cards, enabling the execution of code that can be used to 
perform a man–in-the-middle attack (Paganini 2014). Networking equipment supplier 
Juniper Networks found that its firewall operating system contained “unauthorized 
code” that surreptitiously decrypted virtual private network traffic (Goodin 2015). MIT 
researchers suggested there are weaknesses in the implementation of key provisioning 
for Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), a set of hardware instructions designed to 
improve security by sealing software into hardware-protected enclaves (Chirgwin 2016). 
CHAPTER 8 ■ LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: EMERGING SECURITY CAPABILITIES
125
 Encryption 
 Many organizations already use disk encryption to protect data against loss or theft. But 
in a world where devices are always on and always connected, traditional software-based 
hard disk encryption is not sufficient. New capabilities will make encryption an even more 
pervasive technology used to protect information throughout its life, both when it is stored 
and when it is transmitted. Devices will include self-encrypting drives that maximize 
protection while minimizing the performance impact; encrypted input-output will help 
protect data during communications. Capabilities that currently exist in larger systems, 
such as total memory encryption, will become common in PCs and other end-user devices. 
 Hardware Acceleration 
 There’s often a trade-off between security and performance. Controls, such as software-
based encryption and malware scans, certainly help increase protection, but the 
performance impact can also increase frustration for users, to such an extent that some 
may avoid using the security features altogether (see the discussion of control friction 
and the 9 Box of Controls in Chapter  7 ). Accelerating functions in hardware can shift the 
balance in favor of security by decreasing the impact, both on users and on enterprise 
systems. For example, complex calculations required by standard encryption algorithms 
can be accelerated using hardware instructions rather than executed entirely in software. 
 Enhanced Recovery 
 As I’ve discussed in previous chapters, we must assume that attempts to compromise 
are inevitable, despite our best efforts. As attacks become increasingly sophisticated, the 
ability to recover from compromises will become even more important. Future capabilities 
will help organizations recover from low-level attacks that target fundamental system 
components such as firmware or the BIOS. The system will be able to detect changes in 
these components, whether due to malicious attacks or accidental corruption. It will then 
be able to take steps to restore the components to a known good state, alerting users and 
the security team when necessary. Other anticipated recovery features include enhanced 
capabilities to revoke cryptographic keys to reduce the spread and impact of compromise . 
 AI-Based Security and Automation 
 AI-based security applications will play valuable roles in preventing attacks. Today, for 
example, Cylance uses AI-based agents to distinguish good from bad in milliseconds. 
These applications will be able to provide an even greater level of protection when they are 
integrated with hardware-based security, as exemplified by the Dell-Cylance BIOS protection 
agreement described earlier in this chapter. This kind of integration will enable software to 
more closely monitor the underlying hardware and firmware for attacks that might otherwise 
go undetected. For example, security software could use hardware features to detect 
symptoms, such as memory state changes, caused by specific types of attack. Companies 
are also researching better ways to authenticate users by employing behavioral biometrics: 
identifying users based on a combination of hard-to-duplicate characteristics such as they 
way they swipe characters on a smartphone or even how they walk when carrying the device. 
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 AI will be used more broadly over time to enable a greater level of automation in 
threat detection, prevention, and response. In the future, AI might be used to dynamically 
evaluate trust and the corresponding level of access that’s provided to a user (see the 
granular trust model in Chapter  7 ). 
 Context-Aware Security 
 The theme of context awareness underlies many of the rich user experiences described 
in this chapter. Context awareness can also enhance security: the same  sensors and 
analytical tools that help organizations create personalized experiences can also be used 
to mitigate risk. 
 In the home, TVs might be able to recognize when a child is watching, and show 
only appropriate channels. In supermarkets, cameras that are already used for physical 
security could help increase the efficiency of automated checkout stations. As I described, 
 image recognition technology can determine a shopper’s approximate age. By using this 
information, perhaps in conjunction with data from a scanned driver’s license, the system 
could help avoid the need for cashiers to manually approve alcohol sales, leading to faster 
checkouts for consumers and reduced costs for stores. 
 The sensors in  portable devices , such as mobile PCs and smartphones, may also be 
used to help protect against theft and unauthorized use. A simple case might utilize the 
device’s camera, microphone, and GPS receiver to help authenticate you as the device’s 
owner. If the user looks and sounds like you, and the PC is at your house, we have more 
confidence that the person using it is really the owner. 
 Additional technologies in portable devices, such as NFC, will allow more 
sophisticated examples of context-aware security. Devices will know when they’re no 
longer in proximity of their owner, and may enter a protected state to prevent data loss. If 
your phone is near your laptop, we have greater confidence that you are the user trying to 
access the information on the laptop. When your phone moves away, the laptop deduces 
that you have moved away, too, and begins to armor itself by locking the screen. As you 
move progressively farther away, the laptop first goes into standby to save power, and 
then begins encrypting its contents for protection. 
 The GPS receiver in a portable device can also be used to geofence the device and 
the data it contains. If the receiver detects that a PC has moved outside a specific area, 
the device could alert the owner and the enterprise support team. The same capabilities 
could help protect data whose movement is restricted by specific geography-related 
requirements such as export controls. The device could detect when it’s in a country 
subject to these controls, and encrypt the data it contains to protect it. 
 Cloud Security and Context Awareness 
 Cloud service providers recognize that some organizations are still reluctant to move 
critical data to external clouds due to security, regulatory, and privacy concerns. 
Suppliers have been working to add security capabilities designed to address these 
concerns. As they do so, we can expect more cloud services that are differentiated based 
on the level of trust they offer. 
CHAPTER 8 ■ LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: EMERGING SECURITY CAPABILITIES
127
 Suppliers might offer a “plain vanilla” cloud service for noncritical applications, 
along with a more expensive high-trust cloud service. Besides offering additional 
technical controls, secure clouds might include guarantees that the supplier will meet 
specific privacy and other data-protection regulatory requirements. This tiered strategy 
resembles the zoned approach to network security that organizations are implementing 
as part of their evolving security architecture. Zones that host critical applications are 
protected by a variety of controls, ranging from network segmentation and hardened 
virtualization host servers to additional monitoring. 
 In the future, client-aware cloud services will be able to tailor the access they provide 
based on the security capabilities of the client in order to mitigate risk. A fully managed 
device that includes hardware-based enterprise security features and a full software 
security suite may get more access than an unsecured personal device. At the same 
time, a cloud-aware client will be able to validate that the cloud service it is accessing is 
genuine, and that it offers the required level of security. 
 As businesses use a growing number of cloud services, security requirements 
become more complex. A single enterprise may use multiple external cloud services 
while also operating a private cloud and a traditional computing environment. It will be 
important to streamline access for users. We can expect more emphasis on technology 
that eliminates the need for users to authenticate to each individual service. 
 Security Analytics and Data  Protection 
 Security context can be provided not only by sensors, but also by analyzing information 
about the enterprise environment and the threat landscape. As attackers become 
stealthier, this analysis will become an increasingly important part of an organization’s 
defenses. Within the industry, many are moving toward the use of security analytics 
tools to analyze patterns of network traffic and system use. I expect to see increasingly 
sophisticated external services that analyze a broad range of information in order to 
thwart attacks. 
 As information is used on more devices outside the enterprise network perimeter, it 
will also be increasingly important to focus on controls that are integrated with the data 
itself. Many organizations are already protecting information with technologies such as 
enterprise rights management. In the future, these capabilities are likely to become more 
sophisticated and automated, allowing businesses to define policies that automatically 
store sensitive data in highly secured locations. 
 Conclusion 
 New technologies bring challenges, but they also bring opportunities for the CISO and for 
the organization overall. 
 The rich context-aware experiences that I’ve described in this chapter are entirely 
dependent on IT. To deliver these experiences, organizations will need to understand 
and manage the risks. As the experts in information risk, CISOs and other security 
professionals should have opportunities to become closely involved in the development 
and implementation of key business initiatives. This will result in a higher profile for the 
information risk and security team across the entire organization. 
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 To fully take advantage of these opportunities, CISOs will need broad business and 
people skills as well as a thorough knowledge of security controls. With the addition of 
these skills, I believe the role will evolve into the chief security and trust officer (CSTO), 
with broad responsibilities to enable the business through trusted infrastructure, 
applications, and business processes. As this transition occurs, the CSTO becomes the 
essential enterprise architect, with the IT organization becoming a peer or perhaps a 
subordinate. I’ll discuss these skills further in the next chapter. 
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 CHAPTER 9 
 Corporate Social 
Responsibility: The Ethics of 
Managing Information Risk 
 Be the change you wish to see in the world. 
 —Gandhi 
 In the past year or so, we have passed a major inflection point; it has become clear that 
almost every powered device will compute, communicate, and have an IP address. As 
technology becomes embedded into the fabric of our lives, exploits that take advantage 
of technology vulnerabilities may increasingly impact the well-being of almost everyone 
in society. This makes it particularly important that we apply the right ethical values to 
shape the way we design, develop, and implement these technologies.  
 The past few years have seen an escalating cycle of risk, with correspondingly 
greater impacts for businesses and individuals. If that trajectory continues as technology 
becomes more pervasive, the implications for society could be catastrophic. This 
means we should all, as security professionals, contemplate our ethical responsibilities 
not only to the organizations we work for, the customers we serve, and the company’s 
shareholders, but also to society. To put it another way, I believe that information security 
and privacy are issues of corporate social responsibility. 
 Yet even as it becomes even more important to consistently apply an ethical 
approach to managing information risk, business demands and other challenges can 
make it increasingly difficult to do so. Companies’ continuous efforts to drive growth and 
accelerate time to market translate into demand for faster implementation of internal 
systems and new technology-based products. At the same time, implementing effective 
security and privacy is becoming more difficult due to a more complex threat landscape 
and the expanding, fragmented regulatory environment. 
 These factors result in increasing pressure on technology and business professionals 
to take risky short cuts. In some cases, there may be clear conflicts between business 
priorities, such as the deadline for launching a new product, and “doing the right thing” 
in security and privacy terms. There are also many gray areas in which the right course 
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of action is not immediately clear; whether to expend resources on protection against a 
threat that’s still on the distant horizon, for example. I’ll explore these ethical dilemmas, 
and offer suggestions about how to find solutions to them, later in this chapter. 
 WHAT IS CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY?
 Definitions of corporate social responsibility typically focus on the idea that 
companies look beyond their profits and legal obligations to their broader role 
in society. A common theme is that a company should take into account the 
social, ethical, and environmental effects of its activities on its employees and the 
community around it. Here are three definitions that summarize some of the key 
concepts: 
 “The notion of companies looking beyond profits to their role in society is generally 
termed  corporate social responsibility (CSR)… It refers to a company linking 
itself with ethical values, transparency, employee relations, compliance with legal 
requirements, and overall respect for the communities in which they operate. It goes 
beyond the occasional community service action, however, as CSR is a corporate 
philosophy that drives strategic decision-making, partner selection, hiring practices, 
and, ultimately, brand development.” (McComb 2002) 
 “CSR is about businesses and other organizations going beyond the legal obligations 
to manage the impact they have on the environment and society. In particular, this 
could include how organizations interact with their employees, suppliers, customers, 
and the communities in which they operate, as well as the extent they attempt to 
protect the environment.” (Lea 2002) 
 “The continuing commitment by business to behave ethically and contribute to 
economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their 
families as well as of the local community and society at large.” (World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development 2007) 
 The Expanding  Scope of Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
 Despite the obvious societal implications of security and privacy risks, most companies 
don’t consider them to be CSR issues today. That may change over time, as public and 
corporate awareness of the risks continues to expand. Already, some major technology 
companies include descriptions of how they manage security, privacy, and business 
continuity in their CSR reports (see sidebar). That trend may spread as companies in 
other industries add more technology-based products and services. 
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 Consumer data protection is one area of information risk that is already widely 
treated as a CSR issue; it is even included in the International Standards Organization 
corporate social responsibility standard (ISO 26000). As Forrester Research analyst Heidi 
Shey put it, “It’s time to start thinking of protecting customer data as a corporate social 
responsibility, and not to check off boxes for compliance or a thing that must be done so 
you can avoid some nasty breach costs.” (Shey 2014). 
 In terms of the potential impact on society, security and privacy could be considered 
a digital extension of consumer safety, which companies have viewed as a CSR issue for 
many years. Furthermore, a quick review of the history of CSR shows that its scope has 
continually evolved and broadened to include new issues, typically as public awareness 
of those issues has increased. For example, it’s not so long ago that rivers and oceans were 
used not only as human sewage dumps but also as a convenient method for disposing of 
industrial waste; as late as 1969, one large river in Ohio was so polluted that it regularly 
caught fire. Yet today, discussions of environmental impacts are typical in CSR reports, 
and in the last few years have further evolved into a focus on climate change: in 2015, 82% 
of the world’s largest companies included data about carbon emissions in their reports 
(KPMG International 2015). 
 While early social-responsibility efforts were often philanthropic in nature (such as 
the funding for public libraries and education provided by Andrew Carnegie, founder of 
US Steel), corporate social responsibility reporting is now a mainstream business practice 
worldwide, undertaken by more than 90% of the world’s largest companies. 
 
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES THAT  TREAT INFORMATION 
RISK AS CSR
 Some large technology companies—including Cisco, Microsoft, and Intel—already 
position information risk areas such as security, privacy, and business continuity 
as corporate social responsibility items, and discuss them in their CSR reports. 
While the reports devote space to the companies’ achievements, they also 
describe corporate positions and principles on key issues such as data protection 
and transparency. Cisco’s 2015 CSR report, for example, notes the company’s 
commitment to produce a twice-yearly transparency report that includes data 
requests or demands for customer data received from law enforcement and national 
security agencies around the world (Cisco 2015). 
 Apple CEO Tim Cook has also spoken out about his company’s commitment to privacy 
and security, particularly when protecting user data. In a letter published on the 
company’s web site, he said: “We don’t “monetize” the information you store on your 
iPhone or in iCloud. And we don’t read your e-mail or your messages to get information 
to market to you.” Cook has argued vociferously that government should not have 
“back door” access to systems in order to thwart terrorism. “The reality is if you put a 
back door in, that back door's for everybody, for good guys and bad guys,” he said on 
CBS’ 60 Minutes (Rose 2015). "I don't believe that the tradeoff here is privacy versus 
national security. I think that's an overly simplistic view....we should have both.” 
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 The Evolution of Technology and Its Impact 
 To continue the exploration of why I believe security and privacy is a matter of corporate 
social responsibility, here’s another quick historical perspective, this time examining the 
emergence of information risk in the context of technology’s  evolution . 
 The  march of technology can be viewed as a succession of major waves, each lasting 
roughly 100 years (Rifkin 2013). Each wave has brought transformative benefits to society, 
but also significant challenges. The first wave, starting in the 1760s, included steam 
power, railways, and early factories as well as mass education and printing. The second 
wave, starting roughly in the 1860s and continuing well past the mid-1900s, included 
automobiles, electricity, mass production, and had an even bigger effect on society. Many 
of today’s corporate social responsibility issues today are the negative impacts of those 
first two waves of technology: examples are environmental impacts due to industrial 
production, mining, and oil drilling; factory working conditions; and the safety of mass-
produced items. 
 The third wave began in the 1960s, with early computers, but only really gained 
momentum in the 1990s. It includes the Internet and smart “things,” molecular biology 
and genetic engineering, and renewable energy. Arguably, this technology wave may 
have the broadest impact on society of any to date. Each previous wave lasted about 100 
years, so history suggests that we are far from reaching the crest. If this wave was a movie, 
we’d still be watching the opening credits. 
 If the opportunities presented by this third wave of technology are unparalleled, 
so are the risks to society. As I’ve argued in earlier chapters, as technology has spread 
exponentially, so have the threats and their impacts, while security controls have 
progressed at a more linear, incremental rate. As a result, there’s a continually growing 
gap between the capabilities of the controls and the impact of exploits. If the impact of 
security breaches seems big now, consider what the impact will be in 10, 20, or 50 years, 
when technology is even more pervasive throughout society.  
 Let’s consider some of the  potential impacts by reiterating two examples from 
Chapter 6. Last year, doctors for the first time inserted an artificial “eye” that enabled 
a blind person to see. The device is a retinal implant that receives signals from a video 
camera integrated into eyeglasses. Think ahead a few years, to a time when the implants 
are more sophisticated and can see in much higher resolution, and also include software 
to automatically interpret visual information, such as QR codes. Then imagine that a 
malicious actor creates a QR code that triggers the vision system to download malware. 
 Table 9-1.  The March of Technology 
 Version 1.0: 1760s  Version 2.0: 1860s  Version 3.0: 1990s 
 Steam and coal  Electric lights  The Internet 
 Railways  Communications  Molecular biology 
 Factories  Oil and gas  Renewable energy 
 Printing press  Mass production  “Smart” everything 
 Mass education  Automobiles 
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Like the PC malware that paralyzed Sony’s network in 2014, the malware then demands a 
ransom to re-enable the person’s vision. Now consider the example of a cement company 
that’s embedding sensors in the concrete mix used to build a new road, thus enabling 
local authorities to monitor traffic patterns and adjust signals to optimize the flow of 
vehicles. If the technology is not securely designed and implemented, all that a malicious 
person needs is the ability to execute malicious code, in order to falsify the traffic pattern 
in such a way that vehicles converge on the scene of a planned bomb attack. 
 Here’s example of a  real-life attack that unfortunately has already occurred. Over 
a four-day period during November 2008, members of an Islamic militant organization 
carried out a series of 12 coordinated shooting and bombing attacks across Mumbai. The 
attacks killed 164 people and wounded at least 308. Of the funding that enabled the attack, 
$2 million was raised by cyber crime (Goodman 2015). Think about how cyber crime 
works. Typically, the cybercrime cycle starts with stealing someone’s identity by installing 
malicious code on a device or by taking advantage of insecure behavior. So ask yourself: If I 
don’t keep my systems up to date, if I don’t design and implement them well, and educate 
employees to ensure they are security-aware, am I indirectly contributing to terrorism? 
The answer is that you might be—although in most cases, you won’t even know it. 
 As I discussed in Chapter 6, four  motivations account for the majority of serious 
exploits. Terrorism is one. The others are financial gain, warfare, and hacktivism. Each 
of these motivations can result in consequences with broad impacts across society: 
economic damage, loss of services, damage to morale, degradation of government 
services, and even human casualties. 
 As all companies become technology companies, the technology they create and 
deploy may be exposed to exploits with potential impact on society. The same applies, 
of course, to  public-sector organizations . Even though this idea is becoming more 
widely accepted, I occasionally encounter people who don’t believe it applies to their 
organization. Recently, as I fielded questions after giving a talk, an audience member 
commented that she was on the board of a local school and definitely didn’t see the 
school as a technology organization. “Does your school have a web site that parents and 
kids can use to view and update information?” I asked. She said yes. Then I asked “Does 
your school have an app that lets parents check whether their kids attend class?” No, 
she said, but the school was considering it. “Let’s imagine you have a web site that’s not 
well designed, and a malicious person decides to take advantage of that with a zero-day 
exploit,” I said. “He can compromise the site and the personal information of the parents 
and children that use it.” I added that if a school takes its technology to the next level by 
making an app available to parents or kids, it becomes even more clearly a technology 
supplier—and its security concerns now include product vulnerabilities. By the time 
I’d finished explaining, the audience member asked me if I could come and explain the 
issues to her board, which of course I agreed to do. 
 Here’s another school example, one that highlights the risks of failing to consider 
all the  ethical implications : A Pennsylvania school district issued laptops to some 
2,300 students, then remotely activated the laptops’ webcams—without informing the 
students—and used the webcams to secretly snap students at home, including in their 
bedrooms. Surveillance software on the laptops also tracked students’ chat logs and the 
web sites they visited, and then transmitted the data to servers, where school authorities 
reviewed and shared the information and in at least one case used it to discipline a 
student. Ultimately, the school district was forced to settle a class-action lawsuit that 
charged it had infringed on the students’ privacy rights (Bonus 2010). 
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 Maintaining Society’s  Trust 
 The third wave of technology offers opportunities for all organizations. But as the 
opportunities increase, so does the obligation to use technology responsibly. If we don’t 
implement appropriate security and privacy protection, consumers won’t trust the 
technology. If they don’t trust the technology, they will be reluctant to use it. This could 
potentially affect any company that supplies technology, and impact the growth of the 
digital economy overall. 
 Unfortunately, the privacy and security breaches that have hit the headlines in 
recent years have weakened that trust. As a result, consumers’ trust in technology sank 
last year in 70 percent of countries surveyed worldwide, according to the Edelman Trust 
Barometer, a widely used indicator of trust in business and government. Worse, the rapid 
implementation of new technologies that are changing everyday life, “from food to fuel 
to finance,” emerged as a new factor depressing trust overall. “By a two-to-one margin, 
respondents in all nations feel the new developments in business are going too fast and 
there is not adequate testing,” the study concluded (Edelman 2015). 
 Top US regulators have urged companies to expand and clarify their privacy efforts. 
Federal Communications Commission chairman Tom Wheeler said Internet service 
providers have a responsibility to make sure personal data is held securely and that 
companies are transparent about the data that’s being captured. “There's no question that 
with connected devices, data is becoming today's currency, and we need to be aware of 
the impact of that on consumers,” added Federal Trade Commission Chairwoman Edith 
Ramirez, noting a recent Pew Research Center survey found that 47% of Americans lacked 
confidence that they understand what companies will do with their personal information, 
and had mixed feelings about whether or not to share it (Hamblen 2016). The weakening 
of trust is a dangerous trend. Breaking someone’s trust is like crumpling up a perfect piece 
of paper: you can work to smooth it over, but it will never be the same again. 
 All organizations inevitably experience security and privacy issues. The question 
is how we respond to them. We can manage them in way that focuses on limiting our 
liability, or we can focus on doing the right thing for those who may be impacted. I 
recently participated in a peer group discussion that evolved into an intense debate on 
this very issue. The discussion was prompted by the major breaches that occurred in 
2014 and 2015; as a group, we discussed how we might jointly develop the concept of a 
“minimum standard of care” for security and privacy. Some people wanted to focus on 
limiting corporate liability for a breach. I believed that was the wrong goal, and argued 
that the primary focus should be on protecting our customers. My reasoning was that if 
we protected our customers, we would limit our liability as a natural consequence. But 
if we focused only on limiting liability, we would likely fail to take the necessary steps 
to protect our customers. Furthermore, I believed that the lens we chose to view the 
problem with would bias strategy and outcomes over the long term. A liability-focused 
standard would inevitably cause us to direct our efforts into seeking ways to limit our 
responsibility for the technology we create and manage. But if the standard focused on 
protecting the people who might be impacted, we would direct our efforts to thinking 
about how best to prevent, detect, and respond to risks.  
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 The Ethics of  Managing Information Risk 
 Some professions, such as certified public accountants and doctors, have ethical 
standards that may require them in some cases to break ranks with their organizations, 
such as if they see signs of illegal activities or financial manipulation. We expect doctors 
to be personally accountable for decisions that affect the lives of their patients, rather 
than simply deflecting responsibility for health decisions onto someone else within the 
organization. If CPAs or doctors fail to meet these professional and ethical  standards , they 
may lose their ability to practice. 
 Although there are many professional certifications for security and privacy 
professionals, there’s currently no equivalent to these medical or legal qualifications. 
Security and privacy managers are not automatically barred from practicing their trade if 
they fail to meet professional standards. However, we should all assume a similar level of 
personal accountability for our decisions—especially since our actions may have broader 
implications for society. Regrettably, not all of us do. Some security and privacy managers 
see their role as simply managing a risk register: they identify the risks, and perform the 
analysis and associated cost estimates, but then they take the register to other executives 
who then make the decisions. By doing so, they are abdicating responsibility and 
deflecting accountability onto someone else. 
 As the senior security and privacy professional within the organization, CSPOs 
should share responsibility for information risk decisions equally with the other 
corporate executives and the board. People are often told that they need to “think like 
an owner;” we need to act like an owner too. And ultimately, we need to think about our 
responsibility to all the people we work for—including customers and anyone else in 
society impacted by our actions—as well as our responsibility to the executives we report 
to. If you don’t think your manager is right, think hard about the possible consequences 
of not speaking out and where your responsibility ultimately lies. 
 The recent  events at automakers have shown all too clearly what can happen 
when corporate culture produces a system in which professionals are driven to behave 
unethically in order to meet business goals, or fail to take responsibility for their actions, 
while senior executives apparently remain ignorant. In the Volkswagen emissions-testing 
scandal, engineers included software specifically to deceive test equipment so that cars 
could meet the emissions targets required for sale in the US. An investigation into General 
Motors ignition-switch problems that caused at least 13 deaths described the “GM 
Salute,” in which employees sat in meetings, with their arms folded and pointing outward 
at others, as if to say that the responsibility lay with those other people, not with the 
employees (Maynard 2014). At both automakers, top executives said they were unaware 
of the actions of the lower-ranking employees who were directly involved in the issues. 
 In our daily lives, we encounter many situations in which we need not only to decide 
on the right course of action, but also to take responsibility for voicing our opinions so 
that they are considered by the company as a whole. Suppose that a business manager 
is proposing an action that’s legal but conflicts with our security values and approach 
to protecting customers’ information. Or imagine that implementing the right level 
of protection risks the target dates for a critical product launch. Or that failing to tell 
customers or suppliers about a potential vulnerability becomes the equivalent of a lie. 
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 In the book  Giving Voice to Values , author and educator Mary Gentile discusses 
the ethical dilemmas that many people face in businesses today. Her assumption, as 
she observes in the book, is that “in many if not most of the managerial and financial 
misbehaviors we have seen in the past, there were enough people who recognized the 
lapses in ethics and judgment to have stopped them. The problem was that they did not 
believe it was possible to do so.” Gentile then focuses on providing techniques to help 
people voice their concerns and take action at “those times and situations when we 
believe we know what is right and want to do it, but we experience external pressures—
from our boss, our colleagues, our customers—to do otherwise. As a result, we are not 
sure how to raise our concerns.” 
 
DISCLOSING  SECURITY ISSUES : A TALE OF TWO 
COMPANIES
 Questions about how to deal with the discovery and disclosure of security issues 
are likely to generate difficult ethical discussions for many companies. The following 
examples show how two companies dealt with security issues in very different ways. 
 In December 2015, networking vendor Juniper Networks disclosed that an internal 
code review had discovered “unauthorized code” in its firewall operating system that 
could allow hackers to gain administrative access and decrypt encrypted VPN traffic. 
The company said it had not received any reports of exploits using the vulnerability; 
it said it had released patches to fix the problem and urged customers to update 
their systems (Worrall 2015). This is a case in which a company appears to have 
managed a difficult issue well, in my opinion. It highlights the tough questions and 
discussions that companies face when managing potential security issues. How 
deeply do you test and review your code, knowing that the deeper you dig the more 
likely you are to find vulnerabilities? If you do find a problem, how do you handle it? 
Do you disclose it, quietly fix it, or even ignore it? Does your company have the right 
value structure to ensure that decisions reflect its responsibilities to customers and 
to society? 
 Now consider a contrasting example. In 2015, a vendor of dental practice-
management software agreed to pay $250,000 to settle US  Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) charges that it falsely advertised the level of encryption it 
provided to protect patient data (Federal Trade Commission 2016). According to the 
FTC, the company spent two years touting its “encryption capabilities” for protecting 
patient information and meeting “data protection regulations”—yet at the time, it 
was well aware that its software didn’t provide the encryption required by HIPAA. It 
seems clear that a company that makes deceptive claims of this kind lacks a value 
structure capable of ensuring ethical security and privacy decisions. 
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 The challenges described in  Giving Voice to Values probably seem familiar to many 
of us who are responsible for managing information risk (see sidebar article). First, how 
do we decide what is the ethical course of action? Then, how do we take action by voicing 
our opinions when it really matters? 
 One starting point is to define the organization’s critical security and privacy 
principles, which then can serve to guide our decisions. These principles should be 
derived from the organization’s corporate values. For example, a company that prioritizes 
customer service should also be committed to protecting customer information, and 
therefore its critical principles should include privacy by design. 
 We then need to think about how to focus the company on those principles: how 
we create the right language to express the principles to others, and how we enroll our 
organizations in principle-based decision making. We need to make security and privacy 
clearly visible in the decision-making process, not just within the information security 
organization but across the entire organization. That sends a message to everyone, 
including customers as well as people within the organization, that security and privacy 
are corporate priorities. By demonstrating our commitment to these principles, we can 
create trust in our organization and its technology. 
 We can use our security and privacy principles as a compass to guide us through the 
dilemmas we encounter. We can approach these dilemmas using the same framework 
that we apply to any source of information risk:  sense , interpret, and act (see Chapter 3).
•  Sense: Are changes on the way that that could conflict with our 
security and privacy principles? What is the dilemma that we will 
face? 
•  Interpret : Analyze the issue to determine the following: Can 
I make this decision? Which of our principles can guide my 
decision? Who do I need to talk to? What actions can I take, and 
what are the direct and indirect consequences of each? 
•  Act : Will my action align with the organization’s best interests? 
What about the interests of our customers, and of society in 
general? Will my action or lack of action create embarrassment 
for the company? Is my action practical? Who should I tell? 
 Conclusion 
 As we progress through the third wave of technology, and our reliance on technology 
expands even further, so does the potential societal impact of security and privacy issues. 
Our professional and ethical responsibilities require that we hold ourselves accountable 
for doing what we know is right. This is true today, and will be even more so in the future. 
This means that we will have to take career risks to make sure that security and privacy 
are appropriately handled within the organization, including ensuring that issues are 
discussed at board level. I’ll discuss how to do this in more detail in the next chapter on 
the 21st Century CISO. 
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 CHAPTER 10 
 The 21st Century CISO 
 Leadership is the art of mobilizing others to want to struggle for shared 
aspirations. 
 —Jim Kouzes and Barry Posner, 
The Leadership Challenge 
 The finance director sounded frustrated and exhausted. Our IT auditors had been 
trying to tell her about an obscure yet important data backup problem that affected SOX 
compliance. But her background was in accounting, not technology, and as the IT experts 
presented page after page of technical information elaborating the intricacies of backup 
processes, her eyes glazed over. The more they tried to explain by adding yet another 
layer of detail, the more confused and frustrated she became. 
 That’s when I thought of a solution. “Imagine,” I said, “we’ve got a passenger train 
running from station A to station B. That’s what our backups are like; they’re carrying data 
from our servers to tape.” 
 “We know the train arrived at station B, so we know the backup occurred,” I said. 
“But we don’t know how many passengers got on at station A, and we don’t know how 
many got off at station B. So we can’t definitively say we actually backed up all the 
information, and to comply with SOX, we need to be certain.” 
 The finance director sat up. For the first time since the start of the presentation, she 
seemed alert and engaged. And from that point on, we made progress. She asked how we 
planned to solve the problem, we briefly mentioned a couple of the possible solutions, 
and the meeting ended on an upbeat note. 
 My storytelling, using an off-the-cuff metaphor, succeeded where the more traditional 
approach had failed. It communicated a technical security issue in terms that a senior 
businessperson could understand and remember. And it illustrates one of the key skills of 
the 21st century CISO. We need to extend our reach outside the security organization to 
communicate with and influence people at all levels, from all backgrounds. 
 Chief Trust Officer 
 In this chapter, I’ll explain some of the skills and traits I believe CISOs need in order to 
fulfill their changing role. To set the stage, I’d like to step back for a moment and briefly 
recap the changing focus of information security overall. 
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 As I’ve discussed earlier in the book, every company is becoming a technology 
company. And as the potential impact of information risk expands, it is becoming 
essential to manage security and privacy as a corporate social responsibility. The CISO’s 
role should therefore expand to span the full breadth of information-related risks, as 
described in Chapter  1 . At many organizations, this is already happening. CISOs are 
taking on responsibility for privacy, regulatory compliance, and product and service 
security, in addition to more traditional IT security functions. 
 This is a huge opportunity for CISOs to step into a more valuable, high-profile role 
within the organization. The core skills of information security professionals—evaluating 
and mitigating risk—are as essential for mitigating new risks associated with product 
security, privacy, and regulatory compliance as they are for more traditional IT-related 
threats. But perhaps this broader role requires a different title that more accurately 
reflects the convergence of risk responsibilities, such as Chief Trust Officer or Chief 
Information Risk Officer. 
 Taking on a larger role requires a broader view and a corresponding set of skills. We 
need to communicate in terms that business people understand, and build relationships 
that enable us to influence people at all levels across the organization. We also need 
extensive management and leadership skills, both to operate at an executive level and to 
inspire our expanded risk and security team.  
 The ability to manage the full range of information-related risks is a necessity, 
not just for the CISO, but for the organization. If we do not step into a broader role, the 
organization must acquire these abilities elsewhere. Because of this, CISOs who do not 
adapt to this role run the risk of becoming irrelevant to the organization. Alternatively, 
these risk areas will be managed in a stove-piped, fragmented way, in which case the 
organization may never discuss the aggregation of risks and the controls necessary to 
manage them. If this occurs, organizations will certainly generate unmanaged risks to 
themselves, their customers, and to society. 
 Until recently, one of the CISO’s biggest challenges was obtaining funding for 
security initiatives. Today, due to the prevalence of large breaches, it’s often easier to find 
funding. But more funding doesn’t always lead to greater security or a better outcome for 
the organization. Sometimes the fear of breaches drives organizations to invest heavily in 
controls that generate a high degree of control friction, restricting users’ ability to do their 
jobs. For example, some organizations have installed controls that prevent users from 
downloading apps or files, or even accessing some web sites. These controls threaten 
to stifle users’ ability to innovate and hinder overall business velocity. Furthermore, 
determined users will find ways around the controls, such as using less-secure personal 
systems to access “forbidden” resources. 
 CISOs need business acumen to understand the impact of security controls on 
others in the organization. As I discussed earlier in the book, our approach to security 
architecture should start with an understanding of the 9 Box of Controls, including the 
friction that controls can generate. Business acumen is also necessary to communicate 
technical risks in language that nontechnical people in the business can grasp, and to 
understand that some risks are worth taking. Risk-taking is fundamental to business. 
Without it, no business value would be created. 
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 The  Z-Shaped Individual 
 If we don’t already have the skills required of the 21st century CISO, we need to acquire 
them. 
 To some extent, this trend parallels what is happening in most technology-related 
professions: IT professionals need to acquire business acumen as well as depth of IT 
knowledge. The concept of “T-shaped”  individuals has been widely used to describe the 
idea that IT professionals need to be able to provide value horizontally, across business 
groups in the organization, as well as vertically at all levels within IT. 
 This concept is useful, but it doesn’t fully encompass the skills of the 21st century 
CISO. The unique role of CISOs and other security professionals might be better 
represented as a “Z-shaped” individual, as shown in Figure  10-1 . Adding the third 
dimension of core security skills, such as risk assessment and understanding of controls, 
allows us to deliver value across the business and all areas of IT. 
 The 21st century CISO needs to understand business priorities and processes well 
enough to identify how security controls help or constrain the business. To gain this level 
of understanding, he or she has probably gained experience in areas that are central to 
the company’s business, which, of course, vary depending on the company’s core focus. 
For example, the CISO might previously have worked in manufacturing operations, 
services, or mergers and acquisitions. 
 The CISO needs technical knowledge too, although the depth of technical 
knowledge required remains a subject of intense debate among my peers. I’ve observed 
CISOs at smaller and less-complex organizations who feel they need deeper technical 
skills to do their jobs. This is not surprising. With much smaller security teams, CISOs at 
smaller companies may need to be more involved in day-to-day technical details as well 
as managing people. At larger and more complex organizations, CISOs are less likely to 
spend time delving into technical detail. 
 Figure 10-1.  The T-Shaped IT professional (left) and the Z-shaped CISO (right) 
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 However, all CISOs need to be able to understand enough about the technology to 
absorb the important issues and communicate these issues to other managers outside 
the security group. This means that our technical knowledge must be broad, ranging from 
devices to data centers. We need to know enough about devices, such as smartphones, 
PCs, tablets, and new evolving device types such as wearables, to understand the security 
implications as well as the benefits. At the other end of the scale, we need to know enough 
about data centers and physical access controls to understand and communicate the 
important security requirements and challenges. 
 Our core risk management and security skills provide the link that completes the “Z” 
by connecting technology and business. We understand how to assess and manage risk 
by applying procedural, technical, and physical controls to meet the organization’s legal, 
privacy, and security requirements. 
 Foundational Skills 
 Becoming a Z-shaped individual is the foundation for one of the 21st century CISO’s 
essential traits: establishing credibility across the organization. We must be credible 
in order to build trusted relationships with executives and specialists across the 
organization and to discuss the vast range of issues that affect the business. This 
credibility is built on the competence that comes from understanding the business and 
technology as well as possessing core security skills. By becoming Z–shaped, we will also 
be better positioned to influence risk management for the company’s product and service 
strategy, as opposed to having those risks managed independently by another group. 
 Our ability to influence the organization also springs from a clear mission. I use the 
term  centered to describe this. We can effectively present our case because we have a 
strong sense of purpose and a clear understanding of why the security group exists and 
what we are trying to achieve. 
 This idea returns us to the theme of this book: Protect to Enable. In our global 
economy, most companies operate in highly competitive markets. As the security 
organization, our mission is to enable the free flow of information and rapid 
implementation of new capabilities to ensure success and long-term competitive 
survival. Other CISOs may work at more risk-averse organizations, and therefore some 
aspects of their mission may differ. However, the mission always needs to be aligned with 
the organization’s business priorities. It is essential that this mission becomes a part of 
who we are and why we exist. It provides a sense of purpose that lends authenticity and 
consistency to our actions and helps us build credibility across the organization. 
 As we all know, security can be a particularly distracting profession, with a constant 
barrage of day-to-day emergencies and diversions. So we need a clear mission in order 
to retain a strong sense of direction. Like expert sailors, we can progress toward our goal 
amid the day-to-day distractions and diversions, making continual adjustments and 
corrections to stay on course as the winds shift. 
 We also need to retain a sense of curiosity. To engage with others, we need to be 
genuinely interested in what they do. This curiosity enables us to continue to learn, 
building on and broadening the competencies that then enhance our credibility. 
 Another major reason we need to be learners is to stay ahead of the enemy. Threat 
agents are always learning because they must. As new threats emerge, we put in place 
new controls. But once implemented, these controls tend to be static, while threat agents 
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are dynamic, coming up with new techniques to bypass the controls. Therefore, our 
thinking must also be dynamic, and we must continually learn in order to protect against 
ever-evolving threats. 
 Becoming a  Storyteller 
 We cannot influence people unless we communicate with them. And as the scope of 
information risk expands, we need to communicate with a wider range of people across 
the organization. 
 Communicating with people isn’t always easy, as most of us have discovered. If we 
start relaying technology details to those who aren’t technologists, we won’t capture their 
interest. In fact, we run the risk of doing the opposite, as I described in the example at the 
start of this chapter. 
 To communicate, CISOs must become chameleon-like, with the ability to blend 
into a variety of environments. We need enough knowledge of each business domain to 
be able to communicate with different groups using language they understand. And we 
need to discuss these subjects at different levels. A CFO may only want to hear a high-
level summary expressed in terms of financial impact and return, which is often not easy 
when discussing security investments targeting hard-to-quantify threats. Product group 
managers want to hear security issues expressed in terms that relate to sales, marketing, 
and operational efficiency. 
 I’ve found storytelling to be a powerful tool for communicating with diverse people 
across the organization. When I frame security issues as stories and images that people can 
understand, they relate better to the issues even if they lack a background in technology. 
 I like to tell stories using metaphors and analogies. They are easily remembered, 
and they translate complex subjects into simple terms everyone can understand. In fact, 
the metaphors I’ve used throughout this book, such as the perfect storm in Chapter  1 , 
the train backup in this chapter, and the roundabouts and traffic lights in Chapter  5 , have 
helped me communicate security issues to many people. To use yet another analogy, 
orchestra conductor Benjamin Zander said, “The conductor of the orchestra doesn’t 
make a sound. His power comes from awakening possibility in others.” (Zander and 
Zander 2000). In the same way, I believe the power of the CISO comes from awakening 
the awareness of risk among people across the organization. I use stories based on 
metaphors to create that awareness. 
 For example, employees often find it hard to understand the dangers of stealthy 
threats. This is because the threats are unobtrusive, concealing themselves so they can steal 
information over the long term. Users are usually not even aware that a problem exists on 
their system. They still associate malware with obvious, annoying symptoms such as screen 
messages and system crashes. So when we tell them we’ve detected dangerous software on 
their machine, they have a hard time believing that it matters. That is why we have to focus 
on prevention using low-friction controls. If we do not achieve this as a profession, we will 
perpetuate the worsening cycle of risk we are experiencing today. 
 To communicate the danger, and the need for effective preventative controls, I 
sometimes use the analogy of ants and termites. “Malware used to be like food-eating 
ants in the kitchen,” I explain. “You’d know when you had an infestation because you’d 
see ants crawling over the countertops and walls. Once you knew about them, you’d spray 
or set traps to eliminate them. 
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 “But today, threats are more like the termites that can live in your walls. You can’t see 
them, and you may not even know they are there. But they’re doing much more damage 
than ants ever did. In fact, they may be destroying the structural integrity of your house.” 
 I’ve found using analogies helps quickly drive home messages. People immediately 
understand that these invisible threats can undermine the structure of the computing 
environment, just as termites undermine houses. This makes them more likely to 
accept the next step, which is that we have to perform the digital equivalent of tenting 
their computer to eradicate the vermin, but without toxicity to users or the computing 
environment. 
 THE  NIST FRAMEWORK : A COMMON LANGUAGE 
FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
 To discuss information risk management across the organization, it’s helpful to use 
a common language that everyone, including non-technical people, can understand. 
I’ve found the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity 
Framework to be a helpful tool for communicating the issues. Development of the 
framework was triggered by a 2013 presidential executive order on improving the 
security of critical infrastructure. This led to a year-long private-sector–led effort to 
develop a voluntary how-to guide for organizations. Many companies contributed 
input about standards, best practices, and guidelines to that effort. I was one of the 
first security leaders among the Fortune 500 companies to engage the framework. 
 The framework creates a common taxonomy and terminology for managing risk, 
making it easier for security teams and others to communicate. It fosters collaboration. 
In addition, each organization can measure its risk management maturity level 
against the framework. As the framework is used by more people, including business 
executives, it may help to increase the overall understanding of information risk and 
how to manage it, which would be a good thing for all organizations. 
 Fear Is Junk  Food 
 Just as building trusted relationships is essential to influencing the organization, I also 
think we need to transcend the doom-and-gloom that can pervade discussions of 
security topics. 
 The security industry has a tendency to use fear to sell products. Unfortunately, this 
tendency reflects the fact that many people in the security industry profit from insecurity: 
their revenue grows when more breaches and other incidents occur. Internally, as 
security professionals, we sometimes share this tendency to use fear as a tool to obtain 
additional budget or other resources. Of course, security really is about scary things: 
threats, vulnerabilities, and risk. But focusing on fear as the primary motivator is like 
living on a diet of junk food. It may provide immediate gratification, and it’s somewhat 
addictive, but ultimately it’s not healthy for either the CISO or the rest of the organization. 
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 In the short term, fear can scare people into action and help drive funding for 
security projects. However, relying on fear alone can only work for so long. Eventually, it 
has the opposite effect. It causes the CISO to lose credibility. In fact, I think relying on fear 
may even contribute to the high rate of job turnover among CISOs. Those who rely too 
much on selling fear are snacking on an unhealthy diet, and eventually the organization 
realizes this and rejects them. 
 Ultimately, fear doesn’t work for other reasons too. Most people don’t want to listen 
to a continuous stream of negativity. If we are always seen as the source of negativity, we 
will lose our audience. If we are continually viewed as the group that says no, we will be 
ignored. People will bypass security restrictions in order to meet their business needs. 
 Even within the security organization, fear can become a gravitational force, a 
black hole drawing ever-increasing attention to the negative side of security issues and 
draining energy that should be directed to enabling the business. This is why we need 
to focus on solutions that deliver the three key benefits I discussed earlier in the book: a 
demonstrable and sustainable bend in the curve of risk; the ability to lower the total cost 
of controls; and low control friction to improve business velocity and the user experience. 
 Accentuating the Positive 
 So how do we take a more  positive approach ? By focusing on our mission, which is to 
Protect to Enable. This mission shifts the emphasis from the negative to the positive: how 
we can help the business achieve its goals by solving these information risk and security 
problems. It puts hope and optimism before the challenge. 
 This mission is aligned with the business. Rather than being antagonistic, it is based 
on common values. It sets an optimistic tone, and, in the long term, optimism is a far 
better motivator than pessimism. Threats may be frightening, but our goal is to see past 
the threats and identify the opportunities. To paraphrase the noted Stanford University 
behavioral scientist Chip Heath, there’s no problem that cannot be solved without a new 
framework. Therefore, if we can’t see a solution, we have the wrong framework. Protect 
to Enable provides a new framework. So does the 9 Box of Controls, with its focus on 
cost efficiency and control friction as well as effectiveness. These tools help us focus on 
finding solutions. 
 Imagine you’re invited to attend a meeting to discuss whether the company should 
start using a specific cloud-based business application from a new supplier. Clearly, this 
product introduces risks: it comes from an unfamiliar supplier, it’s accessed over the 
Internet, and it means sensitive data will be stored outside the enterprise. 
 A narrow security view might focus solely on minimizing the risk. However, this 
narrow view can lead to a Catch-22 situation, as discussed in Clayton Christensen’s 
book  The Innovator’s Dilemma (Harvard Business School Press 1997). Typically, it goes 
something like this. To minimize the risk, the organization initially restricts the use of a 
new technology. For example, the technology can only be used for low-risk data, or by a 
narrow segment of employees. The problem with this approach is that it also reduces the 
business benefit to the point that the benefit of the technology cannot justify the expense 
and effort of adopting it. So we reach an impasse. To make the technology a viable 
proposition, we need to be able to show a business benefit, but we can’t show a business 
benefit because we won’t allow viable use of the technology. 
CHAPTER 10 ■ THE 21ST CENTURY CISO
146
 Protect to Enable provides the new framework that frees us from the innovator’s 
dilemma. It allows us to focus on the opportunity and identify benefits that outweigh the 
risks. For example, introducing a new supplier increases competition for our existing 
suppliers, leading to future savings for our organization. This benefit aligns with the 
business and is one that everyone in the organization understands. Perhaps less intuitive, 
but equally important, the savings can be used to fund security controls to mitigate the 
risk of using the technology more widely. Now our benefit/risk equation has a positive 
result rather than a negative one. By enabling the technology to be used more widely, 
we realize bigger business benefits that outweigh the additional cost of controls. This 
example also underlines the need for CISOs to build business acumen that enables us to 
see the opportunity and how it can be used to overcome the challenge of funding security 
initiatives. 
 Let’s look at another example, this time from my experience at Intel in the days 
before I had defined our Protect to Enable mission. Several years ago, a highly damaging 
worm was discovered in our environment, requiring a significant emergency response 
from our team. Upon investigating, we traced the origin of the worm to an employee’s 
personal system. 
 Our immediate response was that of a stereotypical security group. We shut down 
this usage to eliminate the risk of future infections. We immediately tightened security 
policy to ensure only corporate-owned PCs could access the network, and we ruthlessly 
went through the environment and cut off access by any devices not managed by IT. 
 Our response was successful in the sense that it reduced the risk of infection. But it 
led to other risks we hadn’t foreseen. Eliminating personally owned PCs from the network 
meant we now needed to issue corporate PCs to contract employees. This meant that 
we had to provide more people with devices that allowed full access to the corporate 
environment. It also, of course, increased capital costs. The broader impact was that 
it eliminated the potential business benefits of letting people use their own personal 
devices for work.  
 Subsequently—driven largely by employee demand, as well as the massive 
proliferation of new consumer devices—we revisited this issue. This time, we examined 
it from the perspective of Protect to Enable. We looked at the business opportunities if 
we allowed personally owned systems on the network, and then how we could mitigate 
the risks. As I mentioned in Chapter  1 , we rapidly discovered that the business value 
is enormous. Helping employees communicate and collaborate at any time can drive 
significant productivity gains. It also helps make employees happy. They love using their 
personal smartphones, PCs, and tablets, and they appreciate that we enable them to do so. 
 These benefits easily outweigh the cost of the technology required to reduce the risk 
of allowing access by personal devices. True, some of this technology wasn’t available 
at the time we experienced the original security problem. But if we had focused on the 
opportunity first, perhaps we could have found ways to provide some level of access while 
mitigating the risk, and experienced at least some of the benefits we enjoy today.  
 Demonstrating the Reality of Risk 
 Of course, the security organization’s role still centers on  managing risk , which includes 
discussing the negative consequences of people’s actions. If we frame this discussion 
carefully, I believe we can inform without fearmongering. By describing possible 
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outcomes and solutions without using emotional language, in terms listeners can 
understand, we create a context in which the organization can make the decisions that 
are best for the business. 
 Even when we have to highlight unpleasant outcomes, we’re not fearmongering if 
our information is based clearly on reality. Here’s another example from my experiences 
at Intel. As our customers’ use of the Internet expanded, Intel’s marketing groups 
naturally wanted to expand their external online presence by creating new web sites. 
So we, as Intel’s information security group, began assessing the risks and the security 
controls required. Some of our marketing teams didn’t find this an appealing prospect. 
They needed to move quickly, with the freedom to communicate however they thought 
best, and they viewed security procedures as bureaucracy that slowed them down and 
hindered their ability to communicate with customers and partners. 
 What happened next was far more persuasive than any of our initial efforts to 
forestall potential problems. A few web sites were launched without rigorous quality 
control. Hackers found the weaknesses in these sites, but they didn’t crash the sites or 
steal information. Instead, they inserted links to porn sites. 
 When this unfortunate fact was discovered, it provided the leverage we needed to 
improve security procedures. I realized this was a case where a picture spoke a thousand 
words. So, to illustrate the impact, I simply showed the links to people within the 
company. This wasn’t fearmongering. It was simply demonstrating the real consequences 
of their actions on the brand. Everyone could understand the implied question: Do 
we want our brand to look like this? This ended, once and for all, any discussion about 
whether we needed to apply rigorous quality control to external web sites. 
 The CISO’s  Sixth Sense 
 In the book  Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking , author Malcolm Gladwell 
(Little, Brown & Co. 2005) describes an interesting experiment. Researchers asked 
subjects to play a game in which they could maximize their winnings by turning over 
cards from either of two decks. What the subjects didn’t know was that the decks were 
subtly stacked. They could win by selecting from one of the decks, but selecting from 
the other deck would ultimately lead to disaster. After about 80 cards, the subjects could 
explain the difference between the decks. But they had a hunch something was wrong 
much sooner, after only 50 cards. And they began showing signs of stress and changing 
their behavior even sooner, after only about 10 cards, long before they cognitively 
understood a difference existed. 
 As CISOs, we develop a sixth sense about security issues. Often, my instincts suggest 
a need to act or begin investigating a specific direction long before our group is able to 
fully understand or explain what is happening. This sixth sense is particularly relevant 
in the security realm, where our information is almost always imperfect or incomplete. 
When a threat strikes, we do not have time to conduct extensive research or wait for 
evidence to accumulate. Therefore, we need to act decisively based on imperfect 
information. 
 I think we develop this sixth sense from the diverse experiences and skills we’ve 
acquired during our careers. We can also foster this sixth sense by being aware. Some 
security professionals tend to be inwardly focused, looking only at the data and systems 
they need to protect. As described in Chapter  4 , I have directed my teams to try to be 
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more open and outward-looking, sharing information and seeking input from a variety 
of sources, including peers across our company and at other organizations. This can help 
CISOs spot early warning signals and correlate information to quickly identify threats. 
Like secret service agents scanning a crowd, our experience helps us spot anomalies, to 
see the signals and ignore the noise. 
 By identifying future risks early, we may be able to prevent them entirely, or at least 
minimize their impact. We may also reduce the overall effort needed to deal with the risk. 
Early action may avoid the need for emergency response and a potentially major cleanup 
effort. 
 Taking Action at the  Speed of Trust 
 A sixth sense is only of value if the organization can act on it quickly. This requires two 
things. First, we need the courage to take a leap of faith based on what we believe. This 
courage is rooted in the attributes I discussed earlier in this chapter, such as being 
centered and credible, with a clear sense of our mission. 
 The second requirement is that the organization responds quickly when we inform 
them about a security issue. This rapid response is only possible if we have established 
trusted relationships with people across the organization. Because of these relationships, 
the organization can act at the  Speed of Trust , as Stephen M. R. Covey describes it in 
the book of the same name (Free Press 2008). Faster, frictionless decisions are possible 
because people know, from experience, that our information is reliable and that our focus 
is on enabling rather than spreading fear. 
 The CISO as a  Leader 
 Above all, 21st century CISOs must become effective leaders who can inspire their teams 
to enable and protect the organization 
 Over the years, I’ve identified three essential themes I try to instill in my team and 
constantly reinforce in our day-to-day interactions. Our security team members must 
believe in our mission; they must feel they belong within the security group and the 
company as a whole; and they must feel they matter. 
 If I can make people feel that they believe, they belong, and they matter, they will 
tackle any challenge. As Kouzes and Posner put it in  The Leadership Challenge (Kouzes 
and Posner 2012), “leadership is the art of mobilizing others to want to struggle for 
shared aspirations.” If people understand the greater goal, it helps establish an emotional 
connection that guides their everyday actions. This is a key reason that I have thought so 
much about defining the mission, and that I have spent so much time helping the teams I 
have led to see how their jobs are connected to the business’s objectives and concerns. 
 For example, a typical  operational goal might be to patch all systems within a week 
of a new software release. This goal is more meaningful if we establish the links to the 
business using the  I believe, I belong, and I matter mantra: “I believe in the mission of 
Protect to Enable. If I'm not protecting to enable, the other employees at the organization 
I belong to cannot do their jobs effectively. The company doesn’t achieve its results, and 
the company doesn’t execute its vision. Patching systems quickly matters because it helps 
our users do their jobs, which in turn helps the business achieve its goals.” 
CHAPTER 10 ■ THE 21ST CENTURY CISO
149
 Learning from Other  Business Leaders 
 As leaders, we can learn a lot from how other business leaders work. Today, managers 
are moving away from command-and-control to a more collaborative approach that 
takes advantage of the diversity of employee ideas and strengths. I’m not talking about a 
consensus process, which can lead to endless debate and indecision. Rather, a leader’s 
goal is to ensure alignment to a common mission and accelerate decisions. Within this 
framework, differing viewpoints and debate spark creativity, generating new ideas and a 
productive tension that can drive results. 
 Because security can be frustrating, even daunting, it’s vital to find ways to help 
employees stay motivated. It’s important to help employees feel they are making 
progress, not just when they achieve major milestones, but in solving the smaller 
problems they face every day. A key study found that even small wins boost motivation, 
productivity, and creativity. In the  Harvard Business Review article describing the 
study, authors Teresa Amabile and Steven Kramer (2011) determined that the feeling 
of making progress is the most important contributor to an employee’s emotions, 
motivations, and perceptions. 
 Opportunities to lead occur continually, in every interaction with our teams, with 
other people in IT, and with business partners. The question we need to ask ourselves 
is whether we are seizing these opportunities to reinforce our mission and ultimately to 
help the organization achieve success.  
 In highly technical jobs and organizations, we have a tendency to focus on technical 
challenges while overlooking the “people factor.” I think it’s important to remember the 
need for personal connections, which foster the sense of belonging. When we know a 
little more about each other, we care more as a result. I think about this in my day-to-day 
interactions. If a team member is making a presentation, are we paying attention and 
asking thought-provoking questions, or are we distracted? And if so, do we think they will 
feel they belong? 
 When we meet with a team member to discuss their struggles with a project, are we 
helping them think through the issues and come up with solutions? Are we helping them 
believe they can overcome the challenges and that the results will matter to the company 
and to us? Or are we just taking them to task? Each interaction is an opportunity for 
coaching and helping employees improve their performance. 
 A final requirement of effective leadership is the ability to develop other leaders 
within the security group. Otherwise, the group’s strengths in managing risk for the 
business will last only as long as the current CISO’s tenure. By building competence in 
depth, the CISO can ensure that the organization delivers sustained performance over 
time. We will discuss this in more depth in the next chapter. 
 Table  10-1 shows research by executive-search firm Korn Ferry suggesting that 
cybersecurity leaders need a unique set of attributes, including the ability to think 
outside the box, dig deeply into issues, exercise judgment at board level, and be a credible 
business partner (Alexander and Cummings 2016). 
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 Table 10-1.  Attributes of Cybersecurity Leaders(Alexander and Cummings 2016) 
 Key Attributes for Cybersecurity Executives 
 Competence  Experience  Traits  Drivers 
 Strategic, global 
thinker (sees big 
picture) 
 Depth of technical 
experience 
 Learning agile (can 
adapt to the new 
and different) 
 Seeks high visibility 
and accountability 
roles 
 Thinks outside the 
box 




 Flexible  Strives to be agent 
of change (not agent 
of “no”) 
 Analytical (digs 
deeply into issues) 
 Has successfully 
handled security 
incidents in the past 
 Tolerance for 
ambiguity 
 Must “thread the 
needle to balance 
driving change with 
managing enterprise 
risk” 
 Possesses business 
savvy (understands 
how information 




 Pursues close 
engagement with 
business leaders 
(works to add 
business value) 
 Balances competing 
priorities 
 Bias for action 




 Attracts, builds, and 
leverages talent 
 
 Voicing Our  Values 
 Obviously leadership means taking responsibility. Yet some CISOs seem to forget this, 
at least occasionally. A typical situation goes something like this. The CISO warned of 
a security issue but couldn’t obtain the budget or resources to address it. So the CISO 
abdicated responsibility because someone else had made the decision not to fund 
a solution. I take a different view. I believe even if we disagree with the decision, we 
should do our best to voice our values. We need to articulate the potential impact to the 
organization, to our customers, and to society, as I discussed in Chapter  9 . 
 As partners in the organization’s strategy, we should commit to the decision and 
share full accountability and responsibility with our peers. Having said that, we also need 
to clearly express our personal values and stay true to our principles. Adhering to our 
values may mean taking career risks, as discussed in Chapter  9 . Therefore it is critical 
that we take the time to reflect on what our principles and values really are. This personal 
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journey, which we all need to take, adds another dimension to the Z-shaped individual, 
a dimension of values (Figure  10-2 ). As Mary Gentile, the author of  Giving Voice to Values 
(2010) , puts it, “We are more likely to voice our values if we have decided that the costs of 
not doing so, and the benefits of trying, are important enough to us that we would pursue 
them even though we cannot be certain of success in advance. In order to get to this place 
of clarity, we need to spend serious time thinking about our own identity, our personal 
and professional purpose, and our own definition of success and failure.” 
 Figure 10-2.  Another dimension of the  Z-shaped individual : the personal values that guide 
our actions 
 Discussing Information Risk at Board  Level 
 Clearly, corporate discussions of any topics that have such far-reaching potential impact 
on society should include participation by the executive board. Board awareness of 
security has increased somewhat due to the spate of well-publicized breaches. Yet 
surveys show that the majority of boards are still not aware of major security and privacy 
issues. A recent study found that only 32% of boards review security and privacy risks, and 
only 45% have any involvement in security strategy (PWC 2015). 
 In contrast, a significant number of security professionals believe that the CEO 
and executive boards are responsible to society for the sometimes disastrous impact of 
security and privacy issues. In another recent survey, one sixth of security professionals 
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said they advocate arrest and a prison sentence for the CEO or board members after a 
breach (Websense 2015). That seems to indicate that they feel their management is not 
taking the problem seriously enough, or perhaps even chooses to look the other way, and 
that they are concerned about the broader consequences to society. 
 Given the broad and ever-growing importance of security and privacy, boards need 
be much more involved in than they have been in the past. It is the CISO’s responsibility 
to bring important security and privacy issues to the board, and initiate a debate about 
the potential impacts of those issues and the right response. Even with the current 
heightened awareness of security issues, it may not be easy to get the board’s attention, 
because board members have so many other business issues to worry about. It can help 
to hone in on the handful of risks with the largest potential financial impact or other 
major implications such as damage to the company’s brand. Key areas for boards to 
consider include
•  Security and privacy strategy : Is it cohesive and complete? 
•  The security and privacy leadership : Do they act with a level 
of independence? Do they take ownership of issues, or do they 
simply manage a risk register? 
•  Incident response planning and drills : Do they occur? Are they 
integrated across the organization? 
•  “Tone from the top :” Is the executive team engaged? Do their 
actions match their words? 
•  Security and privacy governance : Does it have the appropriate 
decision-making structure, including the right level of “tension” 
between different stakeholders? Is it set up to ask the “high 
contrast” questions (as discussed in Chapter  2 )? 
 The CISO must take responsibility for determining which issues merit the board’s 
attention. That determination will depend on the potential impact of an exploit 
conducted against the company’s internal systems or technology-based products and 
services.  
 C-I-S-O ATTRIBUTES
 In this chapter, I have covered a range of abilities and characteristics that the 21st 
century CISO requires. Many of these probably sound familiar, but it’s all too easy 
to forget them amid the demands of hectic daily schedules. I’ve found a good way 
to remind myself of some of the key attributes is simply to look at my job title. The 
letters in CISO help me remember that we all need Character, Intuition, Skills, and 
Objectivity. So if you’re struggling to remember all the details in this chapter, just 
remember you’re a CISO. You need Character to ensure your actions demonstrate 
integrity; Intuition to anticipate what’s needed and act accordingly, taking risks when 
necessary; Skills that span business, technology, and a wide variety of risk areas; 
and Objectivity in order to avoid falling prey to fear-mongering. 
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 Conclusion 
 As the technology environment continues to evolve, many people believe we’re moving 
toward a future in which  organizations outsource much of the delivery of IT services. If 
this trend continues, what does it mean for the CISO? 
 In this view of the future, the organization shifts away from IT implementation to 
procurement and management of suppliers and services, while setting direction and 
establishing an overall IT architecture. 
 In addition to this, the organization will need to retain the core competency of the 
security group: the management of information risk. Essentially, organizations cannot 
outsource risk. We can hire companies to deliver our business systems, but we’re still 
responsible for compliance with regulations that affect our companies, such as SOX 
and HIPAA. And if a breach results in theft or leakage of personal information or critical 
intellectual property, we’re still responsible for reporting it. Furthermore, we still suffer 
the damage to our brand, even if the breach was due a failure of the supplier’s systems. 
As regulations proliferate and more and more personal information is stored in business 
systems, the risks can only increase. 
 Therefore the CISO’s abilities will remain essential, even if the job title changes. The 
organization must retain the management of information risk as a core competency. 
As CISOs, we are poised to continue providing that core competency as long as we can 
effectively work within this new environment by developing the abilities I’ve described 
in this chapter and throughout this book. These abilities enable us to work with others to 
support the Protect to Enable mission. 
 I’ll close this chapter with an excerpt from a speech by Teddy Roosevelt; the 
sentiments seem as relevant today as when he made the speech back in 1910. “It is not 
the critic who counts; not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, or 
where the doer of deeds could have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who 
is actually in the arena, whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood; who strives 
valiantly; who errs, who comes short again and again, because there is no effort without 
error and shortcoming; but who does actually strive to do the deeds; who knows great 
enthusiasms, the great devotions; who spends himself in a worthy cause; who at the best 
knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, and who at the worst, if he fails, at 
least fails while daring greatly, so that his place shall never be with those cold and timid 
souls who neither know victory nor defeat.” (Roosevelt 1910) 
 We need to be in the arena, and so do our teams. Our mission, as information 
security and privacy professionals, is a worthy cause. With our efforts to prevent harm to 
our organizations, our customers, and to society, we can ensure that tomorrow is better 
than today. 
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 CHAPTER 11 
 Performance Coaching 
 If your actions inspire others to dream more, learn more, do more, and 
become more, you are a leader. 
 —John Quincy Adams 
 Over the years I have attended and taught many management and leadership classes. 
I have also received and written countless performance reviews. I have overseen the 
ratings and reviews for literally thousands of employees, starting when I ran a call center 
for a large retailer back in the late 80s, before I attended graduate school. One thing that is 
clear to me, after so many years participating in these annual and semi-annual corporate 
rituals, is that there is the potential for considerable ambiguity, particularly when 
assessing soft skills, those that cannot be measured using hard metrics such as the ability 
to meet deadlines or deliver revenue commitments. 
 This ambiguity makes it hard for employees to understand how to meet their 
manager’s expectations. It makes it hard for them to understand the factors that may 
be limiting their progress from a junior player in the organization to a more senior role. 
I believe this ambiguity can be clarified, although there will probably always be some 
qualitative differences in perspective between employee and manager, and even among 
different managers. 
 For these soft skills, I believe performance  coaching needs to be emphasized 
over performance  management . This is because at many organizations, performance 
management focuses primarily on promoting the fittest and eliminating the weak. The 
process looks at who is getting the best ratings and who is getting the worst. Managers 
then work to remove the lowest performers from the organization. This selection process 
is a natural cycle, and one that should continue to play a role. However, I believe that 
coaching can yield better long-term results, both for individuals and for the organization. 
Coaching focuses on helping everyone in the organization, including ourselves, reach 
their full potential. The ultimate goal is to create a high-performance organization in 
which everyone performs to the utmost of his or her ability. 
 To effectively coach people, we need to be able to  define the soft skills that are 
required at each level of the progression from entry-level employee to executive. Then 
we can coach them about how to acquire these skills and move up the organization. The 
tables in this chapter are intended to provide those definitions, to provide some clarity 
in these areas of potential ambiguity. They are based on tables that I have used, adapted, 
tested, and refined over many years in a wide variety of roles. Although I created the 
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tables for my own employees, the skills listed in the tables are not specific to information 
risk professionals; they may be equally applicable to employees in other disciplines. 
 The  soft skills in the tables generally describe  how people work, which can be almost 
as important to the organization as  what they do. How people behave and communicate 
affects not only their own ability to achieve goals but also the performance of those 
around them. An individual contributor who interacts poorly with others may impair 
the performance of his or her team, and cause interpersonal problems that the team’s 
manager has to spend time fixing. A senior manager who lacks these soft skills can have 
an even broader impact, hindering the performance of the organization. 
 I have published older versions of these tables to my employees, in the belief that 
feedback should be multi-directional and that leaders as well as employees should be 
measured using the same publicly available criteria. I have also shared these tables with 
industry peers. I am providing them in this book in the hope that they will be beneficial 
to others, and that they will generate comments and feedback that I can use to improve 
future iterations of this living document. 
 How to Use the  Tables 
 Each of the 11 tables in this chapter focuses on a specific area of soft skills, such as 
initiative, commitment, professionalism, or communication. Each table follows the same 
format, with five columns representing the skills required at progressively higher levels 
of the organization, from junior employees to emerging executives. The leftmost two 
columns represent individual contributors: entry-level employees and more seasoned 
intermediate professionals. The rightmost three columns represent increasingly senior 
management positions: a line manager responsible for a team; a senior manager who 
may be responsible for multiple teams, each headed by a line manager; and a leader who 
is responsible for an entire information risk organization and should be able to work 
directly with the company’s board and top executives. 
 As one might expect when discussing soft skills, this is not an exact science. 
The columns show a progression, but they do not represent a precise scale, and there is 
overlap in some areas. An implicit assumption throughout the tables is that someone 
in a more senior role has already acquired the skills needed in less-senior positions 
(i.e. in the columns farther to the left). The skills required at more junior levels tend to 
be more narrowly defined and constrained; those required at more senior levels tend to 
be broader in scope, with more far-reaching impact. For these reasons, the tables may 
be easiest to absorb by reading down the columns (to see all the skills for each role) 
rather than across the rows. 
 Over the years, I have used these tables in various ways. I have used them to help 
employees understand where they need to enhance their skills and abilities if they want 
to move up to more senior positions. I’ve also used them to help employees self-assess. 
Here are some examples of ways to use the tables in everyday  work situations :
•  An employee believes he or she should be promoted to a more 
senior position. You ask them to assess their own skills in each 
area. You also do your own assessment of their skills. Then the 
two of you discuss any differences between those assessments, 
and pinpoint areas that the employee should work on in order to 
acquire the skills needed for a higher-level position. 
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•  You provide an entry-level employee, enthusiastic but fresh out 
of college, with a roadmap of the skills they’ll need to acquire if 
they want to progress to VP level in the future. This gives them a 
practical tool that they can use to guide their personal and career 
development.  
•  You use the tables to identify your own Achilles’ heel, the weak 
spot that hinders your progression to an executive level. You 
notice that even though your skills mostly match those in the 
Emerging Executive column, the skills in a few areas correspond 
to those that you’d expect in a more junior manager. Those are 
skills that you need to improve. 
•  During a coaching session with an employee, you count roughly 
how many of their skills are already at the next most senior level, 
the next column in the table. If 80% of their skills match, they may 
be ready to move up. If there’s only a 20% match, they need to 
work on bringing the rest of their skills up to scratch. 
 The tables cover the following areas: independence and initiative, efficiency and 
effectiveness, commitment, professionalism, discipline, teamwork, problem-solving, 
communication skills, and goal-setting. 
 Independence and Initiative 
 This category, as its name suggests, is all about someone’s ability to act independently and 
take the initiative. As you’d expect, the expectations increase dramatically as one progresses 
up the organization. An entry-level employee may require very specific direction for each 
new task. A more experienced employee (Intermediate) should be able to define action 
plans and complete small projects with minimal supervision. A line manager should take 
responsibility for leading his or her team. An emerging executive can deal with tough issues 
at executive level, and take responsibility for risky independent decisions that he or she 
believes are in the best interest of the organization. See Table  11-1 .
 Table 11-1.  Independence and Initiative 
 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 
 Takes direction 







with a specific 
charter 
 Embraces role 
as manager 
to lead his/


















for the outcome 
(continued)
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 Deals with 
tough issues, 
with no “air 





and resolves or 
escalates 
 Shapes problem 
statements and 
defines action 
plan to complete 
assignments 
 Holds self 
accountable for 
work he or she 
doesn’t directly 
control 
 Can foresee and 
take action on 
problems that 
do not yet exist 


















if it is outside 








 Seeks buy-in 
from manager on 
workload timing 
and prioritization 







 Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 Efficiency and effectiveness are both important, related skills. An efficient employee 
works quickly and uses fewer resources. An effective employee is highly productive. A 
company that combines effectiveness and efficiency achieves better results faster, using 
fewer resources. Table  11-2 shows the progression from an entry-level employee’s ability 
to follow efficient processes to a manager’s ability to manage the resources of a group or 
an entire organization.
Table 11-1. (continued) 
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 Table 11-2.  Efficiency and Effectiveness 
 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 











gets results by 
working through 








tradeoffs for the 
organization 
 Recognizes 
that what you 
say “no” to is as 
vital for driving 
organizational 
efficiency as 



































calm and in 










items and issues 
quickly 























her own actions, 
that people are 
rewarded for 
results, not hours 
worked 
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 Commitment 
 Commitment reflects someone’s loyalty to the organization and their willingness 
to devote time and energy to the cause. In an entry-level employee, commitment is 
demonstrated by personal work ethic and willingness to take on more work. As people 
move up the organization, they demonstrate commitment by taking ownership of bigger 
issues and focusing on driving the best outcome for the organization. See Table  11-3 .
 Table 11-3.  Commitment 










 Drives issues for 








 Becomes a 
role model, 
demonstrating 
strong sense of 
“company first” 
with the right 
corporate social 
responsibility 













best for the 
department 
 Demonstrates 




the success of 
all employees 























creating a good 
home life as 




never stops and 
that we all need 
to continually 
learn in order to 
improve 




asks only for 
what is needed 
 Knows when to 
quit on a losing 
decision but 
willing to risk 
self to do the 
right  thing 
 Subordinates 
ego to the needs 
of others and of 
the company 
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 Professionalism 
 Professionalism is the extent to which someone demonstrates the attitudes, skills, and 
methods required to execute their professional role. For an entry-level employee, this 
includes adhering to established company policies. For senior managers, it involves 
demonstrating broader and deeper adoption of the company’s values and principles. See 
Table  11-4 .
 Table 11-4.  Professionalism 
 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 
 Demonstrates 
pride in his/her 
craft 














code of conduct, 
values, and 
principles 




















 Holds self 
accountable 
























and coaching to 
grow into a role 
model 
 Discipline  
 Discipline is the ability to remain focused and execute consistently despite the many 
distractions of everyday working life. As employees rise to higher-level positions, the 
distractions and demands increase, requiring greater focus and discipline. See Table  11-5 .
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 Table 11-5.  Discipline 
 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 
 Approaches 







 Stays on point, 




























the value of 
“silver bullets” 





























 Individuals must be able to recognize the need to work with others as a team, share 
expertise, and take on suitable team roles. Managers need to create, inspire, and lead 
teams, utilizing each member’s talents in the best way. See Table  11-6 .
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 Table 11-6.  Teamwork 
























teams to solve 
broad, long-term 
problems 
 Requires some 
coaching on 
appropriate 

















 Becomes a key 
player within the 
executive team 
 Actively engages 
team members 
and others to 
generate win-
win  solution 
 Inspires teams 





when a team 
needs course 
correction 
 Willing to 
make personal 
sacrifices for the 
sake of the team 
 Problem-Solving 
 Problem-solving is an important skill for any information risk management professional. 
Individual contributors need to be able to analyze and solve problems. Managers need to 
help their teams solve problems and focus on broader issues including those that involve 
other organizations. See Table  11-7 .
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 Table 11-7.  Problem-solving 
























 Drives analysis 




















































 Good  communication helps organizations thrive. It is essential in almost any role, from 
entry-level team members who must communicate with their colleagues and managers 
to executives who must communicate messages to the entire organization. Because 
communications skills are so important, I’ve divided them into three areas, each with its 
own table: listening, style, and clarity. 
 Listening 
 Communication starts with  listening.  For junior employees, the ability to listen helps 
create a clear understanding of what’s required. More senior employees actively solicit 
multiple viewpoints, listen for the meaning behind the words, and intercept emotional 
outpourings that can overwhelm a situation. See Table  11-8 .
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 Table 11-8.  Communication Skills: Listening 




 Listens to 
the broader 
meaning of 
what is being 






about how to 
respond 







 Finds the 
practical 
solution amid 
the noise from 
team members 
and executives 
 Makes listening 













 Seeks others’ 
perspectives 






 Steps back 
during debates 
and identifies 
the key issues 






 direction  







to expand the 







in others that 
their message 



























to ensure truth 
and consistency 
 Knows when it 
is better to listen 
than to talk 
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 Style 
 How you communicate can be as important as  what you communicate. Each person’s 
communication style should develop to match their role as they progress through the 
organization. See Table  11-9 .
 Table 11-9.  Communication Skills: Style 
























and polish in 
 communications  








 Detects when 
someone is 
trying to direct 
them in a 
conversation 
and can follow 
as opposed to 




















do not avoid 
working with 
this person 
 Recognizes and 














when he or she 
doesn’t know 
the answer; can 
bluff but remain 
directionally 
correct or say “I 
don’t know, but 
I’ll find out” 
 Can make and 
communicate 
decisions on 








 Says the right 
thing at the right 
time 
 Creates and 
delivers “state 
of the union 
addresses” 
and “one voice 
responses” 
for medium-
sized and large 
organizations 
(continued)
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 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 
  Knows when 
to tell (give 
direction) 
versus lead, 
and does both 
things well 
 Clarity 
 Clear communication helps ensure that information and ideas are accurately shared 
throughout the organization. Experienced staff should be able to summarize data and 
create clarity from a confusing mass of information. Senior managers create consistent 
and clear messages for diverse audiences. See Table  11-10 .
 Table 11-10.  Communication Skills: Clarity 





 Focuses on 
and highlights 
key points 
 Tells the story, 
not the facts; 
delivers the core 
meaning and the 
answer (what 
actions to take) 
when appropriate 




or links them 
into a larger, 
more meaningful 
message 
 Sends clear 
and consistent 








 Remains clear 
about the goal 
and does not 
meander—
stays on point 
 Draws summary 
conclusions from 






scope of  material 









areas that need 
clarity, and 










 Brings clarity 
to complex 
situations; 
asks the right 
questions to lead 
the conversation 
to results, and 
avoids stating 





number of words 
to express a point 




who may have 
opposing 
interests 
Table 11-9. (continued) 
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 Entry-level  Intermediate  Line Manager  Senior Manager  Leader/Emerging 
Executive 
 Keeps work 
neat and well 
organized 
 Is aware when 
he or she has 
confused senior 
management 




 All experienced staff should be able  to  identify and set goals, from line managers setting 
goals for their team to leaders defining the organization’s mission. See Table  11-11 .
 Table 11-11.  Goal-Setting 











 Set goals for team; 
ensures goals 
are clear and 
stated in terms of 
measurable results 
 Sets strategic as 






data to support 
recommended 
goals 





ability to set goals 
when starting 
with a blank sheet 
 Challenges 
self, staff, and 







 Provides a degree 
of focus on 
strategic issues; 
demonstrates 
vision in areas of 
expertise 






and raise the  bar 
 Can drive 
consensus on 
vision 
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 Conclusion 
 I believe that performance coaching focused on soft skills can help everyone in 
the organization achieve their full potential, and thus contribute to the creation of a 
high-performance organization. I’d like to conclude by examining what makes a manager 
an effective performance coach. A good performance  coach 
•  Develops and mentors managers and other employees, managing 
people to higher expectations and greater results. 
•  Stretches others and themselves to achieve beyond the norm, and 
rejects mediocrity. 
•  Creates more key players than he or she consumes, becoming a 
net developer of people for the organization. 
•  Holds people accountable for results and coaches them to 
achieve those results. 
•  Distinguishes motion from progress, and separates the means 
from the end. 
•  Responds positively to feedback about his or her own behavior as 
a manager or individual. 
•  Is sought out to provide performance coaching to senior players 
who report to other managers. 
•  Handles tough conversations with employees about their 
behavior or performance crisply, without creating a litigation risk. 
•  Saves senior players from self-destructing or falling short of their 
potential. 
•  Demonstrates empathy and can save employees who are 
struggling due to work-related or personal reasons and might 
otherwise leave the organization. 
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